Daily Report

Central Eurasia

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CONTENTS

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

Georgia, Abkhazia Fail To Reach Accord at Geneva Talks *[ITAR-TASS]* 1
Border River Islands Not To Be Handed Over to PRC *[IZVESTIYA 25 Feb]* 1

INTERREGIONAL AFFAIRS

Belarus Defense Minister Attends CIS Meeting *[Minsk Radio]* 2
Defense Ministers Agree on Tajik Border *[INTERFAX]* 2
Defense Ministers Meeting Ends *[ITAR-TASS]* 2
ITAR-TASS Carries Press Review for 26 Feb 2

RUSSIA INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

U.S. Urged Not To Be 'Hypocritical' on Ames Case *[INTERFAX]* 4
Diplomat on Upcoming Meeting in U.S., Ames *[ITAR-TASS]* 4
Intelligence Staffers on CIA Delegation in Moscow *[ITAR-TASS]* 4
Delegation Went Home 'Empty-Handed' *[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA 26 Feb]* 5
Embassy Adviser Lysenko Expelled From United States *[ITAR-TASS]* 5
Russian Embassy Has 'No Comment' *[ITAR-TASS]* 5
Ministry Denies Knowledge of Expulsion *[Radio Rossii]* 6
Spokesman Says No Lysenko-Ames Link *[ITAR-TASS]* 6
'CIA Agent' Persona Non Grata *[ITAR-TASS]* 6
Kozyrev Comments on Ames Case 'Provocation' *[Moscow TV]* 6
General Says Ames 'Was of Benefit for Russia' *[ITAR-TASS]* 6
Deputy Foreign Minister Mamedov on Ames Case *[ITAR-TASS]* 7
General Staff Has 'No Information' on Ames Links *[ITAR-TASS]* 7
High-Level Reaction to Ames Case Viewed *[IZVESTIYA 25 Feb]* 7
Russia Could Retaliate Over Ames Case *[IZVESTIYA 25 Feb]* 8
Motives for U.S. 'Furor' Over Ames Case Pondered *[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 25 Feb]* 9
'Furor' Continues *[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 26 Feb]* 9
Ames Affair Shows Intelligence Spending Pays *[TRUD 26 Feb]* 10
Deputies' Visit to U.S. Unaffected by Ames Case *[ITAR-TASS]* 11
More on Deputies' Visit *[ITAR-TASS]* 11
Deputy Defense Minister on U.S.-Russian Joint Exercises *[Moscow International]* 12
Kozyrev, Zlenko Agree To Boost Bosnia Political Settlement *[ITAR-TASS]* 12
Kozyrev on Settlement *[Moscow TV]* 12
Churkin Against Air Strikes on Mostar, Tuzla *[INTERFAX]* 13
Seeks More Precise Stance *[ITAR-TASS]* 13
Favors Strong Foreign Policy *[ITAR-TASS]* 13
Grants Interview on Bosnia *[Moscow TV]* 13
Further Churkin Comment *[Moscow Radio]* 14
Comments on Follow-Up to Bosnia Success *[KOMMERSANT-DAILY 26 Feb]* 16
Lauds Yeltsin's Bosnia Initiative *[IZVESTIYA 26 Feb]* 17
Foreign Ministry 'Closely Analyzing' Bosnia *[INTERFAX]* 17
Army Chief on Tasks Facing New Contingent in Bosnia *[ITAR-TASS]* 18
New Contingent To Arrive in March *[Radio Rossii]* 18
KRASNAYA ZVEZDA on 'Provocations' in Bosnia *[25 Feb]* 18
Foreign Ministry Condemns Violence in Hebron *[ITAR-TASS]* 19
Kozyrev Expresses Condolences to 'Arafat *[ITAR-TASS]* 19
Defense Minister Grachev Arrives in Norway *[ITAR-TASS]* 19
Comments on European Security *[Moscow TV]* 20
Soskovets in Norway, Discusses Oil *[ITAR-TASS]* 20

RUSSIA NATIONAL AFFAIRS

Political Issues

Yeltsin Says Pardon 'Presidential Prerogative' *[ITAR-TASS]* 21
Sends Letter to State Duma *[ITAR-TASS]* 21
Amnesty Suspension 'Not Legitimate' *[INTERFAX]* 21
Further Reaction to Duma Amesty Decision Reported 21
Legal Aspects Need Clarification *[ITAR-TASS]* 21
Amnesty Not in Violation of Law *[ITAR-TASS]* 22
Further Duma Council Comments *[ITAR-TASS]* 22
Poltoranin Terms Decision 'Thoughtless' *[ITAR-TASS]* 22
Barannikov Welcomes Amnesty *[ITAR-TASS]* 23
Gorbachev Says Decision Premature *[INTERFAX]* 23
Democratic Russia Denounces Decision *[INTERFAX]* 23
Chubays: Amnesty Absolves 'Murderers' *[Moscow Radio]* 24
Lysenko: Amnesty 'Destabilizing Factor' *[INTERFAX]* 24
Rybkin Says Consultations Needed *[ITAR-TASS]* 24
People's Party Urges Court Inquiry *[INTERFAX]* 25
Popov Accuses Yeltsin of 'Inaction' *[INTERFAX]* 25
Legal Status of Decision Analyzed *[ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI 26 Feb]* 25
Khasbulatov, Rutskoy, Other Prisoners Released *[ITAR-TASS]* 26
Comment Upon Release *[Radio Rossii]* 26
Khasbulatov Not To Engage in Politics *[INTERFAX]* 26
Khasbulatov Interviewed on Release *[Rome LA REPUBBLICA 28 Feb]* 27
Former Prisoners To Seek Stability *[INTERFAX]* 29
Anpilov Comments on Release *[INTERFAX]* 29
Official Details Decision on Amnesty *[ITAR-TASS]* 29
Kostikov Says Release 'Blasphemous' *[ITAR-TASS]* 30
Gaydar, Gorbachev Comment *[Radio Rossii]* 30
Poltoranin Warns of Consequences *[ITAR-TASS]* 31
Shakray Hopes for 'Civilized' Struggle *[ITAR-TASS]* 31
Yeltsin Aides Outline Strategy To Handle Amnesty *[ITAR-TASS]* 31
Yeltsin Preparing 'Certain Actions' *[Russian TV]* 32
Procurator General Resigns Over Amnesty Issue *[ITAR-TASS]* 32
Yeltsin Accepts Resignation *[Moscow TV]* 32
Kazannik Explains Resignation *[ITAR-TASS]* 33
Acting Prosecutor General Appointed *[ITAR-TASS]* 33
Kazannik's Stand on Amnesty Viewed *[ITAR-TASS]* 33
Yeltsin Dismisses Counterintelligence Chief *[ITAR-TASS]* 34
Intelligence Boss To Phase Out Spy-Journalists *[NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA 26 Feb]* 34
Yeltsin Appoints CIS Assembly Envoy *[ITAR-TASS]* 34
Yeltsin Accepts Pamfilova's Resignation *[Radio Rossii]* 34
Poltoranin on Presidential Stand on Mass Media *[ITAR-TASS]* 34
Shakhray Gives Party Program at PRES Congress *[INTERFAX]* 35
PRES To Restore Ties With 'Tsarist' Russia *[ITAR-TASS]* 35
Comments in Support of Yeltsin Message Cited *[ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA 25 Feb]* 35
Paper Publishes Yeltsin's 'Annual Message' *[ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA 25 Feb]* 36

Federal Assembly

Federation Council Approves More Troops for Bosnia *[ITAR-TASS]* 62
Federation Council Approves Nikitov as Administration Head *[ITAR-TASS]* 62
Federation Council Commission on Ossetian Situation *[ITAR-TASS]* 63
Shumeyko Comments on Federation Council *[ITAR-TASS]* 63
Daily Carries Duma Amnesty Decree *[ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA 26 Feb]* 63
Procedure for Implementation *[ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA 26 Feb]* 64

Regional Affairs

Zhirinovskiy's District Says Election Returns Void *[INTERFAX]* 67

Chelyabinsk Prosecutor Resigns Over Amnesty Ruling *[ITAR-TASS]* 67
North Caucasus Spokesman on Amnesty Resolution *[INTERFAX]* 67
Preliminary Results Show Ingush President Reelected *[ITAR-TASS]* 68
Ossetian President Rejects Federal Rule Idea *[SEGODNYA 26 Feb]* 68
North Ossetian President Praises Yeltsin Reform Note *[ITAR-TASS]* 68
To Meet Ingush Counterpart *[ITAR-TASS]* 69
Nenets Okrug Schedules Secession Referendum *[IZVESTIYA 24 Feb]* 69
Planned Terrorist Attack on Sobchak Viewed *[ITAR-TASS]* 69

UKRAINE

International Affairs

U.S. Begins Aid for Dismantling Nuclear Weapons *[ITAR-TASS]* 70
Foreign Ministry Condemns Hebron Massacre *[Kiev International]* 70
Ukraine, China Sign Economic Cooperation Protocol *[Kiev International]* 70
Zlenko Postpones Polish Visit Due to Lysenko Trial *[INTERFAX]* 70

National Affairs

President Kravchuk Holds News Conference *[Kiev TV]* 70
Supreme Council Supports Early Parliamentary Elections *[Kiev International]* 75
Kravchuk Conditions Participation in Elections *[ITAR-TASS]* 76
Diplomat Denies Kravchuk Refusal to Run *[Moscow International]* 76
Kravchuk Decision Viewed *[KIEVSKIYE VEDOMOSTI 23 Feb]* 76
Cabinet Holds Meeting With Crimean Officials *[DEMOKRATYCHNA UKRAYINA 22 Feb]* 76
Cabinet Adopts Resolution on 1994 Social, Economic Plan *[Kiev International]* 77
Parliament Amends 1991 Law on Presidential Elections *[INTERFAX]* 77
Crimean Premier Details Economic Principles *[TRUD 22 Feb]* 78

WESTERN REGION

Belarus

Deputies Discuss Constitution, Electoral Law, Trade *[Minsk Radio]* 81
Parliament Prepares To Adopt New Constitution *[NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA 25 Feb]* 81
Most Deputies Vote for Presidential Republic *[ITAR-TASS]* 81
Official on Deputies' Refusal To Vote on Constitution *[Minsk Radio]* 82
Shushkevich Criticizes Procedures for Constitutional Vote *[Minsk Radio]* 82
Shushkevich Calls For Early Presidential Elections *[ITAR-TASS]* 82
Prime Minister Praises Yeltsin's Annual State Address *[Minsk Radio]* 82

Moldova

Snegur Discusses Russian Mediation in Dniester, 14th Army *[Bucharest Radio]* 82
Snegur Previews Elections, Dniester Situation *[Bucharest Radio]* 83
Discusses Electoral Issues *[Bucharest Radio]* 83
Foreign Observers Visit Dniester, Meet With Smirnov *[Bucharest Radio]* 84
First Multiparty Elections Begin *[ITAR-TASS]* 84
Snegur Votes *[ITAR-TASS]* 84
Snegur Hopes for Parliamentary Majority *[Bucharest Radio]* 84
Further on Snegur Vote *[BASAPRESS]* 85
'High Turnout' Reported *[BASAPRESS]* 85
Partial Results, Preferences Reported *[Bucharest Radio]* 86
Early Returns 'Sensational' *[ITAR-TASS]* 86
Agrarian Democratic Party Wins *[ITAR-TASS]* 86

CENTRAL ASIA

Kazakhstan

Yeltsin, Nazarbayev Discuss Issues Over Phone *[ITAR-TASS]* 88
U.S. Inspectors: International Obligations Being Observed *[ITAR-TASS]* 88

Tajikistan

Rakhmanov, CSCE Secretary General Discuss Cooperation *[Dushanbe Radio]* 88
Russian Border Commander Warns Afghan Side Over Shelling *[ITAR-TASS]* 88
Foreign Ministry Denies Existence of Concentration Camps *[ITAR-TASS]* 89
Supreme Soviet Issues Decree on Regulating TV, Radio *[ITAR-TASS]* 89

CAUCASUS

Armenia

Prime Minister, Israeli Ambassador Discuss Economic Ties *[Yerevan Radio]* 90
British MP Calls Azerbaijan 'Aggressor' in Karabakh *[SNARK]* 90
Yerevan Urged To Ratify Treaty on Status of Russian Troops *[ITAR-TASS]* 90
Military Situation 'Relatively Peaceful' *[Yerevan Radio]* 90

Azerbaijan

Aliyev in London, Comments on Karabakh *[TURAN]* 91
Returns From London *[TURAN]* 91
Result of Defense Ministers Meeting Uncertain *[TURAN]* 91
Armenian Request for Time To Withdraw Viewed *[Baku International]* 92
Foreign Minister Gasanov Visits Germany *[Baku Radio]* 92
Agreement Signed With Turkmenistan on Natural Gas *[Baku Radio]* 92
Military Said To Destroy 38 Armenian 'Chemical Projectiles' *[Baku TV]* 93

Georgia

Shevardnadze Statement on Georgian-Abkhaz Talks *[Tbilisi Radio]* 93
Says West, Russia Agree on Abkhazia *[Tbilisi TV]* 93
Chief Negotiator Comments *[Tbilisi TV]* 94
Failure Blamed on Georgian Position *[ITAR-TASS]* 94
Abkhaz Official on Russian-Georgian Treaty *[Moscow Radio]* 94
Talks With Armenian Leaders Focus on Gas Supplies *[Moscow Radio]* 94

BALTIC STATES

Estonia

President Meri Delivers 24 Feb Anniversary Speech *[Ministry of Foreign Affairs Press Release]* ... 96
President on Priority of Baltic Cooperation *[BNS]* 98
Foreign Minister Concerned Over Yeltsin Address *[Tallinn Radio]* 98

Latvia

Chief of Defense Forces Participates in NATO Training *[DIENA 14 Feb]* 98
Walesa Says Poland, Latvia Natural Allies *[Warsaw Radio]* 99
Gas Deliveries From Russia Canceled *[DIENA 12 Feb]* 99
Presidential Aides 'Misread' Yeltsin Letter *[INTERFAX]* 100
Three Russian Servicemen Attacked in Riga *[ITAR-TASS]* 100
Official Supports Ukrainian Disarmament Process *[Riga Radio]* 100

Lithuania

President on Need for Professional Government, Income Declaration *[TIESA 15 Feb]* 100
Nuclear Agency Head: No Need To Stop Ignalina Reactor *[ELTA]* 101

Georgia, Abkhazia Fail To Reach Accord at Geneva Talks

LD2502192294 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1615 GMT 25 Feb 94

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Konstantin Pribytkov]

[Text] Geneva February 25 TASS—Georgian and Abkhazian delegations failed to reach an accord on key issues in the peace settlement between Tbilisi and its independence-seeking province during their four-day U.N.- and Russia-brokered meeting in Geneva.

The third round of talks, which ended on Friday, revealed at least two problems where a compromise is hardly possible. They are the future political status of Abkhazia and conditions for the return home of refugees. The draft agreements on both these problems remained unsigned.

The two sides agreed to renew negotiations in New York on March 7 on the proposal put forward by U.N. Secretary General's envoy Edward Brunner and backed by Russian envoy Boris Pastukhov.

Pastukhov told ITAR-TASS that he "regretted that the round of talks had not brought the desired result".

The only positive moment he could mention was the "motion towards a compromise" as both delegations confirmed that they welcomed the participation of the Russian military contingent in the UN peace- keeping operations in the conflict area.

Border River Isiands Not To Be Handed Over to PRC

PM2502124394 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 25 Feb 94 p 3

[Vladimir Skosyrev report: "Moscow Rejects Beijing's Proposal To Carry Out Exchange of Islands in Amur and Argun"]

[Text] Beijing—The talks between China and four CIS states—Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, and Tajikistan—on the border problem are of a secret nature, and few people outside a narrow circle of officials have a real impression of their results.

But greater openness is required if only to dispel the rumors that two islands near Khabarovsk in the Amur River and Bolshoy Island in the Argun River will soon share the fate of Damanskiy; that is, they will be transferred to the Chinese.

In actual fact Russia does not intend to give these three islands away. An informed source has reported that our Border Troops subunit, military base, and recreation center are located on the islands near Khabarovsk and that we regard them as Russian soil. At the same time Moscow is prepared to continue holding talks on these islands. Because abandoning the talks could lead only to an escalation of tension. In fact, the same happened at the time the USSR existed, when M.S. Gorbachev stated that the problem of the islands had been solved once and for all. This provoked a strong reaction in Beijing.

Not long before the last round of talks, which ended a few days ago in the PRC capital, Chinese representatives hinted that they were prepared to concede Bolshoy Island if Russia took the same step in relation to the two islands in the Amur. From Moscow's viewpoint this is an unacceptable idea. Therefore at the meeting in Beijing all the sides could do was to again recognize the existence of radical differences and postpone a solution to the question of the islands to an unspecified time in the future.

The talks on the line of the border between China and Tajikistan were also deadlocked. It is a question of control of part of the Pamir. The scale of the differences is indicated by the fact that China is laying claim to approximately one-third of the territory of Gorno-Badakhshan Oblast. But bearing in mind that this is an area in which Tajik armed opposition forces are especially active, it will be understood why Beijing is not trying to force a settlement of this dispute. It too has been postponed until a better time.

It should not be concluded from the foregoing that the Beijing meeting ended in failure. Far from it. With the exception of the islands in the two rivers and the Pamir, the differences concerning other sectors of the border between the PRC and the CIS, which is over 7,000 km long, are being successfully overcome. In the sector to the east of Mongolia a border line has already been drawn on the map, and on-site demarcation work is now under way. Nor should complications arise over the western sector of the Russian-Chinese border, which is 54 km long.

As regards relations between China and Kazakhstan, a border agreement between them is expected to be signed this spring, during Chinese Premier Li Peng's visit to Almaty. In addition, a source considers it a positive feature that the representatives of the three Asiatic CIS states are collaborating closely with Russia and are relying on the informational material accumulated by our diplomacy. The next round of talks will take place in one of the CIS states.

Belarus Defense Minister Attends CIS Meeting

LD2602141694 Minsk Radio Minsk Network in Belarusian 1300 GMT 26 Feb 94

[Text] A session of the CIS Council of Defense Ministers has been held in Moscow. The Belarusian military delegation, headed by Colonel General Pavel Kazlowski, the republic's defense minister, examined and decided on questions concerning integration [words indistinct] of CIS countries in the military sphere. Primarily there was a discussion of documents regulating the activity of the coordination bodies of military cooperation—the Council of Defense Ministers, its secretariat, and also the headquarters for coordinating military cooperation.

The defense ministers of Belarus and the Russian Federation signed an agreement on interaction of air defense forces and means.

The next session of the Council of Defense Ministers is planned for the middle period of March. It is intended that it will be held jointly with the CIS Council of Foreign Ministers.

Defense Ministers Agree on Tajik Border

LD2502210594 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1650 GMT 25 Feb 94

[Text] Chief of the Headquarters on Coordination and Military Cooperation between the CIS states, Serafim Yushkov approved of the decision on strengthening of the Tajik border adopted at the CIS defense ministers' meeting in Moscow on Friday. He suggested that military actions by Afghan Mojahedins and the armed Tajik opposition might become more active in spring.

According to Yushkov, the way from Afghanistan to Tajikistan will become easier due to opening of the mountain pass in spring.

The CIS defense ministers agreed to carry out the earlier agreements on stabilization of the situation on the Tajik-Afghan border. For instance, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan will bring their military contingency to Tajikistan.

The decision on the Tajik border is to be confirmed at the regular CIS summit planned for March 31.

Defense Ministers Meeting Ends

LD2502141894 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1326 GMT 25 Feb 94

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Mikhail Shevtsov]

[Text] Moscow, 25 Feb—A two-day sitting of the Council of CIS Defense Ministers ended today. The representatives of the military departments of 11 Commonwealth states took part along with the Moldovan delegation. Representatives of the Russian foreign ministry, Federal Assembly, State Duma, and border guard command also took part.

Deputy Defense Minister Boris Gromov, who presided over the meeting, told an ITAR-TASS correspondent that he was fully satisfied with the results of the sitting of the Council of Defense Ministers. "All the issues included in the agenda were examined with positive results," Boris Gromov said.

A clause on the Council of Defense Ministers of Commonwealth states and on an organizational staff structure for the headquarters coordinating military cooperation between CIS states has also been agreed and prepared for signing by CIS heads of states.

It is proposed that the Headquarters will have a staff of 244 made up of representatives of the military departments of the states of the Commonwealth.

The meeting of the Council of Defense Minisers also initialled an important draft decision on measures to stabilize the situation on the Tajik-Afghan border. As Boris Gromov noted, the participants in the meeting agreed on the need for the full implementation of the measures adopted earlier on allocating peacekeeping forces to Tajikistan. The ITAR-TASS correspondent has learned that the draft decision on Tajikistan will be discussed on 18 March at a joint sitting of the Council of Defense Ministers and the Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Commonwealth. It is proposed that it should be signed at the meeting of the heads of state of the CIS scheduled for 31 March.

Decisions were also signed at the meeting on measures to prepare for the celebration of the 50th anniversary of victory in the Great Fatherland War and for holding in May-June 1995 the first spartakiad of the Armed Forces of the Commonwealth to be held since the disintegration of the USSR. The spartakiad will include 19 types of sport and will be held in various states of the Commonwealth under the slogan "For the Strengthening of Friendship between the Armed Forces of the CIS."

ITAR-TASS Carries Press Review for 26 Feb

LD2602073894 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 0605 GMT 26 Feb 94

["Press Review"—ITAR-TASS headline]

[Text] Moscow February 26 (ITAR-TASS)—Today's Moscow newspapers focus on decisions taken by the lower house of the Russian parliament on amnesty in connection with the adoption of the new Russian constitution and on political and economic amnesty, as well as on the state of the nation speech by Boris Yeltsin at the Russian parliament.

The SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA newspaper features the complete text of both decisions by the lower house. In an article headlined "Algebra of the Compromise", the same newspaper prints statistical data on how factions of the lower house voted on these documents.

The ROSSIYSKIE VESTI newspaper prints an opinion by presidential press secretary Vyacheslav Kostikov, saying that "the decision on the political amnesty is immoral". The same newspaper also carries an opinion by Yuriy Baturin, the Russian president's national security assistant, who claims that "the Duma (eds: lower house) exceeded its powers".

Editor-in-chief of the NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA newspaper Vitaliy Tretyakov, commenting on the Duma's amnesty decision, holds a diametrically opposite position. He notes that "no juridical chicanery can put into doubt the Duma's important political and psychological victory.

"If the Duma, in compliance with the constitution, has the right to amnesty both the convicted and those under investigation, and if it has done so, those who come under the amnesty should be released. If this does not happen, then the rights of the Duma and the rights of citizens are infringed upon."

Commenting on the president's speech at the Russian parliament on Thursday, the PRAVDA newspaper stresses that the president's state of the nation address "is interesting due to the fact that Boris Yeltsin spoke not the customary language of the Russia's choice movement but the language of those who consistently opposed the destructive policy imposed by radical democrats".

ROSSIYSKIE VESTI carries a series of comments on the president's state of the nation speech under the general headline "Parliament Should Shake the Extended Hand". Most comments note that "the presidential message is of general character".

However, they point at the same time to the fact that "most deputies regard the key points in the presidential message as a result of adjustments in line with political realities which changed after the December 12 elections".

NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA calls its readers' attention to the aggravation of relations between Ukraine and the Crimean Republic, a constituent part of Ukraine, as well as to possible confrontation inside the Crimean leadership in connection with Kiev's demand to streamline The Crimean constitution in compliance with the Ukrainian basic law.

The KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA newspaper carries an essay about Yuliy Khariton, chief designer of the first Soviet atomic bomb, who will turn 90 on February 27.

Under the title "Stalin's Death", the TRUD newspaper features with some abridgments the first part from a hitherto unpublished chapter of a book by former Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Navy Nikolay Kuznetsov who personally knew Stalin for many years.

The chapter describes some almost unknown particulars from the last days of Stalin's life and other events of that time.

In the section "Essay of Russian Geopolitics", SOVETSKAYA ROSSIA completes the publication of an analytical article by Russian Communist Party leader Gennadiy Zyuganov, the first part of which was printed in the previous issue.

U.S. Urged Not To Be 'Hypocritical' on Ames Case

LD2502165294 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1504 GMT 25 Feb 94

[From the "Diplomatic Panorama" feature]

[Text] It is an open secret that Americans spend on intelligence, in other words "espionage", much more than all other countries of the world taken together. So, the U.S. should not be hypocritical, a high-ranking Russian diplomat told Interfax on Friday, commenting on the United States' attempts to attach special importance to the case of the Ames couple, arrested for charges of espionage in favor of Moscow.

To quote this diplomat, "if Americans have any queries about specific details, representatives of the Russian and American special services should discuss them in the spirit of our friendly relations."

The Foreign Intelligence Service (FIS) has neither confirmed nor denied the reports that representatives of the CIA and the EIS have met in Moscow to discuss the Ames affair. "We do not comment on such information," a representatives of the FIS's press bureau told Interfax.

He expressed surprise about the hullabaloo raised in the U.S. in connection with the Ames affair. "We are not doing anything in the U.S. that the U.S. is not doing in Russia," he said. "Americans are not surprised that their nearest associates—Britain and France—collect information in the U.S. as well, friendship and the secret service are two seperate things," he said.

He confirmed that Russian competent bodies had collected compromising information about American diplomats' and Russian citizens' collaboration with the American secret services. He gave to understand that "in a certain situation Moscow might make use of this material," but expressed hope that things would not come to that.

Asked about the FIS's possible reaction to the U.S. administration's decision to oust the Russian diplomats who worked with the Ames couple, he said that this is not the FIS's business. Such decisions are taken at a high political level - by the president or government - and are implemented through the Foreign Ministry. The FIS has nothing to do with this, he added.

Diplomat on Upcoming Meeting in U.S., Ames

LD2502200094 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1843 GMT 25 Feb 94

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Pavel Vanichkin]

[Text] Washington February 25 TASS—The U.S. President met leaders of the Congress in the White House on Friday. The meeting was attended by lawmakers from the Democratic and Republican Parties.

The White House Press Secretary Dee Dee Myers said that the meeting of the U.S. President with congressmen focused on providing U.S. aid to Russia. Recently, a number of U.S. lawmakers called to freeze U.S. aid or reduce it, following a scandal which flared up around the CIA officer Aldrich Ames and his wife charged with spying both for Russia and the United States.

"Undoubtedly, the president intends to oppose any efforts aimed at reducing U.S. aid to Russia," Dee Dee Myers said, adding that the president is convinced that the politics of the U.S. Administration, including its support to Moscow, meets U.S. national interests.

Dee Dee Myers said that at present, the U.S. and Russia are making efforts to settle the problem around the "Ames" case at different levels and using different channels. The press secretary pointed out that the Russians had not responded to U.S. demands so far, adding that they expected a reply in the near future. No one of the U.S. administration has mentioned yet what demands Washington made on Moscow, motivating their silence by the interests of national security.

Presumably, one of the channels expected to be used by the two sides to resolve their problem is a visit to Washington by first Russian Deputy Foreign Minister G. Mamedov. The high-ranking Russian diplomat, who arrived in Washington on Thursday night, intends to meet U.S. First Deputy Secretary of State [title as received] Strobe Talbott and other foreign ministry officials on Friday.

Mamedov's visit to Washington had been scheduled long ago to discuss different problems of international politics. Nevertheless, talking to journalists on Friday Mamedov made it clear that the "Ames case" would be discussed. "We are concerned about anything which might be detrimental to Russo-American partnership," Mamedov said. "However, we believe that we have accumulated enough confidence and gave sufficient impetus to these relations so that we could overcome any problem," he said.

Intelligence Staffers on CIA Delegation in Moscow

LD2502211894 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 2044 GMT 25 Feb 94

[By CRIME-PRESS correspondent Olga Semyonova]

[Text] Reliable sources reject U.S. media reports that the CIA delegation which negotiated with the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service on the "Ames case" has returned to the United States and is dissatisfied with the Russian reaction.

"As far as I know CIA representatives are still in Russia. They have met heads of the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service to discuss professional and technical issues. It seems the sides have managed to reach mutual understanding in some aspects," a veteran staffer of the

Russian Foreign Intelligence Service who used to work in the United States told CRIME PRESS on Friday.

Commenting on the "Ames case" Russian intelligence officials remind that in similar situations Russians seldom make fuss. Last year twenty people were arrested in Russia on espionage charge, according to First Deputy Director of the Russian Counter-Intelligence Service Sergey Stepashin. However, there were no scandals, demarches or loud protesting, as professionals can control their emotions.

Speaking to CRIME-PRESS on Friday, spokesman for Russian Federal Counter-Intelligence Service Aleksandr Mikhailov suggested an example of such sustained reaction the recent arrest of a major agent working for "a Western secret service" reported earlier this year by service Director Nikolay Golushko. As a result, attempts to recruit a number of high-ranking Russian officials have been prevented while the officials removed from their posts.

Delegation Went Home 'Empty-Handed'

PM2802094394 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 26 Feb 94 p 2

[Report by Yelena Ovcharenko and Leonid Timofeyev: "Have the Contents of the Slav Safe Been Sold to the Americans?"]

[Text] If THE WASHINGTON POST is to be believed, a delegation of representatives of the U.S. special services has already visited Moscow, not postponing a "showdown" or waiting for the chief of the Foreign Intelligence Service to return from Bratislava. "The CIA team, which went to Moscow to discuss the 'Ames affair,' is returning without having managed to receive any useful information from Russian intelligence," AP notes. Our sources in the relevant departments did not try to dispute the Americans' assessmment, and even confirmed that their colleagues went away "empty-handed."

But, excuse us: We think that it would be naive to suppose that the U.S. espionage aces visited our glorious city expecting to find out something about the Ameses. What then? Maybe they were trying to sort things out about "poaching"? It is, after all, no accident that a "leak" has appeared in the U.S. press to the effect that the FBI possesses films showing that a meeting had been planned between Ames and a Russian intelligence agent in Caracas. It is probably no accident either that our services recently detained a certain high-ranking person incriminated of spying for the United States. The Americans probably have their "hooks" into other people with Russian passports working both in the United States and in "third" countries. Their Russian colleagues also have such documents. The Federal Counterintelligence Service Public Relations Center expressed to us the hypothesis that the representatives of U.S. special services could be in Moscow in order to ask us not to touch any of their intelligence agents or agencies. But none of the foreigners have appeared in the Federal Counterintelligence Service's lobbies in recent days, and coffee has not been ordered in the reception rooms for the official delegations.

No, most likely this was not an exchange of mutual grievances. Most probably, the Americans, who have involved their President in an unprecedentedly tough and hard-hitting role in the spy mania campaign, who themselves blew up the "affair" to the proportions of a national tragedy, came to Moscow to size up the prospects for the contacts which—as is well known—exist between the two countries' special services. Have they not gone too far, have they not spoiled everything hopelessly? Of course, no official will say whether this is the case. But experts propose that the "spylords" could have actually taken away specific proposals with them from Moscow. Though we think that AP is right here: They returned from the Russian capital, to a Washington resounding from the spy "fall-out," with nothing at all.

Embassy Adviser Lysenko Expelled From United States

LD2502213294 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 2052 GMT 25 Feb 94

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Igor Borisenko]

[Excerpts] Washington, 25 Feb—The U.S. State Department has just declared pesona non grata Aleksandr Iosifovich Lysenko, adviser of the Embassy of the Russian Federation in Washington. [passage omitted]

Aleksandr Lysenko arrived in Washington in July 1993. Under the instructions of the State Department he is obliged to leave the territory of the USA within seven days.

Russian Embassy Has 'No Comment'

LD2602015694 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 0105 GMT 26 Feb 94

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Igor Borisenko]

[Excerpts] Washington, 26 Feb—The U.S. State Department declared Aleksandr Iosifovich Lysenko, counsellor in the Russian Embassy in the United States, "persona no grata." [passage omitted] ITAR-TASS has learned that Aleksandr Lysenko arrived in Washington in July 1993. He is 56 years old. The Russian Federation Embassy stated that "they had no comment on the State Department's statement." Immediately after the announcement by the State Department, a large group of American TV reporters and media photographers gathered at the Russian Federation Embassy, practically blocking the entrance to the building situated a few blocs away from the White House. Policemen who are permanently stationed at the Embassy are watching the developments with indifference.

Ministry Denies Knowledge of Expulsion

LD2602145394 Moscow Radio Rossii Network in Russian 1400 GMT 26 Feb 94

[Text] According to Interfax, the Russian Foreign Ministry has not received from the American side any official notification of the expulsion from the country of Aleksandr Lysenko, a counsellor at the Russian Embassy in Washington.

For that reason, the Foreign Ministry declines to comment on the incident.

Spokesman Says No Lysenko-Ames Link

LD2802103094 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 0954 GMT 28 Feb 94

[Text] Moscow, 28 Feb (CRIME-PRESS)—"Even if Ames really did work for us, what does [Aleksandr] Lysenko, who only came to the United States last summer, have to do with it?" Yuriy Kobaladze, head of the press bureau of the Foreign Intelligence Service, said in an interview with a CRIME-PRESS correspondent. After all, if one is to believe the FBI, the country the Ames started spying for was the old Soviet Union, and the surveillance over them began 10 months ago.

Moreover, for the first time in the history of relations between our countries, Aleksandr Lysenko was, as it were, an official resident of the Russian intelligence in the United States. He was introduced to the director of the CIA and to the U.S. Administration in this capacity and was involved in "cooperation" between the two special services in tackling issues of global significance which override the rivalry between the two intelligence services, such as the fight against international terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and other issues.

Now, as a spokesman for the Russian Foreign Ministry has announced, Russia is forced to take countermeasures and hence expel a CIA employee.

'CIA Agent' Persona Non Grata

LD2802154494 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1511 GMT 28 Feb 94

[By ITAR-TASS correspondents Andrey Palariya and Vladimir Smelov]

[Text] Moscow, 28 Feb—CIA agent James Morris, who worked in Moscow under the guise of a counsellor at the U.S. embassy, has been declared "persona non grata."

An ITAR-TASS correspondent was informed by reliable sources that an official statement about this was made today to U.S. ambassador in Moscow Thomas Pickering. The U.S. spy will leave Moscow within seven days.

This was Moscow's reaction to Washington's decision to expel Aleksandr Lysenko, counsellor at the Russian embassy, from the United States.

Kozyrev Comments on Ames Case 'Provocation'

LD2602202894 Moscow Ostankino Television First Channel Network in Russian 1800 GMT 26 Feb 94

[By INTERFAX observer Dmitriy Voskoboynikov; from the "Novosti" newscast]

[Text] Could it be said that the Bosnian crisis is leading to the first serious manifestation of discord between Russia and NATO? Moscow does not want to paint a gloomy picture. Foreign Minister Kozyrev, with whom I spoke on Friday, stressed the importance of supporting the strategic partnership with the West, including in resolving the Bosnian problems. Evidently he will meet with U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher in the second half of March - it is unlikely it can be managed earlier - to discuss how that can best be achieved.

However, the Foreign Ministry's attitude to the NATO ultimatums is unequivocal. Their time has passed and if they are put forward once again with regard to one or another of the warring sides in Bosnia without consultation with Russia that will be simply a farce. The Kremlin is reacting calmly to the fact that some G-7 caricaturists have returned to the image of the Russian Bear. Both Yeltsin and Kozyrev state with satisfaction: A Bosnian settlement is not possible without Russia.

Will their opponents, who earlier demanded the resignation of the head of the Foreign Ministry practically every week, get into parliament?

However, nervousness has arisen in relations between Moscow and Washington, which obviously was not prepared for decisive Russian diplomacy. At least, many have formed the impression that the fuss which arose around the Ames couple in the United States was whipped up not in the least because Russia's excessive independence on the Bosnia issue was not to everybody's liking.

[Begin Kozyrev recording] It is difficult to get away from the impression that what we're dealing with are attempts by certain circles to provoke a kind of exacerbation, on the one hand, to cast suspicion on Sarajevo, on the other hand—I have to say, on the whole, that in the United States, and in our country, Russia, too, there are numerous examples of that—the partnership between the two great powers is not to everybody's liking. Therefore, I think that it is difficult to get away from the impression that it's a provocation we are dealing with. [end recording]

General Says Ames 'Was of Benefit for Russia'

LD2602190394 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1855 GMT 26 Feb 94

[Text] Moscow February 26 TASS - " Ames worked in the United States for Russia. He protected Russian interests since he revealed spies stealing Russian secrets to the U.S. He inflicted no direct damage to the Americans and was of benefit for Russia," head of the Russian

Armed Forces General Staff Colonel-General Mikhail Kolesnikov told a news conference here today, when asked about CIA officer Aldrich Hazen Ames charged with espionage in the Russian favor.

In his turn, commander of the Russian air-borne troops General Yevgeniy Podkolzin said there is no connection between the U.S. arrest of CIA officer Aldrich Hazen Ames and success of Russian diplomacy in settlement of Bosnian crisis.

Deputy Foreign Minister Mamedov on Ames Case

LD2702120794 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1105 GMT 27 Feb 94

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Georgiy Shmelev]

[Text] Moscow, 27 Feb—Georgiy Mamedov, the deputy foreign minister of the Russian Federation, is confident that "the Ames case" will not affect the Russian-U.S. relations.

After the conclusion of a working visit to Latin American countries, Georgiy Mamedov visited Washington where he was holding negotiations on the situation around Sarajevo and Russian-U.S. relations. Straight after his return to Moscow he said in an interview to an ITAR-TASS correspondent that "they touched on the question of 'the Ames case' but it is an exaggeration to say that I was a special representative on this matter." Georgiy Mamedov said that there is rather a big fuss in the United States over this matter, but he believes that a lot is unclear in this case—Ames himself has not admitted to being guilty.

Georgiy Mamedov said that it is difficult to explain why the declaration of "the Ames case" has coincided in time with the critical situation over Sarajevo and with the declaration of the new initiative by Boris Yeltsin, the president of Russia.

The deputy minister noted that "we simply should calmly and in a balanced way sort all that out."

General Staff Has 'No Information' on Ames Links

LD2802112694 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1118 GMT 28 Feb 94

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Andrey Polaria]

[Text] Moscow February 28 TASS—"The General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces and its intelligence service have no information on any links between the Ames couple and Soviet or Russian special services," Russia's Chief of Staff Colonel-General Mikhail Kolesnikov told ITAR-TASS on Monday.

He stressed that the U.S. mass media misinterpreted his statement on the Ames affair at the press conference on February 26. "Such misinterpretations pursue one unseemly objective—to get confirmation of the assumption that the CIA officer and his wife cooperated with the Soviet and Russian intelligence services".

High-Level Reaction to Ames Case Viewed

PM2502125794 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 25 Feb 94 p 6

[Aleksandr Shalnev report: "Why Is Washington Making a Fuss?"]

[Text] The circumstances of the exposure and arrest of the CIA counterintelligence agent accused of cooperating with Soviet and Russian intelligence prompts a host of questions and requires explanations attributable to the extremely specific realities of American society.

The key questions, in our view, are the following:

Why was it deemed both possible and necessary to include President William Clinton directly in the propaganda campaign immediately launched by Washington? It is possible to recall a fair number of spy scandals which have erupted in the United States in recent decades, including the affair of the Walkers, father and son, for working with whom Oleg Kalugin, if you believe the former general of Soviet intelligence, was handsomely decorated. But not one of these affairs was advertised at such a high level as the presidency. Even Ronald Reagan, who never missed an opportunity to have a fling at the intrigues of the "Evil Empire," was not actively involved in the public exposure and condemnation of the Walker family, who inflicted extremely ample damage on the United States. So why was Clinton dragged in, although it was perfectly possible to restrict things to a statement by the director of the FBI or the bureau's direct chief, the attorney general? Was it not in order to stress with especial authority Washington's dissatisfaction with Moscow's actions? Probably this is so. But surely Moscow, in carrying out intelligence operations against the United States, was not doing anything different to what the United States engages in in Russia?

Surely Washington will not really try to prove that it does not recruit its own intelligence agents, or that, in doing so, it places a special premium on holders of secrets of extreme importance, and consequently, on our intelligence and counterintelligence agents?

IZVESTIYA has already carried a brief report on the recent arrest of a certain Russian citizen who inflicted the same sort of damage on our interests as Penkovskiy once inflicted on the Soviet Union. According to the information at our disposal, either the Americans or their traditional intelligence partners, the British, had been working with the new "Penkovskiy"—it was the British, let us recall, who recruited the original Penkovskiy, and later wooed him together with the CIA.

Competent sources clearly intimate that they see a direct link between the arrest of the neo-Penkovskiy and the exposure of the CIA official: It is a sort of retaliatory action, they told me.

An action all the more serious, let me stress, for the U.S. President's being directly involved. What lies behind this? Theories are being voiced that the arrest of Ames is a response not only to the arrest of the spy in Russia, but also to the boldness displayed by Moscow in the Balkans, a boldness which for the first time in recent years cast the United States into a secondary role in world politics. By the sensationalism of the Ames affair, by direct hints that very swift and sincere apologies are expected from Moscow, as if spying were an exclusively Russian activity, we are pretty clearly given to understand: Just you know your place.

There is, however, some hope in Russian intelligence sources that the Ames affair will not cancel out all the productive and useful elements that have developed in recent years in relations between the Russian and U.S. special services. It would be a pity, my sources told me, if these relations were now undermined.

And a final point. However you look at it, the main credit for exposing Ames belongs to American-style Pavel Morozovs [Soviet archetype of someone who informs against his own relatives]. After all, it was Ames' neighbors, staggered by the inordinate expenses of this civil servant on an ordinary salary, who drew him to the attention of the "competent organs." And after that it was all a matter of technology, with which the U.S. counterintelligence agency is handsomely equipped.

One cannot fail to mention that, in the previous sensational affair—that of the Walker family—the role of exposer belonged to the mother and former wife of the spying duo. State interest transcend personal and even family interests; this is roughly how she explained to reporters the motives of her action, which, it must be said, was absolutely typical of the realities of American society.

Russia Could Retaliate Over Ames Case

PM2502150794 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 25 Feb 94 p 6

[Vladimir Ivanidze report: "Why Is Moscow Staying Silent?"]

[Text] An avalanche has descended on the Russian Foreign Intelligence Press Service. This is how we may describe what has been happening since Wednesday morning at the old Moscow town house at 11 Kolpachniy Pereulok. Press Service Director Yuriy Kobaladze has been parrying questions about Aldrich Ames, the Soviet-Russian agent in the CIA, which journalists have been asking all day, with just one answer: "We have no comment to make on events in Washington" and "the Foreign Intelligence Service is concerned and would not want to see anything hamper the building of good relations between the United States and Russia."

Replying to an IZVESTIYA question about how our intelligence service—when it was still Soviet—managed to recruit such a high-ranking CIA staffer as Aldrich Hames, Yuriy Georgiyevich sighed heavily: "Who told you we recruited him?" My explanation—that Bill Clinton himself had told everybody that Ames had been recruited—provoked an altogether human reaction from the chief of the intelligence service Press Center.

"Well, you must understand that I am not the president or the Foreign Ministry! I cannot comment. And no special service in the world would comment on whether a particular person is one of its agents or not. If I say yes, then I put a guilty man in the dock, and if I say no, you will ask me to prove it. Basically, the official position of the Russian intelligence service is not to comment!" Mr. Kobaladze stated.

In order to find out about the Russian intelligence service's unofficial policy, we had to approach a ranking Foreign Intelligence Service staffer who asked us not to reveal his name.

Thus something unusual has happened in the normal practice of intelligence services. The U.S. President has personally informed the whole world that the FBI has caught a former Soviet and now Russian spy together with his wife, also a spy. The Russian intelligence service representative believes that Clinton has started a real "spy-mania" which has not been long in coming. All the American newspapers have taken up the improbable scandal, and the arrest of the Ameses has been covered in great detail.

The intelligence service representative did not agree that the arrest of such important agents could be regarded as a setback. "Just a minute, why do you think it's a setback?! The intelligence service has recruited practically the head of the department. What do you call that, a setback?! In this matter interpretation is everything. Well...of course, the fact they have been arrested is not a good thing. The intelligence service certainly can't rejoice about it. But it is completely wrong to state unequivocally that it is a setback," the representative told IZVESTIYA.

He did not deny that all the fuss that has been made could be connected with the fact that the FBI and CIA are worrying about their budgets. Propaganda stunts of this nature are practiced by intelligence services all over the world. Particularly in countries where public opinion has an impact on the size of the budget.

In this representative's opinion, today Moscow could also arrest CIA agents in Russia and create a furor. "But we won't be doing this," the representative added; he believes that Russian spying against the United States is at least no greater than the level of U.S. intelligence activity against the former Soviet Union.

And so the facts look like this. It is clear that Clinton has taken an unprecedented step by personally announcing the capture of a spy, thus linking his name with the success of the special services forever. From this it would seem that the proof of Ames's guilt cannot be doubted.

Moreover, the CIA and FBI are not getting tired of praising one another, which is also surprising. The squabbling between these two departments has long been a tradition.

Finally, one last point. The Ames agents apparently did everything in their power to ensure that the FBI found them out. They bought a house in a luxurious suburb of Washington and paid for it with a lump sum rather than in installments. They bought a very expensive sports car. And most surprising of all, they spent an enormous quantity of money which far exceeded their salaries. And when they spent all this money, as if for the FBI's convenience, they used credit cards rather than cash! All this is somehow not very hush-hush.

Judging by the reaction of Russian departments and the text of the U.S. protest note, it has been suggested that our country should stay silent until the United States has concluded its investigation and Clinton has won his brownie points. All the indications are that there are no specific complaints against Russia.

Motives for U.S. 'Furor' Over Ames Case Pondered

PM2502152394 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 25 Feb 94 p 3

[Article by Ravil Mustafin: "What Lies Behind the Arrest of the Ames'"]

[Excerpts] CIA officer Aldrich Hazen Ames, 52, was arrested on his way to work. His wife Maria was arrested at home. The Ames are accused of spying for the former USSR and for Russia for nearly nine years. [passage omitted]

In principle the arrest of a foreign agent is not that rare an event in the invisible war the various special services have been waging among themselves for many centuries. But the arrest of the Ames caused, perhaps, an overreaction in the United States. In Moscow U.S. Ambassador Pickering made an official protest to Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Lavrov. In Washington Secretary of State Christopher asked those Russian diplomats who had been in contact with the Ames' to leave the United States quietly, as it were. President Clinton, who, as it happens, was aware that U.S. counterintelligence had had the Ames under surveillance for 10 months, ordered administration staffers to carry out a detailed analysis of the consequences of the spies' activities for U.S. national security. Some senators were calling for aid to Russia to be frozen.

According to our experts, there are several ways of explaining the ballyhoo in the United States over the arrest of the Ames. First and foremost it could be a wish on the part of the U.S. special services to obtain one-sided advantages in conducting intelligence on Russian territory. Actually, Russian intelligence is doing no more in America than U.S. intelligence is doing in Russia, according to one Foreign Intelligence Service representative. Incidentally, CIA Director James Woolsey has repeatedly stated that his department is keeping an extremely close eye on Russia.

It is not inconceivable that the Ames case got such heavy publicity in view of the exposure of more than 20 foreign, including U.S. intelligence agents in Russia last year. They included a Russian citizen, who, as Nikolay Golushko, director of the Federal Counterintelligence Service, said in an IZVESTIYA interview, had caused damage to Russian national security interests comparable to the damage caused by former GRU officer Penkovskiy, who was shot in 1963.

Some observers believe that the furor caused by the arrest of the Ames' is a kind of adverse reaction on the part of certain U.S. circles to the shift of emphasis in Russian policy in the Balkans.

'Furor' Continues

PM2502214194 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 26 Feb 94 p 2

[Ravil Mustafin report: "Ames Affair: The Furor Continues"]

[Text] It would appear that the fuss raised over the arrest of the Ames couple, who is accused of spying for Moscow, is increasingly taking on a hysterical character in the United States. An ITAR-TASS correspondent reports on the artificially hyped atmosphere of spy mania around the so-called Ames affair. An indicative example: On TV shows viewers are being asked what punishment they would determine for this married couple, who are accused of espionage. Whereas formerly it was claimed that two Soviet citizens cooperating with the CIA were exposed and executed in the eighties on Aldrich Ames' tip-offs, this figure has now already increased to 10.

Meanwhile, after Ames fell under suspicion from the FBI in 1991, he was removed from top-secret work involving opposition to the KGB and was transferred to a department remote from politics—the department for combating narcotics.

All the same, the exposure of a double agent, a routine event for the intelligence world, is still riveting the heightened attention of the mass media. THE WASHINGTON POST reports on the recently completed visit of a special CIA delegation to Moscow. Details of the visit by the U.S. intelligence agents to their Russian counterparts are not reported. The paper only says that discussion of the Ames affair was unproductive. However, it can be assumed with a great deal of probability that the visitors from Langley could not have failed to

take advantage of the opportunity afforded to them of censuring their Russian colleagues and rivals for not honoring a sort of gentleman's agreement between the two intelligence services to stop recruiting their agents among high-ranking officials, to which category Aldrich Ames can apparently be assigned. It can also be supposed that the Americans tried to twist the arms of the Russian intelligence agents to make them wind down their activity on U.S. territory and reduce the number of Russian intelligence agents working there. And, possibly, they also tried to find out what secrets Ames betrayed.

Of course, the leadership of the Foreign Intelligence Service [FIS] could not meet such demands. FIS Director Yevgeniy Primakov once called on the Americans to wind up intelligence activity against each other on a mutual, equal basis. However, the Russian intelligence agency's call was left hanging in the air. In principle it would be possible to return to discussion of this proposal today. However, judging by the assessment of this visit given by the Americans themselves, Langley believes that only they have the right to carry out intelligence activity.

It would be unjust to accuse Russian intelligence agents of perfidy and breaking a gentleman's agreement—if, despite all the stupidity of such an agreement, it does exist. The point is that Ames, the U.S. press claims, was recruited back in the mid-eighties before the beginning of Gorbachev's perestroyka. And Russian intelligence agents, as it were, inherited him from the Soviet intelligence agency. And it would be simply the height of folly to refuse the services of such a valuable agent. I am confident that, if the Americans were in our place, they would have acted in exactly the same way.

Ames Affair Shows Intelligence Spending Pays

PM2802110994 Moscow TRUD in Russian 26 Feb 94 p 6

[Interview with KGB Major General Boris Solomatin, retired, by unidentified correspondent, under the rubric "Exclusively for TRUD"; place and date not given: "We Have Begun to Assess One Another Differently"]

[Text] This comment on the "Ames affair" comes from KGB Major General Boris Solomatin, retired. According to his colleagues he is one of the most successful intelligence officers and has recruited at least four superspies, one of them an agent who is mentioned in this commentary.

[TRUD] Aldrich Ames is not the first agent to be exposed but he is the first whose exposure has merited comment at the very highest level. Why is that?

[Solomatin] I was in intelligence work for 37 years, I was the resident in India and Italy and twice in the United States (1965-1968 and 1971-1975), and I could quote many examples.

The Soviet Union did not react officially to the exposure of Penkovskiy, Tolmachev, Yuzhin, and others who worked successfully for the Americans. FRG Chancellor Brandt left office because a close aide of his turned out to be a GDR intelligence officer. Even that well-known expert on Russian folklore, President Reagan, did not presume to respond officially in 1985 to the report that for 17 years the Russians had a U.S. spy (it would be nobler to call him an agent) with whose help we were able to fully monitor top-secret communications traffic [perepiska] between nuclear submarines, the main component of the U.S. atomic triad. As for the damage caused to U.S. security by that agent, U.S. specialists have noted that in the event of war—which heaven forbid, of course!—the scales could have been tilted in our favor. It is with good reason that they called him the agent of the century. Furthermore, at the very top in our country there were people who were seriously afraid of a sharp reaction from the United States in the event of that agent's arrest. But there was no official reaction. All that happened was that journalists in the United States published four thick volumes and a few movies were made.

[TRUD] Evidently something has changed in relations between us if the arrest of an agent has become the grounds for political statements.

[Solomatin] I believe that we have begun to assess ourselves and each other differently. From being equal powers whose intelligence services worked against each other we have been transformed into a country which has to ask permission to do this now.

I believe that this began when we started to surrender and abandon our positions without a fight and with a certain degree of enthusiasm. The blame for this rests largely on Gorbachev and his unprofessional clones Bakatin in the KGB and Pankin at the Foreign Ministry. After the Cold War ended something occurred in our country which happens when you clean out the sewers: At the top there were so-called state figures who decided that the time had come to look after their own affairs at the expense of the state's interests. These and other "great guys" set about the destruction-cum-"reformation" of state security and first and foremost the intelligence service. They finally found a scapegoat, the cause of all our failures. But it is already clear now that the real "goat" in the form of the old party-administrative hierarchy is still alive and well and sends us all a greeting. The reform of the state and of the security system ended in failure. I recall how when they completed the reform in our country they entered the international arena and invited the gentlemen in the West to reciprocate by abandoning intelligence work themselves. The reply was an intensification of intelligence work in the republics of the former USSR.

But when journalists, in the course of earning their daily bread, tried to obtain information about this they invariably heard the reply—"we do not comment on intelligence and counterintelligence operations." In the United

States they have progressed not just to commentaries but also to statements by the president on this question, a routine question as far as intelligence work goes and even more so when viewed in the context of history.

Clinton has full access to a short 1975 study by the "Rand Corporation," the think tank of the U.S. Air Force, which talked about the possible impact of the successes and failures of the intelligence services on interstate relations. The specialists' conclusion was this: This cannot have a particularly significant impact on relations between states.

Some people are trying to link the inappropriate U.S. [neadekvatnyy] reaction to our so widely publicized diplomatic action over Sarajevo in which Russia outdid the United States. I do not believe that. In my view what we are dealing with today is a typical recurrence of imperial thinking in the United States, a criticism which those people, incidentally, ceaselessly level at us. It is all quite simple: We can, you cannot. We can because we have the money. Whereas you have an outstretched hand. We can because our pockets are full, yours are empty. You may be a power if you want to but it must be within the confines of your own Russia. Beyond that it is us and our interests.

I think that the Americans did not give it much thought when they embarked on this scandal. They overlooked at least two possible consequences.

First, in Europe, where I also worked and I know how arrogantly U.S. intelligence agents behaved toward their European colleagues (toward the Italians, for example), this fuss will make many specialists smile: For decades, they will say, you never tired of lecturing us or of criticizing us because we are bad at keeping our secrets and because KGB agents take them away by the sackload and now you yourselves have allowed this embarrassment to occur.

Second, when Russia itself looks into the mirror of this story it will suddenly see that the big bucks which are being spent on intelligence are "working." And we will realize the importance of intelligence work to the state and will begin to organize it properly.

Deputies' Visit to U.S. Unaffected by Ames Case

LD2502235794 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1741 GMT 25 Feb 94

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Igor Borisenko]

[Text] Washington, 25 Feb—The arrest of CIA staffer Aldrich Hazel Ames, who has been accused of spying for Russia, has "in no way affected" the visit to the United States of a group of Russian members of parliament and representatives of the law and order bodies, the ITAR-TASS correspondent learned from the head of the delegation, Mikhail Mityukov, first deputy chairman of the State Duma.

The group of Russian representatives, which is in the United States to learn about fighting organized crime and protecting intellectual property, has had meetings with high-ranking representatives of the FBI and the State Department. They were received by U.S. Attorney General Janet Reno and U.S. Commerce Secretary Ronald Brown.

"There have been no contacts on this problem, and in any case we are not empowered to hold meetings with anyone on these issues," Mityukov declared. "I think this isolated case should not sully the pretty friendly level of relations between our countries. It will be examined and studied by the appropriate bodies, both Russian and American, after which we shall be in possession of real information. I think this case is being too much politicized".

More on Deputies' Visit

LD2702094894 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1029 GMT 26 Feb 94

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Igor Borisenko]

[Excerpt] Washington, 26 Feb—Russian parliamentarians and law enforcement workers are visiting the United States with the aim of familiarizing themselves with the experience of U.S. law in fighting organized crime. They have held meetings with Attorney General Janet Reno, Secretary of Commerce Ronald Brown, and representatives of the State Department and the FBI.

The arrest of the CIA agent Aldridge Ames, accused of spying for Russia, "has had no effect" on the visit, Mikhail Mityukov, the head of the delegation and first deputy chairman of the State Duma, told ITAR-TASS. In his words, at meetings with the FBI heads, they discussed the fight against organized crime, first and foremost against the Italian mafia and Asian criminal groups.

We are primarily interested in how organized crime is combated in the United States, and how the law enforcement bodies act and cooperate, he continued. "The primary problem," according to M. Mityukov, is drawing up an American-Russian agreement on arranging laws which would open new paths toward cooperation in fighting organized crime.

Meanwhile, he added, the Russian and American experts "are establishing contacts to coordinate" their efforts.

Serious attention during the tour of the Russian delegation has been devoted to issues of intellectual property. "The fight against intellectual piracy is very topical", the Russian parliamentarian said. Both Russian and American businessmen are affected by it." [passage omitted]

Deputy Defense Minister on U.S.-Russian Joint Exercises

LD2702013794 Moscow Radio Moscow in Russian to Tajikistan 1700 GMT 26 Feb 94

[From the "Radio Slavyanka" program of the Russian Defense Ministry]

[Text] The holding of joint military exercises is noteworthy now. As journalists often say, such a thing was quite unthinkable just a few years ago. Joint exercises were held very rarely, and as a rule only with our former Warsaw Pact allies. Joint exercises are now being held perhaps not so much more frequently, but every exercise is considerably more interesting, especially those conducted with our former enemies, members of the NATO bloc. Joint exercises with the Americans are planned for July this year. Colonel General Georgiy Kondratyev, deputy defense minister, talks about the details of these exercises.

[Begin Kondratyev recording] This will be the first time not only in the history of the Russian armed forces, but also in the history of the entire former Soviet Union, that such exercises have been held. They will be joint exercises, involving the 27th Motor Rifles Division of the Volga Military District of the Russian Armed Forces, and the 3d Infantry Division of the United States. The commanders of the Russian Federation land forces of the Volga Military District and I, as deputy defense minister, have already worked out a plan for conducting the exercise. We determined that the main goals of the exercise should be: to examine jointly issues relating to possible planning of peacekeeping operations; what documents are necessary for this; how to train the personnel; and directly, during the course of the exercise, to work out questions relating to real actions, approximating the actions of U.S. and Russian subunits in conflict zones, that is, real actions during peacekeeping operations. These command and staff exercises will involve not only the commands of the two divisions but also a number of subunits. We agreed on somewhere around 200 or perhaps 250 men, up to two companies, with their own standard combat equipment and reinforcement assets. I think these exercises will go off very well indeed, and our officers will get a certain amount of experience in planning and conducting peacekeeping operations not only in CIS countries but also perhaps in other spots round the world.

Why has this need emerged? Starting in 1992, as you know, we have been carrying out peacekeeping operations, and we are doing so currently in the Dnestr region, in South Osetia, and to some extent in North Osetia and Ingushetia, where a troop is involved, and we have taken part in the Abkhaz-Georgian conflict. According to the latest understanding between President Boris NIkolayevich Yeltsin of Russia and Mr. Shevardnadze in Tbilisi, it is possible that Russia will carry out peacekeeping operations in Abkhazia, under the aegis of the CSCE and perhaps the United Nations, something which we are aiming for. The need to share experience in conducting exercises has therefore become urgent. And we shall hold such exercises. I believe this is useful both for the Russian side and for the American side, and indeed, useful for other countries, too. [end recording]

Kozyrev, Zlenko Agree To Boost Bosnia Political Settlement

LD2502133394 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1323 GMT 25 Feb 94

[By ITAR-TASS diplomatic correspondent Denis Perkin]

[Text] Moscow February 25 TASS—Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev and his Ukrainian counterpart Anatoliy Zlenko agreed during a telephone conversation on Friday that it is necessary to boost political settlement in Bosnia.

Kozyrev and Zlenko stressed the importance to ensure safety and most favourable conditions in order to help Russian and Ukrainian peace-keepers to fulfil their mission near Sarajevo and coordinate activities.

Kozyrev on Settlement

LD2502193594 Moscow Ostankino Television First Channel Network in Russian 1800 GMT 25 Feb 94

[Interview with Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev by correspondent Dmitriy Vosboynikov on 25 February; place not given; from the "Novosti" newscast—recorded]

[Text] [Announcer] As you know, an initiative was put forward by Russia recently for the leaders of the five leading states to hold a meeting on the settlement in Bosnia. Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev today stated his point of view on the prospects for such meeting.

[Kozyrev] It seems to me that this idea is gaining more and more support. Late last night I had a telephone conversation with French Foreign Minister Alain Juppe, where he said it should be well prepared and that this meeting, proposed by the Russian president, provided an answer to the main question confronting us at the moment—how to prevent the bird we have managed to catch in Sarajevo slipping from our hands.

[Voskoboynikov] Are you planning a meeting with U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher? Quite a lot of issues worth your discussing seem to have accumulated lately, such as Bosnia or the Ames affair.

[Kozyrev] I would like to say that it was a proposal of the president, who suggested a serious discussion of strategic matters with President Clinton. With us it is, as it were, as if a car were going along the road of partnership, but when a sharp bend occurs on that road, then it starts vibrating because it lacks various mechanisms. A stabilizing device is needed. A stabilizing strategy for mature

partnership—that is what it is all about. It was with this in mind that a meeting of ministers was proposed. At the moment we are searching for the best solution, but it is a fact that I received an official invitation today.

Churkin Against Air Strikes on Mostar, Tuzla

LD2502194594 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1504 GMT 25 Feb 94

[From the "Diplomatic Panorama" feature]

[Text] Deputy Foreign Minister Vitaliy Churkin, the Russian president's special envoy, rejected the idea of using "the Sarajevo technique" elsewhere in Yugoslavia.

NATO officials have been calling on an increasing number of occasions for using the technique of an ultimatum followed by diplomatic activity in Tuzla and Mostar.

Churkin told NATO that a replay of the Sarajevo scenerio was out of the question. He believed that that which did not come off the first time, is also not going to lead to anything the second time. He did not think that air strikes could be effective in Mostar, where Bosnian Croatians and Moslems are engaged in fighting. "In any case, we do not support such operations," he emphasized.

He said that what was needed in Tuzla was opening the airport for humanitarian aid rather than lifting the siege. "Various options are possible but I do not think that the humanitarian situation in the town can be improved by shelling its environs," Churkin said.

Vitaliy Churkin stressed that energetic activities were being carried out in Tuzla. "The purpose is to open the airport under an agreement between the UN forces' leadership in former Yugoslavia and the two conflicting parties—Serbs and Moslems. Both Serbian and Moslem parties put forward the demands which hamper the resolution of the issue on opening of the airport," he said.

"Russia keeps working with Serbs. However, we hope that somebody else will assume responsibility for negotiations with Moslems who currently control the airport. To open the airport it is necessary that the UN and Serb observers come there. This creates certain problems for the Moslem party," Churkin added.

Seeks More Precise Stance

LD2502173694 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1605 GMT 25 Feb 94

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Lyudmilal Yermakova]

[Text] Moscow, 25 Feb—My dream is that, pushing on from such an important moment in the Bosnian crisis as the initiative of the Russian president, a democratic consensus will start taking shape in the sphere of foreign policy, which would sever all extremist attempts, Vitaliy Churkin, the deputy foreign minister and the special representative of the Russian president in the conflict zone, said. Commenting at the request of an ITAR-TASS correspondent on today's decision of the Federation Council to allocate an additional military contingent for the UN forces, the diplomat stressed that we do not need confrontation and war, but we need a strong foreign policy based on a democratic consensus. Today's parliament decision, adopted at Yeltsin's request, will make it possible, he says, to hope that that is exactly how it will be.

Churkin reported that for the time being the issue of expanding the presence of Russian troops in other places is not on the agenda. In general, he thinks that the crisis over Sarajevo—the behavior of the Russian side and of our Western partners, who are NATO members—needs to be analyzed seriously. During the crisis our attempts to solve issues amicably with them did not always produce a response, the deputy minister noted. That is why now, he believes, we need to formulate our position more precisely and to defend it in an equally precise way.

Favors Strong Foreign Policy

LD2502185094 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1748 GMT 25 Feb 94

[By ITAR-TASS parliamentary correspondent Lyudmila Yermakova]

[Text] Moscow February 25 TASS—"I favour the formation of a democratic consensus in foreign policy to prevent any extremist pronouncements. The consensus should proceed from the Russian president's initiative on the Bosnian settlement," Deputy Russian Foreign Minister and presidential envoy to the conflict zone Vitaliy Churkin said here today.

"We do not need war and confrontation, we need a strong foreign policy to be based on democratic consensus," said the diplomat commenting on ITAR-TASS request at today's decision of the Federation Council to assign additional troops to the U.N. forces. The decision taken on request of Boris Yeltsin will give hope to the consensus, he said.

In the words of Vitaliy Churkin, the question of expanded Russian presence in other areas has not been raised.

"We still have to analyze the crisis around Sarajevo—the behavior of Russians and their Western partners, members of NATO," said Churkin. "Our attempts to peacefully settle problems of the crisis have not always been supported," he noted. "We should clearly outline our stand and keep to it," said Churkin.

Grants Interview on Bosnia

LD2502215394

[Editorial Report] Moscow Ostankino Television First Channel Network in Russian at 1845 GMT on 25

February broadcasts its "Man of the Week" program, which features an interview with Vitaliy Churkin, Russian deputy foreign minister and Boris Yeltsin's special envoy for the settlement of the Yugoslav crisis, by an unidentified correspondent. The program combines an interview with Churkin with biographical facts and pictures of Churkin at work.

In the introductory extract, Churkin says of the threatened air strikes on Bosnia: "If it had happened, if air strikes had been carried out, that would have been regarded inside Russia as a national humiliation, and I thought this was simply inadmissible."

Churkin is asked by the interviewer to describe his most unpleasant impressions from his latest visit to Sarajevo. He replies: "My most unpleasant impression was linked with the mass media. Generally I associate myself with the most fervent supporters of freedom of speech and a free press. But what I saw there forced me to think a little more deeply about the responsibility of journalists as well. This is because on 20 February, on Sunday, about 300 journalists arrived, all the world's leading TV companies and others besides. Most of the journalists who arrived were war specialists, and they had come to film a war, to film air strikes. On the Sunday, when I gave a news conference with Izetbegovic, when we addressed the media after our meeting, the situation was extremely tense. The press was demanding air strikes. And I must say that that frightened me a little, not theoretically but simply practically, because there were still some unclear points, and it was impossible to completely rule out the worst at that time. The fact that their mood was broadcast on TV screens to the whole world could in one way or another have influenced the most serious political decisions.

"I tried as best I could at the news conference in Sarajevo to defuse the passions, and we do not really know for sure how successful I was, but the next day the mood of the journalists had changed a great deal. Not because of me of course, but because the television journalists in particular had had to spend the whole night on the roof waiting for air strikes, even though it was already clear to everyone by about 2100 the previous evening that everything was all right and that there would be no air strikes.

"So you see, there are complex and ambiguous aspects in your profession as well."

Churkin admits that during his talks with the Serbs, the situation seemed "almost hopeless." "However, it must also be said that I was holding a great trump-card—the letter from the president containing both a request to the Serbs to withdraw heavy weapons from Sarajevo and our pledge to then send our troops to the Sarajevo region. If I had not succeeded, holding such a trump-card, in having such a brilliant proposal accepted by the other party at the talks, that would of course have been a colossal blow for me as a professional. So it was indeed a fairly tense moment."

Churkin says he did regard the operation as a personal success, but adds emphatically that it was "a huge success for the Foreign Ministry, in which the collective working on this situation performed outstandingly well." He praises in particular the contribution made by Deputy Foreign minister Sergey Lavrov. "Everyone joined in and managed, in an extreme situation and in a short period of time, to carry out a complex diplomatic operation."

Asked how he explains his rapid rise to the post of deputy foreign minister at the age of 42, Churkin says he has always studied hard and he has always said what he thinks. He describes himself as "democratically oriented," but adds that he has never felt the need to participate in political movements.

Asked about his special strengths and weaknesses as a diplomat, he says he is able to communicate with the most diverse people, but that he regrets not having learned French well.

The program ends with more general questions about Churkin's likes and dislikes and words of praise for Churkin from the correspondent.

Further Churkin Comment

LD2602165194 Moscow Mayak Radio Network in Russian 0730 GMT 26 Feb 94

[Interview with Vitaliy Churkin, deputy foreign minister and the Russian president's special envoy to former Yugoslavia, by Mayak observer Vladimir Pasko on 24 February in Moscow—recorded]

[Text] [Announcer] The situation in Bosnia is attracting attention even after the elimination of the Sarajevo crisis. Will it prove possible to extend the cease-fire around the Bosnian capital to other flashpoints in the country? This question formed the subject matter of a conversation between our observer Vladimir Pasko and Deputy Foreign Minister Vitaliy Ivanovich Churkin, the Russian president's special envoy, who was in Sarajevo at the height of the crisis and subsequently held consultations with representatives of the United States, the European Union, and United Nations Organizations in Bonn.

So last Thursday he returned to Moscow and, immediately after reporting to the Russian leadership on the work he had accomplished, he received a Mayak representative.

[Pasko] Vitaliy Ivanovich, it was not the first time that you had been to Yugoslavia, Belgrade, and Sarajevo. What is going on there? How do you see things, not as a man burdened by tasks of some kind, but as a simple observer?

[Churkin] If one is to talk about change, then, visually, the most noticeable changes have probably occurred in Sarajevo. My last two visits to the city over the past seven days contrasted sharply, of course, in atmosphere

with what things were like earlier. I was first in Sarajevo in May 1993, later I was there on two other occasions, and now the fourth and fifth trips have taken place during the last seven days.

Well, the city is calmer now. Snipers are still firing, but, even so, in the streets, in the main street, children were running around, since it was covered with snow. They tried to slide about on something remotely like skis, clung on to a car and slid over the snow. There were more people in the streets. In other words, the situation is moving away from being a war one.

During the last trip, I had to spend a night in Sarajevo for the first time—that famous night of the 20-21 . Although we slept in quite a comfortable flat that night, there was no electricity—electricity is a rarity. The water comes on for an hour or two during the day, and one can fill up in the bathroom. Needless to say, there is no...

[Pasko, interrupting] And the water is ice cold?

[Churkin] Needless to say, there is no hot water. It is more than cool in the apartment.

[Pasko] What about food?

[Churkin] Well you see, the city's population is supplied through the United Nations, the Red Cross, and other humanitarian organizations. The rations are extremely meager.

During one of my trips, I was taken to a bakery. It is the only bakery in Sarajevo. Incidentally, it is of interest, and it is important, that the bakery operates on Russian gas. When people throughout the world talk about humanitarian aid to Bosnia-Herzegovina and to Sarajevo, it is somehow not mentioned that, throughout these months, albeit with interruptions, Russian gas has been getting through to Sarajevo, and, if it had not been for Russian gas, the city might simply have perished, since that is the only source of any kind of heating. It is the only source of power for the only bakery in the city.

But, in general, one can see that people do not have enough to eat, and that life is very hard. It is easier for the UN people. There are special food supplies for the United Nations. Meals at UN headquarters are pretty good—you get a first, second, and third course. UN back-up is quite good. It is simply impossible to feed the city on the same level, of course, since airborne supply is the only source of provisions, and disruptions are not uncommon.

So, the fact that it has proved possible, nevertheless, to carry out the operation to place heavy weapons—both Serbian and Moslem—under control or to withdraw them is not just a qualitative military-political turnabout; it is also an extremely important humanitarian action. We now hope that it will be possible to advance further toward normalizing the situation in the city. At the moment, in many districts there, one can only drive along in an armored personnel carrier or in an armored jeep. It is still dangerous. There are checkpoints everywhere between the Croatian and Moslem districts of the city. In other words, there is still a very long way to go to normality. We will have to do some special work on that now.

[Pasko] Vitaliy Ivanovich, as far as I recall, Sarajevo is mainly a Muslim city. Of the 360,000 population only 40,000 are Serbs.

[Churkin] Yes. The Serbs that there are rather more. If I am not mistaken they say 60,000. There are also Croats there, 10-20,000 of them, but indeed, there are mainly Muslims and Serbs. The problem is that in some places in the city - although they all lived together just as they did throughout the country—there are quite clearly defined Serbian areas of the city. Grbavica area, for example, where our battalion is now stationed along with the French, is a Serb area of the city. And the demarcation line passes between Muslim and Serb areas. And the reason why this cross-fire and the exchange of artillery strikes took place recently is that as soon one of the sides made an attempt to change the front line in the city—quite often this was the Muslims who have a superiority in infantry—then the Serbs responded with powerful fire from all of their weapons against the city. The result is that the city has been destroyed to a very large extent.

The Serbs have now withdrawn their weapons or put them under UN control. The Muslims have also handed over about 50 heavy weapons. They simply had less of these in the city, but they have also put them under UN control. Now neither of the sides has the capability of firing.

[Pasko] What surprises me here is the statements made by some of the Bosnian leaders who represent the Muslim community and, in particular, the Bosnian representative in the United Nations, attacking our initiatives and the fact that our Russian battalion has appeared there. That is, clear dissatisfaction is being expressed when it would seem that the reaction should be quite different.

[Churkin] As for the specific person that you have referred to, I can say that he is a totally irresponsible man who is distinguished by the fact that throughout the crisis he has made the most disgraceful statements, taking advantage of the fact that he speaks English well. There are also people who are not so keen on naked propaganda but who have also recently made similar statements. I have had contacts with the people who make these statements. I know them quite well. There are considerable differences between their positions and ours. We are aiming toward peace while they are aiming toward war. It is as simple as that.

I do not consider that this is the position of the whole Muslim leadership or—as it is now usually referred to in international contacts—the Bosnian Government. For example, Izetbegovic, the number one and Silajdzic, the number two, in the Muslim leadership, occupy a more

pragmatic position and I still proceed on the basis that they understand that it is necessary to reach a political accord.

You only have to talk to those other people and it becomes totally clear—and they do not even conceal this—that they want to fight the whole war over again.

[Pasko] If there are disagreements among the Bosnian leaders, how can it be hoped that they will agree to a peaceful settlement and how can it be hoped that an external diplomatic interference being discussed at the moment will be successful?

[Churkin] Well, you have touched upon a most painful issue. This is one of our biggest difficulties. Admittedly, there is no unity among their leaders and this is clear to everybody. Therefore, conditions should be created whereby the people supporting extremist approaches would be isolated, so that they should understand that nobody is going to add fuel to the war and that the time has come to conclude a peace agreement. I think that such moment is likely to come. The settlement documents themselves need some further improvement, but on the whole, the time will come when the positions of people with more pragmatic views in the Muslim government will become stronger, but this is one of the most difficult tasks—how to isolate extremists among the Muslims.

[Pasko] To what extent can we count on U.S. assistance in this matter? After all, a strange statement was issued after the recent talks in Washington between U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher with Haris Silajdzic.

[Churkin] Well, these statements seem clear enough to me. You know, I think that statements should be taken at their face value. On the whole, Americans tend to say reasonable and correct things. There is nothing wrong if the Americans have decided to work in closer contact with the Muslims and, to some extent, with Croatians, and to come up with some new sensible proposals regarding the settlement. The stress should be laid on the word sensible—I said this to the Americans and then repeated it at the multilateral meeting in Bonn, and everyone seemed to agree. The important point is that the Americans are now saying that, like the Europeans and like us, they proceed from the assumption that borders should be drawn on the basis of a key criterion—that a republic with the Muslim majority is to get 33.3 percent of the territory. Now this criterion has been consolidated in the U.S. approach. If the Americans, as they help the Muslims with this business—this is a very complicated job, you have to read the map and calculate on the computer all the time the percentage [of parts of territory due to each side], and to take into account a number of various parameters—if they really arrive at some sensible proposals that can be accepted by the other sides, then I can see absolutely no harm in this. After all, we can help the Serbs to take a realistic stance—why cannot the Americans help the Muslims do the same? If they succeed, they will deserve fame and glory. All the more so that we have an understanding, the Americans have assured us that they intend to work in the closest possible contact with us, and I am in fact quite pleased with the personal and professional relations I have developed with U.S. Special Envoy Charles Redman. So, my attitude to all this is calm. But it is important that all these agreements and intentions expressed both publicly and privately should be implemented in the same form in which they were declared.

[Pasko] Vitaliy Ivanovich, now the last question. We—I mean President Yeltsin—have suggested holding a summit on the Bosnian settlement. Knowing all that you know, how did your partners in the former Yugoslavia settlement talks react to this proposal, in your opinion?

[Churkin] Well, for instance, I have just seen the British statement that welcomes this proposal. When I say partners, I mean a broader circle of partners involved in the settlement of this conflict. So here is the first unequivocally positive response, but there is something I would like to add. Of course, as far as I know, the proposal does not imply that the meeting could take place tomorrow, or the day after tomorrow, or next Sunday. It is desirable to have it within some deadline, so that we do not lose the impetus gained through resolving the political crisis around Sarajevo, but intensive work will of course be necessary to achieve this. I must say that right now we are involved in extremely intensive work on political settlement in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Second, we do not think that this is the only possible format of such meeting. There can be some other forms of a summit. So, although this was stated formally and authoritatively by the president, we are open to suggestions. I would like to finish this with a little joke: We are against any kinds of ultimatums.

Comments on Follow-Up to Bosnia Success

MK2602124094 Moscow KOMMERSANT-DAILY in Russian 26 Feb 94 p 3

[Sergey Tsekhmistrenko report: "Bosnia's Enfant Terrible Is Expected in Moscow Soon"]

[Excerpts] Russia intends to follow up on its diplomatic success in the Balkans. Andrey Kozyrev has personally invited Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic to come to Moscow. In the West his name has become a synonym for "Serb aggression" and he is considered "the number one defendant" in the future international trial of Yugoslavia war criminals. He will arrive in Moscow at the beginning of next week. This sensational piece of news was reported to KOMMERSANT-DAILY's correspondent Sergey Tsekhmistrenko in an exclusive interview by the president's special envoy Vitaliy Churkin, the main "culprit" for the Balkan triumph. The conversation took place immediately after yesterday's session of the Federation Council, where Mr. Churkin made a statement during the debate on sending an additional Russian troop contingent to Bosnia. In his opinion, Russia,

having blocked the execution of NATO's ultimatum, saved not only Sarajevo but the North Atlantic bloc itself from an inevitable ground war in the Balkans. [passage omitted]

What lies ahead?

According to Mr. Churkin, Russia intends to exploit the success. In this context he welcomes the Federation Council's decision to send an additional 300-strong contingent to the conflict zone which will be deployed not only to Sarajevo but also other hot spots (the results of the discussion, in the diplomat's opinion, point to the first indications of a democratic consensus on foreign policy emerging). The dialogue with the Serbs will also be raised to a basically new level, and in this sense Karadzic's upcoming visit can be seen as only a first sign that could be followed by Moscow's de facto recognition of Slobodan Milosevic (up to now his relations with Yeltsin have been rather cool). Mr. Churkin said preparations are under way for a summit meeting of "great power" leaders (on Yeltsin's initiative). In his words, the West has supported this idea while the debate at present is centered around the "format of the meeting:" whether it will be attended by five (as Yeltsin proposed) or more leaders. At this point KOMMERSANT-DAILY's commentator differs with the deputy minister, believing that there is far from universal support for Yeltsin's idea in the West while considerable efforts are yet to be undertaken to make sure that Vitaliy Churkin's hopes are translated into life. And his own efforts will also be essential here. May God help him!

Lauds Yeltsin's Bosnia Initiative

PM2502164194 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 26 Feb 94 p 3

[Konstantin Eggert report: "Vitaliy Churkin: 'Russia Has Saved Not Only Sarajevo, but Also NATO's Prestige'"]

[Text] "The significance of President Yeltsin's initiative on Bosnia must not be underestimated, but it is still too early to sound a victory"—Vitaliy Churkin, deputy foreign minister and the special representative of the head of the Russian state for the former Yugoslavia, stated in an interview with IZVESTIYA.

He admitted that the main difficulty continues to be the search for a formula for a political settlement in Bosnia-Herzegovina. "A meeting between five leading powers—Russia, the United States, Great Britain, France, and Germany—is not the only possibility, and we have already proposed other options for the cast of participants," Churkin reported, avoiding more detailed explanations.

Answering a question about the degree of mistrust which the Muslims feel toward the officers and men in the Russian peacekeeping battalion, the deputy chief of Russian diplomacy said: "I raised this question myself in a conversation with President Alija Izetbegovic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and I think I was able to convince him that our military are not an anti-Muslim force in any way." Churkin emphasized the amicable tone of the talks with Izetbegovic, noting: "We are proceeding from the official statements of the Bosnian leadership, and not paying attention to the irresponsible Muslim activists who want war rather than peace."

Following the 12 December elections, AFP circulated a report to the effect that the Russian battalion in Croatia, part of which is now redeployed in Sarajevo, voted almost to a man for the communists and Zhirinovskiy's party. In that case, can we count on the impartiality of these people? Vitaliy Churkin gave the following answer to this question: "AFP did not count up the votes. We have secret ballots, and everyone is free in making his decision. I know the servicemen in the battalion. They are highly professional and disciplined officers and men. Today they are standing in the line of fire, preventing both the Muslims and the Serbs from being killed."

The president's special representative is convinced that the Kremlin's initiative has saved not only Sarajevo, but also NATO's prestige. In his opinion, air raids would have led to an escalation of war on the entire territory of Bosnia, because they may have created the illusion among some of the Muslims of an easy victory, which in actual fact would have been unattainable. "Following the bombings, the North Atlantic bloc would have had to take the next logical step—that of bringing ground forces into Bosnia, which would have dragged Europe into the quagmire of a long and futile war," Vitaliy Churkin believes.

Foreign Ministry 'Closely Analyzing' Bosnia

LD2802122094 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1137 GMT 28 Feb 94

[Text] Russia's Foreign Ministry is "closely analyzing" the situation following the downing of four combat planes belonging to the Bosnian Serbs Monday morning in the area of Banja Luka in Bosnia-Herzegovina by NATO aircraft, a senior Foreign Ministry official told Interfax on Monday.

As he said, Russia's Foreign Ministry sent an inquiry to the headquarters of the UN Protection Forces in the former Yugoslavia. "According to the preliminary data available to the headquarters, the Bosnian Serbs' planes were returning to their base after a bomb strike on a military plant controlled by Bosnian Muslims. If this is indeed the case, the Bosnian Serbs violated one of the UN Security Council's resolutions adopted more than a year ago. The resolution bans flights by military planes in the air space of Bosnia-Herzegovina," he said.

According to the diplomat, the "closed skies" resolution has been repeatedly violated by Bosnian Serbs, Muslims and Croats. "They all were aware of the possible "adequate military" measures toward "the violator." However such measures were not taken till today," he said.

Russian diplomats who scored in the past two weeks considerable successes on the road of settling the crisis in Bosnia by peaceful means had repeatedly warned the Serbs, Croats and Muslims against the possible provocations "by field commanders or whoever else," Interfax's interviewee pointed out. "Now what we warned against and what we feared has happened," he said.

Army Chief on Tasks Facing New Contingent in Bosnia

LD2602141994 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1100 GMT 26 Feb 94

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Vladimir Gondusov]

[Text] Moscow, 26 Feb—The Russian side has adopted the only correct stance in the settlement of the Bosnian conflict: "The best path to peace is the one that does not produce human casualties." This was stated at a news conference today by Colonel General Mikhail Kolesnikov, chief of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces.

The situation in the region of the conflict, the general said, remains complex. The NATO ultimatum on bombardments has not been lifted. An increase in forces is essential. This is why, at the suggestion of the Russian president, the Federation Council decided to send an additional contingent of Russian "blue helmets."

They have been given the task, Mikhail Kolesnikov said, of separating the opposing sides, preventing attempts to transfer heavy weapons to other parts of the Balkans, ensuring unhampered access to Sarajevo for humanitarian aid convoys, and creating conditions for the deployment of additional UN forces.

New Contingent To Arrive in March

LD2602155494 Moscow Radio Rossii Network in Russian 1200 GMT 26 Feb 94

[Text] Russia has begun to play a more independent role in the Bosnian conflict. The fulfillment by the Serbs of their commitments to withdraw heavy weapons from the vicinity of Sarajevo is, to a great extent, an act of trust in Russian policy in the region. According to our correspondent Marina Chernyukha, this was stated at a news conference in Moscow today by Mikhail Kolesnikov, chief of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces. He emphasized that compared with the Muslims' infantry the Serbian infantry now finds itself in a disadvantageous position. If the former want to seek revenge, it might have grave consequences.

The prevention of provocations by either side is the main task of the Russian blue helmets. It was noted at the briefing that the additional contingent of 300 servicemen will be arriving in Bosnia in March.

KRASNAYA ZVEZDA on 'Provocations' in Bosnia

PM2502130994 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 25 Feb 94 p 3

[Report by Sergey Sidorov: "President Warns Against Provocations In Sarajevo"]

[Text] As is known, Russian head of state Boris Yeltsin expressed the hope that all sides in the Bosnian conflict will observe the cease-fire and will not perpetrate any provocations against UN forces, including Russian soldiers in Sarajevo.

Vitaliy Churkin, the Russian Federation president's special representative, before returning to Moscow after his latest tour of former Yugoslavia, said that the possibility of adventurist sorties and provocations against the "blue helmets" in Sarajevo is not ruled out. According to him, there are those among Muslim figures in Bosnia who are continuing to make neurotic and sometimes irresponsible statements. The Russian diplomat did not specify who said what, although it is known that people very close to Bosnian President Alija Izetbegovic have repeatedly called the Russian contingent in Sarajevo "occupiers." Muhamed Sacirbey, the Bosnian Muslim government's representative at the United Nations, used the same word recently.

According to a spokesman for the Russian Armed Forces General Staff, this "rebuke" should seriously worry both the Russian leadership itself and Russia's partners among the NATO countries. Neither the British, nor the French, nor any other national contingent in the UN force in Bosnia has been attacked in this way. And if the deliberate defamation of the Russian "blue helmets," who played a key part in relieving the tension around Sarajevo, does not stop, Russia, according to him, will be fully entitled to consider a range of independent measures to protect its soldiers. That is what France did, for example, by sending an aircraft carrier group to the Adriatic Sea when Paris believed the lives of the French servicemen in Bosnia to be in particular danger.

Nonetheless, Russia's stance on the Bosnian conflict remains the same. No ultimatums or threats of intervention by force will help resolve the crisis, which has a considerable international as well as internal dimension. Russian diplomacy's aim at the present stage is to make the cease-fire in Sarajevo the breakthrough to peace in Bosnia as a whole. And this will be achieved through close cooperation with the United Nations and NATO. This is the aim of the new Russian initiative on a summit meeting to discuss ways of stopping the war in former Yugoslavia, to be attended by the United States, Russia, France, Britain, and Germany. The foundation for the success of the conference exists. At the Bonn meeting on Tuesday there was unanimity, according to observers, among the Europeans, Americans, and Russians on a number of aspects. Chiefly on the fact that all countries interested in a settlement of the conflict must use all their political authority to pressure the warring sides into

accepting the terms of the EC peace plan with regard to the territorial division of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Western capitals' initial reaction to Russia's initiative varied. The British Foreign Office has so far refrained from commenting, traditionally deferring to Washington. The United States, in turn, is in no hurry to assess the initiative, believing that a "summit meeting would require a great deal of preparation." There was a neutral, "if not negative" reaction from Rome. "The fact that Italy was not named among the participants in the proposed meeting made a negative impression" on Italian Foreign Minister B. Andreatta.

Foreign Ministry Condemns Violence in Hebron

LD2502183594 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1610 GMT 25 Feb 94

[Text] Moscow, 25 Feb (ITAR-TASS)—The Russian Foreign Ministry issued a statement today, saying the following:

Violence has again flared up in the territories occupied by Israel. At dawn today an Israeli settler opened machine-gun fire, killing and wounding dozens of people in al-Khalil [Hebron]. As a result, the situation has sharply deteriorated on the West Bank of the river Jordan and in the Gaza sector, and clashes have taken place between Israelis and Palestinians, causing more human casualties.

We decisively condemn this act of terror, carried out during a time of prayer in the month of Ramadan, which is sacred for Muslims. Measures must urgently be taken to prevent similar occurrences in the future and to punish the culprits. We express our condolences to the families of those who were killed and injured, and to all Palestinians.

It is notable that the incident in al-Khalil has been condemned by the leadership and the main political parties in Israel, which, however, does not absolve the Israeli leadership of full responsibility, nor does it remove the need to act in such a way that will prevent violence from increasing.

Such acts are certainly having a negative influence on the process of the Arab-Israeli dialogue and are damaging to everything positive that has been achieved toward a Middle East settlement through intense efforts. This crime has been carried out precisely when a tangible possibility was taking shape for arriving at an agreement between Israel and the PLO on the introduction of self-government in Gaza and the Jericho area. We consider it necessary to do everything possible to ensure a productive continuation of the talks and to prevent giving the extremists a chance to torpedo the peace process.

The Russian Foreign Ministry is closely following the development of the events and is in contact with the interested parties in the interest of a speedy normalization of the situation and the creation of conditions for the further development of the peace process in the Middle East.

Kozyrev Expresses Condolences to 'Arafat

LD2602143794 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1251 GMT 26 Feb 94

[Text] Moscow, 26 Feb—Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev was in touch with PLO Chairman Yasir 'Arafat today. He expressed condolences in connection with the tragic death of scores of totally innocent people in Hebron (al-Khalil), which has aroused the indignation of Palestinians, Arabs, and the entire Muslim world. We resolutely condemn this crime, the minister said.

Andrey Kozyrev expressed the hope that neither the Palestinians nor the Israelis would give in to the provocations of extremists and that the vigorous search for an all-embracing peace in the Near East would be continued.

In this connection Yasir 'Arafat stressed that he was interested in Russia's vigorous efforts. He requested the UN Security Council to support the Palestinian proposals.

Andrey Kozyrev replied that Russian representatives at the UN would urgently be given instructions on this score. They agreed to maintain day-to-day contact on these issues both by telephone and via diplomatic channels.

Defense Minister Grachev Arrives in Norway

LD2502183294 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1749 GMT 25 Feb 94

[Text] Oslo February 25 ITAR-TASS—Russian Defence Minister Pavel Grachev arrived here today on a working visit. At the airport he was welcomed by Norwegian Defence Minister Jorgen Kosmo.

The ministers discussed security in Northern Europe and possible bilateral cooperation of the armed forces on the Kola Peninsula. Grachev and Kosmo laid wreaths to the monument to Russian servicemen killed in Norway during the Second World War.

A meeting of Pavel Grachev and Norwegian Foreign Minister Bjorn Tore Godal focused on bilateral cooperation, ecological problems of the Novaya Zemlya and settlement of the Bosnian crisis.

Grachev will also visit the Norwegian parliament to meet heads of several parliamentary committees. On Saturday he will leave for Lillehammer to see the Winter Olympics.

Comments on European Security

LD2502224594 Moscow Ostankino Television First Channel Network in Russian 2140 GMT 25 Feb 94

[Excerpts] [Announcer] Pavel Grachev, the Russian defense minister, arrived in the Norwegian capital on Friday on a working visit. [passage omitted]

[Begin Grachev recording] If we really want to cooperate for peace, if we want two—not two, let us say Russia and NATO to draw together—of course, the priority role should be given to Russia as a great power. It looks like it is pointless to decide issues of security in Europe without Russia. [end recording]

Soskovets in Norway, Discusses Oil

LD2702225694 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1830 GMT 27 Feb 94

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Igor Pshenichnikov]

[Excerpt] Lillehammer (Norway), 27 Feb—Oleg Soskovets, first deputy head of the Russian Government, paying an official visit to Norway today met Norwegian Minister for the Economy, Oil Industry and Power Sector Jens Stoltenberg.

Oleg Soskovets told ITAR-TASS that the meeting focused on cooperation between the two countries to exploit offshore oil deposits. Norway has unique experience in this area and the future of the Russian generating industry lies precisely in this kind of extraction of oil and gas. A month ago, Russia and Norway signed a memorandum on cooperation in oilfield development. This is now being put into effect and a legal framework is being drawn up. Norway is interested in partnership with Russia and is planning close cooperation with it also as part of the European energy charter. Our interest is in management experience in oil and gas extraction with foreign investment, Oleg Soskovets stressed.

Commenting on the outcome of his meeting here on Saturday with Norwegian Foreign Minister Bjorn Godal, he said that Norway is closely following the reform process in Russia. The Norwegian foreign minister was told that no changes to the Russian government's reform policy are planned and that the reforms are irreversible. It was also stressed that Russia is in a special situation by virtue of its involvement in the CIS. This refers primarily to the credits for fuel purchases that Russia extends to CIS states because of economic and political circumstances. These credits are considerably more than the aid being planned by the G-7 and the IMF. This circumstance defines the specific nature of relations between Russia and the other CIS states, the first deputy prime minister emphasised. [passage omitted]

Political Issues

Yeltsin Says Pardon 'Presidential Prerogative'

LD2602171894 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1652 GMT 26 Feb 94

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Tamara Zamyatina]

[Text] Moscow February 26 TASS—A letter of Russian President Boris Yeltsin to State Duma speaker Ivan Rybkin reminded him that the pardon is a presidential prerogative under the Russian Constitution. The letter was passed over today by presidential adviser Georgiy Satarov.

The letter says the deputies used the notion of "political amnesty" instead of the "pardon" term. Referring to the presidential message, Boris Yeltsin also reminded the speaker that civil reconciliation does not mean all-forgiveness and clemency should not run counter to the law and morals.

The president offered deputies of the lower parliament chamber to improve the resolution and bring it in correspondence with the constitutional norms. Yeltsin also considers it necessary to elaborate a criterion of politicians' responsibility for their decisions, says the letter.

Sends Letter to State Duma

LD2602174094 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1722 GMT 26 Feb 94

[Text] Moscow February 26 TASS—Russian President Boris Yeltsin has sent a letter to speaker of the Russian State Duma Ivan Rybkin.

"I am very satisfied with the Duma intention to follow the path of national reconciliation, civil peace and accord. I am convinced this intention is sincere. This is what I call for in my annual message that was passed over to you on February 24, 1994," says the document.

Recognizing and respecting constitutional powers of the Duma, including those related to the amnesty issues, Boris Yeltsin noted that the formula used in the resolution is rather not an amnesty but a pardon, which is a prerogative of the president. He also thinks that the resolution did not fully develop the practical side of the issue, insufficiently considered and ensured political and social consequences of the decision.

"In this connection and aiming to consolidate the spirit of constructive cooperation and accord, I suggest to:

1. Improve the resolution and bring it in full correspondence with the Constitution and the Russian legislation.

2. Develop and adopt as a memorandum a system of criteria, forms and mechanisms of responsibility of state institutions and politicians for decisions whose consequences hamper our joint policy towards national reconciliation, civil peace and accord.

I would be grateful if you consider it possible to do this work together with presidential representatives," says the letter.

Sources at the presidential press service told ITAR-TASS, State Duma speaker Ivan Rybkin met presidential adviser Georgiy Satarov today to discuss the implementation of measures suggested by the Russian president in the letter to the Duma speaker.

Amnesty Suspension 'Not Legitimate'

LD2602200594 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1818 GMT 26 Feb 94

[Text] The demand by the Russian President to "suspend the amnesty" declared by the State Duma, is not legitimate, Interfax was told Saturday by the chairman of the security committee of the Russian State Duma Viktor Ilyukhin (Communist party faction).

He believes the resolution of the political and economic amnesty is "the right and timely act. It does not flare up a civil war. It is those who are trying to stay in power."

Ilyukhin said that according to the Russian Constitution adopted at the referendum on December 12, the adoption of the act on amnesty is the prerogative of the lower house of parliament and "the president, and the Federation Council have nothing in common with it. [no end quotation mark as received]

Speaking about the resignation of the Russian Prosecutor General Aleksey Kazannik, Ilyukhin said that he made a premature step. "If he really wants to guard legality and order, he must not resign but implement the decision of the legislative body."

The State Duma, believes Ilyukhin, will confirm the act again, since most deputies voted for it.

By his actions the Russian President has confirmed again that he had never respected the old Constitution and will not respect the new, presidential Constitution, said Ilyukhin.

Further Reaction to Duma Amesty Decision Reported

Legal Aspects Need Clarification

LD2702165194 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1302 GMT 27 Feb 94

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Kontantin Pribytkov]

[Text] Fribourg (Switzerland), 27 Feb—According to Sergey Filatov, the head of the Russian president's administration, it is necessary to clarify the legal aspects of the decision by the State Duma on political amnesty. "This is not a matter of the individuals to whom the decision applies. This is a matter of principle. A precedent is being created in society when the article 'Political Rehabilitation' is extended to criminals or people

charged with committing crimes," he told an ITAR-TASS correspondent. "This is incomprehensible to Russian society and to the rest of the world, and it is this aspect that should be clarified first and foremost."

Filatov, who is in Switzerland to take part in a Russian-Swiss academic seminar organized by the Institute of Federalism of the Fribourg University, said in the interview he regretted that the Constitutional Court was not working. In his words, the court ought to decide whether the decision of the Duma was constitutional. "If we have decided to live according to the Constitution, then this ought to be justified by the Constitution."

The concept of "political amnesty" presumes that there was a political offense. "But what is at issue are people that have committed a criminal offense," Sergey Filatov continued. "And this criminal offense cannot be given an amnesty by the said resolution. Because neither the carrying of arms, nor the use or keeping of arms, nor calls to use violence—all the things that these people are accused of—can be given an amnesty. That is the craftiness of it. In general, it has no legal precedent."

The head of the Russian Federation Presidential Administration reminded that two people who used arms have already been convicted by the court. "The court has ruled and they are already in prison. What kind of political amnesty can one talk of here?"

The intentions of those who initiated the decision are clear: "To reach peaceful accord, to refrain from stirring up the things that happened. They must be stirred up," Filatov believes. "The culprits should be identified by name. We have been moving toward this goal for longer than 24 hours. Unfortunately, we have been moving toward this goal for almost a year, starting from the Seventh Congress. All the conciliatory initiatives by the president were met with a categorical rejection, there was aggression and hostility that put one part of society at loggerheads with another. Somebody must answer for that."

"When people speak about political amnesty, I would like first of all to define its meaning," the head of the presidential administration remarked. "If there are political crimes in our country, those guilty must be found here, too. Is it somehow related to the political rehabilitation of people who were sentenced and repressed at one time? No, the situation is totally different, and I believe therefore, that a full stop should be put here in a legal appraisal."

Amnesty Not in Violation of Law

LD2802140294 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1251 GMT 28 Feb 94

[By ITAR-TASS parliamentary correspondent Ivan Novikov]

[Text] Moscow, 28 Feb—The State Duma Council did not see that there were any grounds for thinking that, by issuing the anmesty resolution, the State Duma had exceeded its powers and violated the law and the Constitution. That was the conclusion to which the participants of today's session of the chamber's council came.

The council discussed the situation that had emerged in connection with the anmesty decision and the negative reaction to it from the president's administration.

It is expected that the Duma Council will issue a special statement concerning that matter.

Further Duma Council Comments

LD2802144194 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1345 GMT 28 Feb 94

[By ITAR-TASS parliamentary correspondent Ivan Novikov]

[Text] Moscow, 28 Feb—The State Duma Council sees no grounds for thinking that the State Duma exceeded its powers and violated the law and the consitution with its decision on the amnesty. That was the conclusion reached by the participants in today's session of the chamber's council.

The council discussed the situation that has developed over the anmesty decision and the negative reaction to it from the president's staff.

Commenting on the course of the session at the request of the ITAR-TASS correspondent, Valentin Kovalev, deputy chairman of the Duma, said: "Several of the country's political figures have spoken in the press about the amnesty and stated that the act adopted by the State Duma should be regarded more as a pardon than as an amnesty." However, "there are clear legal criteria that make it possible to distinguish between these two acts. An amnesty is a legislative instrument that is binding for all. A pardon is an act that is applied individually and must be applied strictly to a specified person. Furthermore, a pardon covers only the convicted. An amnesty also covers those under investigation, as in this case."

"In my view, there are no grounds whatsoever for saying that the State Duma exceeded its rights and violated the law and the constitution; the Duma Council registered this opinion in the record, and there were no objections to this view," Valentin Kovalev noted.

Poltoranin Terms Decision 'Thoughtless'

LD2502165694 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1609 GMT 25 Feb 94

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Tamara Ivanova]

[Text] Moscow February 25 TASS—"The thoughtless and impulsive decision of the State Duma on amnesty may entail the most grave consequences for Russia," chairman of the Duma Committee on Information Policy and Communications Mikhail Poltoranin told an exclusive ITAR-TASS interview here today.

The initiators of "political amnesty made a fool" not only of themselves but also of those they supported; "Both the August 1991 putsch plotters and participants in the bloody October developments should plead guilty in order to become free," said Poltoranin.

In the opinion of Poltoranin, the opposition worked most for the liberation of Aleksandr Rutskoy as a "national leader". But the situation will also be used by people who fired at unarmed people.

The amnesty resolution is an act of humiliation and discrediting of the authorities, not only those executive, said Poltoranin. "It is a blow on the law-enforcement bodies and the legal system of the state," he noted.

Intruding into competence of the court bodies, the State Duma did not think about consequences. The latter may not only occur in political life but also affect the interior bodies, which fight against crime risking the lives of their staffers.

Poltoranin said he is against "global amnesties". In his opinion, some 20,000 people will be freed from prisons and penitentiaries to make the life of law-abiding citizens even more dangerous.

Barannikov Welcomes Amnesty

LD2502213694 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1941 GMT 25 Feb 94

[By ITAR-TASS corespondent Olga Solodova]

[Text] Moscow February 25 TASS—Former Russian Security Minister Viktor Barannikov, who was arrested as an organiser of the armed opposition revolt last October in Moscow, welcomed the amnesty to anti-Yeltsin rebels proclaimed by the State Duma, but does not believe himself to be guilty of anything.

"I welcome the amnesty if it leads to stabilisation of the political situation in the country", Barannikov was quoted as saying by his lawyer Dmitriy Matveyenko on Friday.

Matveyenko, however, told TASS that the former minister understands that an amnesty covers only guilty people and "does not consider himself to be such a man".

Barannikov is currently staying at home. He was transferred from prison to hospital because of heart problems and later released on condition that he stays in moscow.

The lawyer said his client had been already discharged from hospital and his state of health is satisfactory.

Gorbachev Says Decision Premature

LD2502161094 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1402 GMT 25 Feb 94

[Text] Former president of the USSR Mikhail Grobachev believes that the State Duma's resolution on political amnesty was discussed with President Boris Yeltsin beforehand. In an interview with Interfax on Friday he noted that the speaker of the parliament's lower chamber Ivan Rybkin insisted on taking this decision, and, in Gorbachev's opinion, "this decision is too serious not to have been discussed with the president beforehand."

Gorbachev says that the fact that in his speech to the Federal Assembly on the following day Yeltsin did not mention the subject of amnesty confirms his version.

Gorbachev pointed out that he had always favored that the coup plotters face a trial, a trial which would be open and complete, "otherwise we will not learn the lessons of the August 1991 events."

At the same time, he said, if the State Duma's resolution really promotes national accord, he is ready to understand and accept that.

Gorbachev noted that he is ready to support the decision if the State Duma, all political movements of the country and Russian society will act jointly for the sake of accord, for the rescue of Russia, as it was declared after the adoption of the amnesty resolution.

"Even though all this concerns me directly, because the creation of the State of Emergency Committee inflicted a unrepairable damage to the country and to me personally, I put the interests of Russia higher," he stressed.

However, Gorbachev did not rule out that the State Duma's decision would finally lead to further confrontation. (The full text of the interview given by M. Gorbachev to Interfax will be published in one of the next editions of "Interfax-Exclusive").

Democratic Russia Denounces Decision

LD2602191594 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1818 GMT 26 Feb 94

[Text] The Coordinating Council of the "Democratic Russia" Movement has called the Duma's amnesty decision "an attempt of revenge by communist and fascist extremists."

The move threatens all Russia since "it can undermine political stability and disturb peace in Russia," says a statement released by the movement in Moscow on Saturday.

The movement regards the decision as legally misleading since amnesty as pardon presupposes reference to concrete criminal code clauses. However, there are no such references in the ruling, which need to be reexamined by the Prosecutor General from the angle of its compliance with the law.

Those Duma members and factions that voted for the amnesty, as democrats believe, cannot expect popular trust today, nor can they hope for respect by posterity. "This applies most of all to those of them who just recently disguised themselves as democrats, above all

Sergey Shakhray and Sergey Stankevich, the Russian Unity and Concord Party leaders. On February 23, 1994, they deserved the name "traitor," the document says.

The democrats are convinced that at a time of rampant crime and political instability, putting the Duma's amnesty into effect "threatens the rights, life, and property of the people of Russia and the constitutional system in the country; it will untie the hands of both those who once rebelled against the legitimate government and of a significant number of criminals."

Chubays: Amnesty Absolves 'Murderers'

LD2502174794 Moscow Mayak Radio Network in Russian 1547 GMT 25 Feb 94

[Text] A media briefing took place in Moscow today. Anatoliy Borisovich Chubays, chairman of the State Committee for Management of State Property, spoke at it. The majority of his talk was devoted to the plans for privatization and Russian President Boris Yeltsin's message to the Federal Assembly. You can hear the second part of Anatoliy Borisovich's news conference tomorrow. But now we shall tell you about, we shall dwell on, the other no less important and urgent questions which Anataoliy Chubays touched upon.

[Begin Chubays recording] A few words about the Duma's amnesty decision. Overall I must say that this decision of course qualitatively alters the situation, in the sense that the Duma and its leader, Rybkin, have revealed their true colors, and have called a spade a spade. Everything can now be seen in its true light. Any illusions which existed before on this matter have now been dispelled. Everyone should be clear about this.

To tell the truth, I am concerned not only about Khasbulatov and Rutskoy, personally—good luck to them. What I am worried about is that the decision in the form in which it has been adopted, this decision essentially saves actual murderers—and I use these words advisedly—actual murderers from any punishment at all. There is, for example, a certain Shtukaturov who, it was established during an investigation, personally fired a grenade launcher at Ostankino. Four people died as a result of that shot, including one video engineering and three cloakroom assistants.

Totally innocent people died. Their blood is on the hands of the murderers. Since the moment the amnesty decision was made, the blood is also on the hands of those who voted for it. Zhirinovskiy personally, and Zyuganov personally, have blood on their hands and so have their groupings.

I would like to ask Zhirinovskiy personally, and Zyuganov personally, to go and meet the families of the people who died—if only the families of the cloakroom attendants and the video engineer—and to explain their actions and how they can justify their decision. What they will have is not an abstract vote in the Duma but a conversation with living people, the relatives of those who died at the hands of murderers who will be at liberty tomorrow, and who did not use cold steel—a knife or a pistol—but fired a grenade launcher in the capital in broad daylight on a Sunday. This man is to be freed tomorrow thanks to the decision of the State Duma. [end recording]

Lysenko: Amnesty 'Destabilizing Factor'

LD2602192394 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1818 GMT 26 Feb 94

[Text] The State Duma deputy Vladimir Lysenko, one of the leadership of the Yabloko faction, does not believe that there will be civil reconciliation in Russia after adoption of the memorandum on accord and resolution on amnesty by the State Duma. On Saturday in his interview with Interfax he expressed opinion that people "who are in Matrosskaya Tishina and Lefortovo will start an active political struggle against the president, government, and existing regime immediately after their liberation."

Lysenko qualified the resolution on amnesty, which, as he said, was initiated by the leader of the Party of Russian Unity and Concord Sergey Shakhray, as "a destabilizing factor." At the same time he pointed out that if "an extremist wave is not very high after the liberation of the October events participants then Shakhray will bypass his major political rivals of democratic orientation, Yegor Gaydar and Grigory Yavlinskiy." "If the situation sharpens then the consequences will be very serious both for Shakhray and for the Party of Russian Unity and Concord headed by him. In this case the president will dismiss the initiator of this document," he said.

Lysenko did not rule out possibility of "preliminary contacts" between the State Duma speaker Ivan Rybkin and Boris Yeltsin on the issue on amnesty. At the same time he declared that "Shakhray was the first in this issue." "I am almost sure that first of all Shakhray has coordinated this issue with Premier Viktor Chernomyrdin," said Lysenko.

Rybkin Says Consultations Needed

LD2602192794 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1916 GMT 26 Feb 94

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Aleksandr Chernov]

[Text] Moscow February 26 TASS—Russian State Duma Speaker Ivan Rybkin told ITAR-TASS today they will have to take up the amnesty question several times, as the process will last for six months and require explanations as need be.

Rybkin said they need most interaction with the president, the government and the Federation Council. The interaction has been discussed with Presidential Assistant Georgiy Satarov. There is also need for a memorandum to include a system of criteria and a mechanism to ensure national reconciliation, civil peace and accord.

Speaking of possible consequences of the amnesty, Rybkin said "street political fighting and gladiators a la Rus are inadmissible. If someone tries to do it, one can be sure: the State Duma and the president will be able to put them in place."

The speaker also reminded that "amnesty as a rule suggests toughened punishment for repeated violation".

As for persons liable for political amnesty, they are expected to "actively join Russian life and the search for interaction". Those who do not want to involve in "the common cause" should better say at home, said Rybkin.

People's Party Urges Court Inquiry

LD2702155994 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1426 GMT 27 Feb 94

[Text] The Russian People's Party led by Telman Gdlyan has urged President Boris Yeltsin to ask the Constitutional Court to question the legitimacy of the State Duma resolution concerning amnesty.

In its statement published Saturday evening the party qualifies the resolution on granting amnesty to those who "instigated and joined" the events of August 19-21, 1991, May 1 and September 21-October 4, 1993 as "another victory won by the anti-reformist forces and disregard for the norms of morality and law". According to the document, connivance at these forces was what inspired them to stage their revolt in August of 1991, which led to frustrating the plans to sign a union treaty, breaking up the USSR and exposing the nation to severe hardships. "Unfortunately, as a result of political near-sightedness, the Russian leadership continued Gorbachev's policy of conciliation with the reactionary forces," the document states.

According to its authors, the State Duma resolution, "which is allegedly aimed at reaching conciliation and national concord, is in fact an attempt to legitimize lawlessness, anarchy and the use of force in political strife".

The Russian People's Party expressed concern over the fact that the encouragement of those who organized and perpetrated "monstrous crimes" may lead to another coup "aimed at curbing democratic reforms and unleashing a civil war".

Popov Accuses Yeltsin of 'Inaction'

LD2702154594 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1426 GMT 27 Feb 94

[Text] A well-known reformist Russian politician has described the position of President Boris Yeltsin and his team on the recent amnesty issue as one of "amazing inaction."

Gavriil Popov, chairman of the Russian Movement for Democratic Reforms, addressing a meeting of the movement leadership on Saturday, said the president could have forestalled the amnesty decision of parliament by putting before it his own draft resolution laying down conditions on which those involved in last October's conservative revolt could be released, one of which could be a ban on any political activity for a specified period.

Parliament's amnesty resolution could prove to be "either a step towards national conciliation or a step towards the aggravation of the situation," Popov said.

He said the prosecution of the organizers of the 1991 coup attempt and of the October 1993 rebellion had proved "the total helplessness" of Russia's law enforcement system. The Prosecutor General's Office needs "purging from top to bottom," he said.

At the same meeting, Popov described NATO's plan to carry out air strikes against the Bosnian Serbs as "the first attempt of the West to provide a legal basis for Russia's expulsion from the number of great powers."

He said the fact that the case of the Ames couple, charged with espionage for Russia, was given publicity at a time when the Serbs were withdrawing their heavy weapons from around Sarajevo looked like "an attempt to discredit in the eyes of the Americans the first independent step of Russia."

"Surely America could not admit that its policy in Yugoslavia had fallen through," Popov said.

Legal Status of Decision Analyzed

MK2602094094 Moscow ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI in Russian 26 Feb 94 p 1

[Unattributed report: "Amnesty: ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI Experts' Opinion"]

[Text] Russian General Prosecutor Aleksey Kazannik must apparently have contradictory feelings about having landed in the problematic legal situation created by a majority of the State Duma deputies who spoke for passing the decree announcing political and economic amnesty.

First, being general prosecutor, Aleksey Kazannik has no right to oversee the legality of a legal act passed by the State Duma. Hence his unequivocal statement that the General Prosecutor's Office would immediately execute the Duma decree as soon as the document is on the general prosecutor's desk. As many people know, a package of Duma acts was delivered on the evening of 24 February at 15a Pushkinskaya Street, where A. Kazannik's agency is located. He, according to General Prosecutor's Office officials, is ill at the moment. Will this circumstance affect the date for making a decision?

Second, there is also no knowing what the general prosecutor's reaction would be to the circumstance that a number of noted lawyers have serious doubts about the constitutionality of some of the provisions of the amnesty decree. Solving such differences is the prerogative of the Constitutional Court, but it is not functioning at present.

What shall be done in this case? How is one to qualify the Duma decree in regard to acts of treason?—precisely this article is invoked to charge a number of persons from among the organizers of the August 1991 and October 1993 events. Would it not be acting against logic and legal norms if the Duma amnesties Rutskoy, Khasbulatov, and others, and leaves in jail those who fall under more merciful articles of the Criminal Code?

Finally, one detail of no mean importance is the entering into force of the decree as soon as it becomes published. The State Duma has no press organ of its own that could be an official information source. The Duma is not known to have passed any normative act on this score. This means that the appearance of Duma decisions on the pages of some newspaper is no more than information.

Thus, in addition to creating political tensions, the State Duma decision also creates a field for confrontation of a legal nature.

Time will tell whether the legal community is going to have an impact on the Duma decision. At any rate, the controversial nature of this situation will affect the future of the Lefortovo inmates.

Khasbulatov, Rutskoy, Other Prisoners Released

LD2602151394 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1456 GMT 26 Feb 94

[By ITAR-TASS correspondents Anna Melnikova and Aleksandr Kharchenko]

[Text] Moscow February 26 TASS— Ruslan Khasbulatov, Aleksandr Rutskoy, Albert Makashev, Andrey Dunayev, Viktor Anpilov and Vladislav Achalov were freed from the Lefortovo investigation ward today in accordance with a State Duma resolution on amnesty.

All the accused who agree with the State Duma resolution will be freed from Lefortovo today, Deputy Russian Procurator General Vladimir Kravtsev told ITAR-TASS.

It is Kravtsev who sets free persons arrested after the October 1993 revolt, as Russian Procurator General Aleksey Kazannik sent in his resignation earlier today. Kravtsev has told a news conference today the four deputies of the Russian procurator general are at one with Kazannik and are ready to resign as well.

Comment Upon Release

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[Text] Today Ruslan Khasbulatov, Aleksandr Rutskoy, Albert Makashov, Andrey Dunayev, Viktor Anpilov, Vladislav Achalov, and Ilya Konstantinov left the investigation ward of the Lefortovo prison. Aleksandr Barkashov was released today from the Matrosskaya Tishina prison. They have been released in accordance with the State Duma's anmesty resolution.

What is the mood of the former prisoners who came back to freedom today? Here are some statements of those released:

Anpilov said that if the prices during his imprisonment have gone up, he will struggle on to the victorious end. He sees his task in summoning the working collectives to fight against the regime.

Replying to the question on what he intends to do in the near future, Aleksandr Barkashov said he would do the same as before.

Rutskoy described his release from prison as a return to the people.

Khasbulatov told journalists that he did not think he was to blame.

Makashov said that he intends to go home to Samara for a rest.

Khasbulatov Not To Engage in Politics

LD2702153994 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1426 GMT 27 Feb 94

[Text] The former chairman of Russia's parliament, Ruslan Khabulatov, has said in an exclusive interview with Interfax's correspondent V.Terekhov that he has no intention of engaging in political activity.

He has "a strong aversion for today's politicians", he explained.

"I see no genuine politicians in this country; in its leadership I see no people with whom an agreement could be reached, who would honour their commitments. As compared with them Machiavelli is a child. As for me, I attach particular importance to moral standards in politics," said the former chairman of Russia's parliament.

He intends to engage in taking an inventory of his papers, Khasbulatov said.

"Ironically enough, I concluded two volumes of "World Economics and International Economic Relations" by September 21st," he said. This book exposes "the entire absurdity of economic reforms in Russia", he added.

Khabulatov believes that, had he not been released from Lefortovo under the State Duma resolution, he would have gained freedom anyway for a number of reasons.

"First of all, for the reason that the investigators failed to confirm my guilt, and, secondly, because of my health," he noted.

The tribulations of the past few months affected his health, he said. "I experienced pains in my heart for the first time ever, and so I'll have to take care of my health in earnest," he said.

"During investigations it became clear that I was not responsible for the attempts to seize the mayoralty and the TV center. I addressed people after that, not knowing about the bloody fighting in Ostankino," Khasbulatov said.

When asked about the possibility of returning the amnestied men to Lefortovo, Khasbulatov said: such an attempt would "only emphasize the stupidity of those who may seek to organize this".

Khasbulatov Interviewed on Release

BR2802132594 Rome LA REPUBBLICA in Italian 28 Feb 94 p 5

[Enrico Franceschini report on interview with Ruslan Khasbulatov, former Russian parliamentary speaker, granted to Franceschini and CORRIERE DELLA SERA's Paolo Valentini in Moscow on 27 February: "'There Is a Dictatorship Here; I Will Not Return To Politics'"]

[Text] Moscow—Ruslan Khasbulatov lives behind the Patriarch's ponds, the place in Moscow where Bulgakov set the beginning of his "The Master and Margarita." He lives in a modern apartment block constructed in the typical style of the homes of the former Soviet nomenklatura—a fenced garden, porter's desk, immaculate entrance lobby, and four elevators. It is the same block where I came to interview Leonid Brezhnev's grandson some months ago. The former parliamentary speaker's apartment seemed even larger and more comfortable than that occupied by Brezhnev's grandson—a labyrinth of rooms, mahogany and oak "empire" style furniture, paintings by well-known artists on the walls, and soft carpets. The man who opened the door for us wore no shoes, only socks. As soon as we entered, CORRIERE DELLA SERA's Paolo Valentini and I followed suit and removed our shoes, as is usual in Russian homes, in order to avoid dirtying the floor with snow and mud. In stockinged feet, we followed him to the office where Khasbulatov was waiting for us.

It was his first morning of freedom. He wore a black shirt, blue jeans, and slippers. He held a big cigar, from which he drew from time to time. He was pale, rather as he was when we interviewed him 4 October with Rutskoy in the White House under the gunfire. But of course he was in a much better mood. He got up from a divan covered with a large bearskin, on which we then sat. He shook hands with us and said: "I wanted to meet with you out of politeness, out of respect for what you did that day." He was referring to the appeal that he issued through us for the Western countries to intervene vis-a-vis the Kremlin to save his life and the lives of others, if they surrendered. "But the Russian newspapers printed a lot of nonsense, as though Rutskoy and I had sought help only in order to escape who knows where." We told him how we conveyed their appeal to the Italian diplomatic service and how it reached the EC foreign ministers at their meeting in Brussels.

"This is the first time I have heard about it. The Russian press misled our people. Be that as it may, we came out of parliament alive 4 October not thanks to the help of the European governments but because the commandos of the Alfa and Vympel group sent by Yeltsin to kill us all refused to obey orders. As you know, Alfa and Vympel were dissolved, destroyed as a punishment, a few days ago.

[LA REPUBBLICA] Will you tell us how exactly your arrest took place?

[Khasbulatov] Two young commanders reached us. We had moved to the room next to that in which we received you for the interview a little earlier, because shots were still reaching that one. They said: "Our group has met and decided not to carry out the order to arrest you and to execute you, Ruslan Imranovich [Khasbulatov], Aleksandr Vladimirovich [Rutskoy], whom we greatly respect, and all the others here. We are officers, we have a heart, we reason with our own brains, we love our homeland, and we know that you are defending a just cause—the constitution. If you trust us, follow us, leave here with us, and we will protect you from those people. We will guarantee your safety, even if they attack us." We did trust them, and all went well.

[LA REPUBBLICA] How do you feel now, after five months in prison?

[Khasbulatov] After 144 days, to be exact. Well, the air of freedom is always better, it is a great help. Now I want to finish writing my book on economics, then I will think about a book about what happened in October. The book about the 1991 coup has been translated in several countries, including Italy. I would like a publisher who pays well...

[LA REPUBBLICA] You do not intend to be just a writer, do you?

[Khasbulatov] I must think about it.

[LA REPUBBLICA] Don't you want to return to politics?

[Khasbulatov] In the past three years it has become difficult to find political interlocutors who are really worthy from the viewpoint of integrity. Those with whom I have had dealings behaved like petty criminals, always prepared to break their word. Petty tricksters who adopt the guise of great politicians. They disgust me. I do not know when a new leadership class will emerge. Be that as it may, I am an economics teacher, a respected and well-known academic. I will write books, return to my students.

[LA REPUBBLICA] Do you think that Russian democracy is in danger?

[Khasbulatov] Unfortunately democracy in Russia has taken a great step backward. Until 21 September (the day Yeltsin dissolved parliament—LA REPUBBLICA editor's note) there was a democratic system, a democratic

constitution, better chances of emerging from the economic crisis. Now there is an authoritarian system. Ask the Western leaders whether they are pleased with the result. I would like you to convey my question to Mr. Kohl, Mr. Major, Mr. Mitterrand, Mr. Clinton: Are they pleased with what they have done to Russia? They have helped Yeltsin to become a dictator with no limits or controls, they have driven the country to the brink of destruction. For our people there is no longer any democracy or freedom: Are people in the West happy about this?

[LA REPUBBLICA] Yeltsin and the government are espousing many of your positions in economic policy, in foreign policy...

[Khasbulatov] All they can do is repeat my words. They cannot act. At least they have realized something, despite their lack of intelligence: They have realized that parliament and I were right. Now they are saying what the people want to hear, but I have my doubts about whether they are capable of acting. If they do something, they do so clumsily, unprofessionally. This irritates both the Russian people and the world community.

[LA REPUBBLICA] What is your opinion of this Duma, the new parliament?

[Khasbulatov] It is too early to issue a final assessment. After all, it has only been working for little over a month. For the present, I am grateful to the deputies who, by approving the amnesty, respected the voters' wishes: None of them could have been elected if he had not pledged to struggle to restore some justice.

[LA REPUBBLICA] Was the amnesty a surprise for you?

[Khasbulatov] No, because I know the Russian people and their ability to bring pressure to bear. We owe our freedom entirely to the people. There has been talk about my release for weeks now. In any case there was no evidence; all their attempts to fabricate it were in vain. Their story no longer stood up. They were obliged to release me and Rutskoy. Parliament and I did not take a single illegitimate step, but they wanted to blame us for certain mistakes, the street incidents, and the actions of the armed gangs, which acted autonomously. I never ordered the television station to be attacked.

[LA REPUBBLICA] Did you consult with Rutskoy before deciding whether to accept the amnesty?

[Khasbulatov] No, we were always totally isolated in prison. But I would remind you that to accept an amnesty does not entail acknowledging your guilt.

[LA REPUBBLICA] Were you ever hit or maltreated from the day of your arrest until your release?

[Khasbulatov] Never. Everyone always treated me with respect. I will tell you a story in this regard. It was the commandos of the Alfa group that brought us to prison in a bus. Perhaps somebody did think that I was public enemy number one, because Kortsakov, the head of Yeltsin's personal bodyguard, was in the bus too, and there were two armored cars behind. The young commandos were forbidden to speak, so as they entered the bus, one by one, each of them placed a hand on my arm and squeezed it as a sign of solidarity.

[LA REPUBBLICA] How did you spend your time in prison?

[Khasbulatov] I had a lot of time to reflect. I read a great deal. Books on philosophy. And novels—all of Dreyser's, Sue's "The Mysteries of Paris," and Prosper Merimee.

[LA REPUBBLICA] Were you never depressed?

[Khasbulatov] Never. In my heart I always believed that this is how things would turn out. I never lost hope.

[LA REPUBBLICA] Did you speak with Rutskoy Saturday evening [26 February], after your release?

[Khasbulatov] I phoned him at home but he was already asleep.

[LA REPUBBLICA] What time did you go to bed?

[Khasbulatov] At 0500 this morning. My desk was covered in mail and documents. I spent the night sorting them out.

[LA REPUBBLICA] Did your wife experience any problems during this period?

[Khasbulatov] She received telephone calls telling her that she had to leave this apartment. It is said that Yeltsin has created a new system. It is not true: He uses the same communist methods from before.

[LA REPUBBLICA] You used to be great friends with Boris Yeltsin. How did you become arch enemies?

[Khasbulatov] I would not say that we were great friends. It would take a book to answer your question. We will talk about it again next time.

[LA REPUBBLICA] But if you could say something about Yeltsin now...

[Khasbulatov] I will not say anything. As far as I am concerned, he no longer exists. I regard him neither as a political leader nor as president; this man no longer exists; he is neither dead nor alive. As far as I am concerned, he is finished.

[LA REPUBBLICA] Do you think that Russia shares your opinion and that Yeltsin will not remain in power long?

[Khasbulatov] Yes, I am absolutely sure.

[LA REPUBBLICA] Ruslan Imranovich, pardon me for asking: Why do you always wear a black shirt? Were you wearing one when you were arrested?

[Khasbulatov] No. In parliament I wore a white shirt. But after two weeks of being without water and unable to

wash, it became black. This one really is black, though. I put it on precisely in order to recall 4 October.

Former Prisoners To Seek Stability

LD2702153394 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1426 GMT 27 Feb 94

[Text] The leader of the National Salvation Front and former MP, Ilya Konstantinov, has said that "the former inmates of Lefortovo, as well as most political forces in the country and State Duma deputies, are not interested in bringing political strife in Russia beyond legitimacy; they intend to work to stabilize the political situation".

An active participant in last May's and last October's riots in Moscow, Konstantinov left the Lefortovo prison as a result of the amnesty proclaimed by the State Duma on February 23rd.

According to Konstantinov, the amnesty granted to "those who defended the Supreme Soviet and the Constitution is first of all an act of justice", since "the people charged together with him are not to blame for anything".

Konstantinov described the attempts to link the amnesty with the start of another spiral of civil war in Russia as "political provocation". According to him, in Russian society there are forces interested in "inciting political hysteria" with a view to using the resulting situation as a means of pressure on the State Duma and on the opposition.

When asked about his short-term plans, Konstantinov said that he intends to "have a rest and get his bearings".

Anpilov Comments on Release

LD2602202994 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1823 GMT 26 Feb 94

[Text] At 17:15 Ilya Konstantinov, leader of National Salvation Front, left the investigation prison Lefortovo. A crowd which has gathered at the prison's gates actually embraced him. Saying "Thank you, thank you," Konstantinov came up to his car with great difficulties and moved away.

When asked by journalists who will become Russia's next president, leader of the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia Vladimir Zhirinovskiy who was staying near Lefortovo answered that the people would make their choice. In Zhirinovskiy's words, the people will have to choose either him or Rutskoy.

Leader of the Labor Russia and Russian Communist Labor Party Viktor Anpilov left Lefortovo at 17:25, just after Konstantinov. Hundreds of his supporters welcomed Anpilov.

At an improvised meeting Anpilov declared: "The will of the single Soviet people has torn us from the torture-chambers. We have not recognized our guilt and do not recognize it. There is no guilt. We have chosen amnesty for the sake of accord and reconciliation in the society."

"If I leave the prison and see that prices have dropped and people live better then Yeltsin was right. If prices raised and people live worse then I shall continue my struggle till the victory," declared Anpilov.

Accompanied by a 400-strong crowd of his supporters Anpilov left the square before the investigation prison on foot.

In his interview with Interfax Anpilov said that now his nearest task is "to organize working staffs for struggle with the regime." He intends "to travel throughout the country and to meet with working people."

Anpilov believes that now Premier Viktor Chernomyrdin has occupied that place on the political arena which earlier was occupied by Ruslan Khasbulatov.

According to Anpilov, it is necessary to hold early presidential elections because there is a new Constitution and a new president should swear on the new Constitution.

Official Details Decision on Amnesty

LD2802072094 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 0405 GMT 28 Feb 94

[By ITAR-TASS observer]

[Text] Moscow, 28 Feb—The office of the Russian Federation Procurator General "was forced to take steps immediately to release those amnestied" after the State Duma's resolution on the amnesty was published and thus was entered into force. Deputy Procurator General Vladimir Kravtsev said this in an exclusive interview with an ITAR-TASS observer. In this context, he denied allegations that he had acted with undue haste with respect to the inmates at the remand center at Lefortovo prison and described such statements as "attempts of the president's entourage to shift all the blame for the implementation of the amnesty resolution, which had come into force, onto the bodies of the procuracy." Incidentally, Procurator General Aleksey Kazannik explained his decision to resign by the fact that "a prosecutor in Russia does not have the authority to suspend an act of amnesty. Neither does he have the right of legislative initiative, so he could not request the State Duma to reconsider its own resolution."

According to Vladimir Kravtsov, at 1100 on 26 February "Procurator General Kazannik signed an official request to the State Duma to clarify a number of questions which were unclear to us as executors of this law. That evening we received an official response signed by two chairmen of Duma committees, Vladimir Isakov and Ilyukhin," to the effect that there was no need whatsoever "to make special additional clarifications of the procedure of the execution of the State Duma resolution on the political and the economic amnesty."

Vladimir Kravtsev also described some details of the release of the inmates from the remand center at Lefortovo prison. On that day, he asserts, "the prosecutor's office, with no rush at all, acquainted all eligible inmates with the full text of the resolution and learned their opinion, as required by Article 5 Point 4 and by the note at the end of this article, whether they agree that this act of amnesty be applied to them personally."

"They all agreed, though not unequivocally," Vladimir Kravtsev said. Thus, Ruslan Khasbulatov wrote that "I have not and am not pleading guilty" but, in view of the direction and the essence of the State Duma resolution, "I agree that this act of amnesty should be applied to me." Other expressed similar views. Altogether, throughout the day on 26 February the General Procurator's office sanctioned the release of 16 of those accused in organizing the tragic October events in Moscow, Kravtsev said. He also acknowledged that he had personally signed all the instructions of the prosecutor's office on the release.

"I would like say on my own behalf" that now "the president's team is simply looking for someone to blame," Vladimir Kravtsev stressed. He went on to say that the resignation statement of Aleksey Kazannik, made on Saturday, is "his personal decision. He did not urge us (deputies-Eds) to join him and so on." However, "should such methods of putting pressure on the prosecutor's office, among others, continue, it is our duty and responsibility to resign," Kravtsev said. He also stated, on the instruction of his colleagues, that deputies of Procurator General Aleksey Kazannik would not resign before the Federation Council had made a decision over the dismissal of Aleskey Kazannik. They had jointly made this decision after internal consultations on 27 February. Vladimir Kravtsev did not preclude the possibility of "the Federation Council not accepting the resignation of Aleksey Kazannik" but added to this: "I am almost convinced that it will be accepted and immediately effective."

Kostikov Says Release 'Blasphemous'

LD2602195094 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1851 GMT 26 Feb 94

[Text] Moscow, 26 Feb (ITAR-TASS)—Vyacheslav Kostikov, the press secretary of the Russian president described the release of organizers and participants of the events in October 1993 from Lefortovo as a blasphemous action. He said today that people whose hands and conscience have been party to bloodshed, people who were ready to push Russia into the bloody maelstrom of the civil war have been released without trial.

The press secretary of the Russian president believes that the State Duma and in the first place those parties who initiated and supported this blasphemous action are wholly responsible for this act of moral violence. This is the first time in the history of world parliamentarism. He believes that the State Duma is becoming the coparticipant of unlawfulness.

Having abused the people's trust, the deputies have for the the first time in history—the statement he has issued says—taken the side of evil-doers against the state. The State Duma, which was called upon to be the guardian of law, the initiator of civil accord, and a participant in building a rule-of-law state, has by its own will removed from the framework of justice persons accused of the gravest of state crimes, preferring hasty political demarches to a just court.

The document points out that an outrage has been committed against justice, public opinion has been rejected, and the opinion of a president elected by popular vote has been challenged. The haste and urgency with which the State Duma strove to achieve the immediate implementation of its resolution, and in essence the covering up of the evil done to Russia, is evidence not of the Duma's desire to achieve civil peace and accord, but of its effective incitement to political extremism.

In the unlawful situation that has come about, the president of Russia reserves the right to act in accordance with the powers granted to him by the Constitution, Kostikov declared.

Gaydar, Gorbachev Comment

LD2702202594 Moscow Radio Rossii Network in Russian 1900 GMT 27 Feb 94

[Excerpts] [Passage omitted] [Announcer] The State Duma has decided on a political amnesty. The resolution was published on 25 February, and on the 26th, Aleksandr Rutskoy, Ruslan Khasbulatov, Albert Makashov, Viktor Anpilov, Ilya Konstantinov and others emerged from detention. [passage omitted]

Yegor Gaydar, of Russia's Choice, was one of the few who voted against the political amnesty.

[Begin Gaydar recording] I am absolutely convinced, no shadow of doubt, that this decision is a step towards destabilizing the situation in Russia. I am absolutely convinced that the people just released from prison will in the coming months take charge again of forming armed gangs who will hit the Moscow streets. I am absolutely convinced that their conduct will lead to bloodshed. I would like Russia to recognize who are its heroes, and who is leading it along this path. [end recording]

[Announcer] Now the opinion of those whom we approached for their comments. Mikhail Gorbachev is the ex-president of the former USSR, the former general secretary of the former CPSU, and a witness in the SCSE case.

[Begin Gorbachev recording] (?Regarding this decision), I feel that the State Duma is of course entitled to make it. That is its prerogative, as in the Constitution. So everything is clear from the legal standpoint.

Secondly, an amnesty is not an acquittal. It is clemency. This has to be kept in mind. The main aspect of it is that if three-fourths of the deputies equate Russia's current situation to one of grave crisis and conclude on the need to abandon all that drives us apart, if in this situation such a majority decision is reached by deputies, then I am ready to agree with them.

So in the given situation, I would say this: I agree with the decision as understood in my first point. Recriminations must not be allowed onto the scene. This is a signal, the alarm, that we have to abandon secondary considerations. Given that, I am in favor of the State Duma's decision. But if it is a move back to the previous strife, recriminations and tension in the country, then I condemn those who want to use the State Duma in this way to provoke civil conflict. [end recording] [passage omitted]

Poltoranin Warns of Consequences

LD2702153294 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1340 GMT 27 Feb 94

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Tamara Zamyatina]

[Text] Moscow, 27 Feb—The release of those responsible for the October bloodshed in Moscow who have been given an amnesty by the State Duma will only assist their return to active politics. This opinion was set out in an interview Mikhail Poltoranin, member of the "Russia's Choice" faction of deputies and chairman of the Committee for Information Policy in the State Duma, gave to an ITAR-TASS correspondent. In his view, following the release of the "Lefortovo" inmates, "the president must not slacken his grip on the reins of power, otherwise the carriage of Russian statehood could go off the rails."

For his part, the former KGB head, Vadim Bakatin, speaking from political and professional experience, forecasts that "in the present circumstances many of the Lefortovo inmates will rush to whip up the crowd to act against the president." If events turn out that way, he suggests, the force of the law will have to be applied at once to political adventurists.

Shakray Hopes for 'Civilized' Struggle

LD2702191494 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1758 GMT 27 Feb 94

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Anna Melnikova]

[Text] Moscow, 27 Feb—"The release of Rutskoy will alter the configuration of candidates at the coming presidential elections, and will especially weaken Vladimir Zhirinovskiy's position," deputy of the State Duma, Minister for Affairs of Nationalities and Regional Policy Sergey Shakhray said in an interview with an ITAR-TASS correspondent today. He voiced the hope that those released from Lefortovo "will wage the political struggle in civilized forms."

"There is in me, as in anyone else, an element of alarm in connection with the political statements of the inmates of Lefortovo released yesterday," Sergey Shakhray added. "The political organizations which achieved only a political amnesty, should take upon themselves responsibility for the actions of the released leaders. If the latter plan to continue the struggle in the elections like other citizens of the Russian Federation, that is a normal phenomenon, but if they are planning to fight in order with the help of slogans to seize, destroy, or gun down—that means fresh criminal cases will be instituted and there will be no consensus or reconciliation."

But Deputy Konstantin Zatulin in an interview to ITAR-TASS expressed the opinion that any political statements by Ruslan Khasbulatov and Viktor Anpilov on leaving Lefortovo are "quite natural." The most important thing was whether these statements would be followed by any political actions. Konstantin Zatulin considers it expedient to "discuss in the Duma the question of a possible ban on political activity by active participants in the October events of 1993."

We remind you that after coming out of Lefortovo Viktor Anpilov spoke today on Moscow's Theater Square, calling on several hundred activists of "Working Moscow" and the Russian Communist Workers' Party to set up a workers' party.

In an interview to REUTER's agency Aleksandr Rutskoy's aide Andrey Fedorov stated that his boss "will not stay out of politics because he has never given up the idea of becoming president. He has come out of prison in a fighting mood."

As for Ruslan Khasbulatov, he told journalists that he was leaving politics and intends shortly to visit his relatives in Chechnya.

Yeltsin Aides Outline Strategy To Handle Amnesty

LD2802131194 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1125 GMT 28 Feb 94

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Tamara Zamyatina]

[Text] Moscow, 28 Feb—Assessing the degree of risk from the release of the Lefortovo prisoners, presidential aide Georgiy Satarov noted at today's Kremlin briefing that there are two ways to ensure that destabilizing developments are averted. First, according to Satarov, "the president of Russia is inclined to minimize the potential harm inflicted by the political amnesty decision." With this aim in mind Boris Yeltsin will, in the near future, possibly today, address the citizens of the country in defense of human rights and with an assessment of the act of political amnesty.

Second, Georgiy Satarov remarked, State Duma chairman Ivan Rybkin and the deputies have recognized

that they have "become the hostages of their own decision and of the future behavior of those whom they have set free." Therefore, the president's aide thinks, "whether from considerations of self-preservation or arising out of a wish for accord and reconciliation" the deputies will try not to allow a new round of extremism in society.

Another participant in the briefing—Aleksandr Yakovlev, the president's plenipotentiary representative in the Federal Assembly—voiced a warning in connection with the fact that 1 May 1994 might repeat the "fresh and painful experience of last year's May Day." The lawyer reminded his listeners that the law does not provide for a second act of amnesty in relation to one and the same group of persons.

Unlike his colleagues in the presidential administration, Yuriy Baturin, the president's national security aide, sees from his viewpoint the greatest danger for society as being in the split among the democrats. He pointed out that there is now a strategy for uniting democratic forces, laid down in the president's message.

Answering a question from an ITAR-TASS correspondent on how Boris Yeltsin reacted to the two aides' efforts to suspend the political amnesty, Georgiy Satarov answered: "We have not been asked to resign. His reaction was a balanced one."

Although the members of the the presidential apparatus intended to devote the briefing to the president's message, journalists changed the theme of the meeting with questions like: "How was it that the situation with the political amnesty caught you unawares?"

In their answers Aleksandr Yakovlev, Georgiy Satarov, and Yuriy Baturin repeated their already well-known arguments on the imperfect nature of the legislation, the dual position of the procuracy, and the need to observe the law.

Yeltsin Preparing 'Certain Actions'

LD2802115194 Moscow Russian Television Network in Russian 1100 GMT 28 Feb 94

[From the "Novosti" newscast]

[Text] The Russian president's press service will start holding regular briefings from today. Boris Yeltsin's press secretary Vyacheslav Kostikov and presidential aide Georgiy Satarov discussed a very topical and timely subject with journalists today—the defense of democracy and human rights.

As ITAR-TASS has just reported, Georgiy Satarov, the head of state's aide, told the briefing that Russian President Boris Yeltsin has prepared certain actions aimed at defending the democratic state and society. He refused to specify the form in which these measures would be carried out. However, Yuriy Baturin, the president's assistant for national security, added that these steps might even be taken today. He described press speculation that this would include a TV address as being close to the truth.

Procurator General Resigns Over Amnesty Issue

LD2602142394 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1255 GMT 26 Feb 94

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent]

[Text] Moscow, 26 Feb—Aleksey Kazannik, the Russian prosecutor general, announced his resignation today. The statement by the prosecutor general, made public at a news conference held at the prosecutor's office, says:

"The Russian Federation president has appealed to me to suspend the amnesty process ordered by the resolution dated 23 February of the Federal Assembly State Duma, entitled 'On Declaring Amnesty for Political and Economic Prisoners.' I fully agree with the civic attitude and the content of this appeal by the head of state.

"Many dozens of people were killed and over 1,000 were crippled in the May and October disturbances. There are widows, orphaned children, and sorrowing parents. Enormous material damage has been caused. However, the State Duma is forgiving all those people who are guilty of this. In accordance with its will, unrepentant organizers of mass disturbances, their instigators and perpetrators will be set free. Among them there are many people whose conscience is burdened with killings, pogroms, and robberies. The act of 'political' amnesty, as the legislators have called it, will forever remain a black page in the history of Russian parliamentarism.

"Despite this, as the Russian Federation prosecutor general, I have to think not only of the spirit but also of the letter of the law when I make a decision. The prosecutor in Russia does not have the authority to suspend an amnesty act. Nor does he have a right to legislative initiative enabling him to appeal to the State Duma for the resolution to be reconsidered. Therefore I have no choice: I resign as Russia's prosecutor general.

"I am little concerned about my future. I have always felt strongly about Russia and its longsuffering people. I believe a golden age will come when truth will be called truth, a lie will be called a lie, virtue will be called virtue, and lawlessness will be called lawlessness. But it will come through the efforts of neither the patriot-communists, nor the supporters of Zhirinovskiy, nor yet through those of democrats who have debased their noble status as members of the Russian intelligentsia."

Yeltsin Accepts Resignation

LD2602192094 Moscow Ostankino Television First Channel Network in Russian 1800 GMT 26 Feb 94

[From the "Novosti" newscast]

[Text] I have just received an INTERFAX report in the studio. It says that Boris Yeltsin has accepted the resignation of Procurator General Aleksey Kazannikov.

This is followed by a report from the presidential press service which says that the edict also decrees that Aleksey Nikolayevich Ilyushenko be presented to the Federation Council as a candidate for nomination to the post of procurator general of the Russian Federation.

Until the procurator general is appointed, Ilyushenko is entrusted with carrying out his duties.

Under another edict, Ilyushenko is released from the post of head of the control directorate of the president's administration.

Kazannik Explains Resignation

LD2802132094 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1244 GMT 28 Feb 94

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Yuriy Scherban]

[Text] Moscow, February 28 (TASS)—"I have acted in full compliance with law and my conscience is clear. Let those who do not rely on law blush for their conduct," said Alexey Kazannik, former Russian prosecutor general, as he parted with his colleagues on Monday. Kazannik's resignation was accepted by Russian president on February 26.

Addressing his colleagues, Kazannik explained his resignation, saying that he had been put under pressure from high-ranking officials from the president's administration who demanded that the resolution on amnesty adopted by the State Duma be suspended. "As a supporter and authorised official of President Yeltsin, I had to carry out any presidential orders, even of they were illegal," Kazannik said.

On the other hand, Kazannik referred to officials of the prosecutor's office who believe that "there are no legal grounds to do anything against this amnesty." Facing a complex dilemma, Kazannik tried to "personally get in touch with the Russian president and explain the situation to him." However, he failed to do this and decided to resign from his post.

Kazannik declared that Aleksey Ilushenko, temporarily appointed to the post of the prosecutor general by the Russian president, as a chairman of the control department of the president's administration, had called on him to prevent putting the resolution an amnesty into effect. This "illegal" demand, as Kazannik put it, was made by participants in an emergency meeting held to discuss the only one problem—how to prevent the amnesty and who adopted a decision not to let prisoners out of Lefortovo whatever the cost might be.

Acting Prosecutor General Appointed

LD2702061994 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 0549 GMT 27 Feb 94

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent]

[Text] Moscow February 27 TASS—Vladimir Shumeyko, chairman of the Federation Council, has consented to the president's proposal to appoint Aleksey Ilyushenko as acting prosecutor-general of the Russian Federation.

It has become known from reliable sources that the decision was taken "on the basis of the president's recommendation pending the consideration of an item to this effect at a Federation Council meeting in accordance with Article 102 of the Russian Constitution".

The need to appoint an acting prosecutor-general arose in view of the resignation of Aleksey Kazannik from the post on Saturday.

Kazannik disagrees with the release, by a State Duma decision, of those guilty of the October 3-4, 1993, bloodshed in Moscow, and regards it as unlawful and uncoordinated with law enforcement agencies.

Kazannik's Stand on Amnesty Viewed

LD2602220394 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 2129 GMT 26 Feb 94

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Tamara Zamyatina]

[Text] Moscow February 27 TASS—"The strange stand of the Russian procurator general's office provokes bewilderment," presidential assistants Yuriy Baturin and Georgiy Satarov told ITAR-TASS on Saturday.

"The Russian procurator general sent a letter to the State Duma on Saturday morning to specify circumstances preventing the procurator's office from the implementation of the Duma resolution on political amnesty. Two Duma committees started to prepare a response to the procurator's inquiry believing that the procurator general's office waits for the answer," they said.

Meanwhile the committees did their work, the procurator general's office implemented the resolution to free culprits of the October 1993 bloodshed, which runs counter to the law, judging by Kazannik's letter.

The resolution on liberation of the accused was signed by Deputy Procurator General Kartsev "on silent consent of the procurator general, stressed presidential assistant on national security and doctor of juridical sciences Baturin. As a result, the procurator general's office created a precedent of illegal implementation of decisions, he said.

In his turn, Satarov said the procurator general's office adopted a resolution to free the Lefortovo inmates while the Duma tried to remove contradictions in its resolution on political amnesty.

Yeltsin Dismisses Counterintelligence Chief

LD2802105094 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1043 GMT 28 Feb 94

[Text] Moscow February 28 ITAR-TASS—President Boris Yeltsin today sacked Nikolay Golushko as the chief of the Russian Federal Counter-Intelligence Service, the president's press office told ITAR-TASS.

Intelligence Boss To Phase Out Spy-Journalists

MK2602093094 Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in Russian 26 Feb 94 p 2

[Pavel Koltsov report under the "Moscow Rumors" rubric: "Spies Will No Longer Be 'Journalists'? Things Seem To Be Moving That Way"]

[Text] It has transpired that Yevgeniy Primakov, director of Russia's Foreign Intelligence Service (FIS) has ordered that the financing of foreign offices of a number of Russian publications used by FIS officers as journalistic cover be stopped.

Inside the FIS, however, they see nothing sensational about this. Yevgeniy Primakov arrived at the conclusion as early as two years ago that the Russian intelligence service had more than enough journalist "cover." Chiefs of many Russian mass media had long been convinced of that. Thus a decision has been made to phase out journalist cover until none remains. In the United States, for example, there has long been an act prohibiting intelligence officers from working under the guise of journalists.

In all fairness, far from all professional Russian spies subscribe to their superiors' decision. "While journalist status is not diplomatic immunity, of course, it is still a useful thing," one of them argued.

Yeltsin Appoints CIS Assembly Envoy

LD2502135094 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1306 GMT 25 Feb 94

[Text] Moscow February 25 TASS—President Boris Yeltsin appointed Sergey Tsiplyayev his plenipotentiary representative at the Interparliamentary Assembly of the Commonwealth of Independent States.

Yeltsin's decree notes that the appointment was prompted by the need for maintaining permanent relations between the Russian president and the Interparliamentary Assembly of the CIS states.

ITAR-TASS learnt at the presidential press service on Friday that Tsiplyayev, the president's representative in St. Petersburg, will perform his new duties concurrently.

The decree provides for setting up an office (which will be a component part of the president's staff) to ensure the operation of the president's representative at the Interparliamentary Assembly.

Yeltsin Accepts Pamfilova's Resignation

LD2502144394 Moscow Radio Rossii Network in Russian 1400 GMT 25 Feb 94

[Text] The Russian president has accepted the resignation of Social Protection Minister Ella Pamfilova.

Vyacheslav Kostikov, the president's press secretary, told INTERFAX that Yeltsin had listened to Ella Pamfilova's reasons for resigning and found them convincing.

But Boris Nikolayevich voiced the hope that Pamfilova would not abandon the social sphere and would continue to tackle the problem as a deputy in the State Duma.

Ella Pamfilova has already, as INTERFAX recalls, tendered her resignation twice this year, following the the departure from the government of Yegor Gaydar and Boris Fedorov.

Poltoranin on Presidential Stand on Mass Media

LD2602181794 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1723 GMT 26 Feb 94

[By ITAR-TASS parliamentary correspondent Ivan Novikov]

[Text] Moscow February 26 TASS—The first and second TV and radio channels must be state, chairman of the State Duma committee for Information Policy and Communications Mikhail Poltoranin told ITAR-TASS here today.

"One should only welcome special attention of the president given to the issue in his message to the Federal Assembly. But I would not hurry to rejoice as there may be forces to urge the president on unjustified decisions," he said.

In the words of Poltoranin, he "repulsed the attacks of forces wishing to divide the material-technical basis of mass media and break the single information space for the past two years."

His parliamentary committee receives inquiries of deputies who are alarmed with the attempts to divide the influence spheres in mass media bodies. "The president said that TV and radio channels are not liable for privatization and shall be state, but one cannot say for sure whether they will remain state in future," added Poltoranin.

In his words, the parliamentary committee aims to create conditions for economic independence of mass media, which "is the only guarantee of observation of constitutional rights in Russia at a time of anarchy." "If mass media fails to get the economic basis for its independence it will be suppressed and this process has begun. The president shall say the word in order not to allow this to happen," said the committee chairman.

Shakhray Gives Party Program at PRES Congress

LD2602211294 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1818 GMT 26 Feb 94

[Text] The First Congress of Russia's Unity and Concord Party [PRES] opened in Moscow on Saturday. Taking part are 220 delegates from 66 regions of Russia.

They intend to discuss the draft of a party program and the results of the elections to the Federal Assembly, amend the rules and elect the steering bodies, and work out the party's strategy and tactics for local elections.

In his speech on the party program, its leader Sergey Shakhray declared that his party is "a national conservative organization, respecting such traditional values as state, family, property, and morality." In his words, the party aims at keeping Russia as a state by recognizing the economic, political, and cultural diversity of its regions.

Shakhray proposed endorsing only "the framework of the program" at this stage and to finalize it at the 2d Congress, planned for the spring this year. Before that the program could be explained in the party's regional branches.

As a delegate has revealed to Interfax, the money for the forum have come "from the party fund and from the commercial structures, sharing the party's goals and tasks."

PRES To Restore Ties With 'Tsarist' Russia

LD2702175094 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1734 GMT 27 Feb 94

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Anna Melnikova]

[Text] Moscow February 27 TASS—The Party of Russian Unity and Accord [PRES] led by Sergey Shakhray proclaimed itself "an all-Russia provincial conservative party". This idea took shape during the party's first congress which ended its work in Moscow on Sunday. The congress drew party representatives from Russia's 64 regions.

"We understand conservatism as something resting upon spirituality, morals, family", Shakhray told a news conference after the congress. He said "the Party of Russian Unity and Accord aims to restore upset ties with the tsarist Russia without totally repudiating the Soviet times". He told reporters the party did not yet have any programme, it "is expected to be adopted at the party's second congress this coming autumn". Participants in the first congress took a decision to publish a party newspaper.

Among his potential allies, Shakhray listed the Yabloko (Yavlinsky-Boldyrev-Lukin) Bloc, entrepreneurs' movement, as well as organizations of social democratic orientation, while the party's main opponents are Zhirinovskiy's Liberal Democratic Party and the Communist Party of the Russian Federation. The party leader did not rule out the possibility of tactical coordination of activities with the Russia's Choice bloc. However, he stressed that "we cannot regard them as our allies".

Comments in Support of Yeltsin Message Cited

PM2502171594 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 25 Feb 94 p 1

[Unattributed report: "First Responses to the President's Message"]

[Excerpt] [Passage omitted] The Russian Federation president's message to the Federal Assembly "contains a sufficiently powerful potential charge for the main areas of domestic and foreign policy—which represent the president's constitutional duty—to be carried out by him now," Aleksandr Yakovlev, the president's representative in parliament, stated.

As is noted in the president's message, laws establishing clear rules pertaining to the functioning of state organs and, above all, the organs of executive power should be drafted and adopted in the very near future. They should provide effective mechanisms of control and accountability which make it possible to adopt legal acts which can actually be carried out, that is to say, do not allow arbitrary interpretation, and which are economically sound and include specific sanctions for their nonfulfillment. These include laws on the government, on the federal executive bodies, on normative legal acts, on the federal state service, on the bases of the organization of government and executive bodies in the components of the Russian Federation, and on the status of deputies of the State Duma and members of the Federation Council.

The Russian Federation president's Message "On Strengthening the Russian State" raises the most topical problems. This was stated by Aleksandr Shokhin, deputy of the State Duma and minister of the economy.

The president's message as applied to the economy "should be used to establish the normal mechanisms of market relations," he stressed.

He emphasized that first and foremost "the state should learn how to collect all the taxes which now exist and establish strict currency, financial, and banking control."

The Russian Federation president's message to parliament contains answers to the questions which are being thrown up today by the time and the actual situation, according to Vasiliy Tarasenko, chairman of the Federation Council Committee for the Affairs of the Federation and the Policy of the Regions. He suggested that "deputies and voters received in the Message what they expected to hear." The main point is that Boris Yeltsin's program "is based on the firm conviction that the democratic state's new Constitution should work." Each of his arguments is backed up by specific articles of the Constitution, Vasiliy Tarasenko explained.

Paper Publishes Yeltsin's 'Annual Message'

PM2502110194 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 25 Feb 94 pp 1, 3-7

["Russian Federation President's Message to the Federal Assembly" "On Strengthening the Russian State. (Basic Guidelines for Domestic and Foreign Policy)," signed by Russian Federation President B. Yeltsin and dated the Kremlin, Moscow, 24 February 1994]

[Text] **Introduction**

Russia is now experiencing one of the most important stages in the development of its state system. At the end of last year its first-ever democratic Constitution was adopted by national ballot.

Despite highly acute political struggle and spiritual turmoil, despite tremendous mental and physical weariness, Russian society found the strength to take a difficult yet crucial step on the path to renewal and stability. And that enhances its value many times over. It is the duty of all of us who are actually involved in Russia's destiny to make the most of this opportunity.

Two years ago we began the painful but ultimately necessary and healing reform of the economy. With tremendous difficulty we moved away from the edge of the economic abyss into which the old system was irreversibly pushing us and began the slow and not always confident move toward recovery.

Last year we momentarily looked into another chasm—that of civil confrontation—and recoiled in horror. We now have to do everything we can, and possibly more, to ensure that this never happens again.

The Russian Constitution is not only a symbol of our striving for national accord. It is a real basis for establishing cooperation in Russian society, primarily between the branches of federal power. Among the thousands of highly complex problems facing Russia today there is none that can be resolved amid confrontation and mutual mistrust. The resumption of the implacable struggle represents the way to deadlock, and there will be no way out. For those to whom Russia's citizens have entrusted the governance of the country it represents the route to political disgrace, damnation, and eternal oblivion.

The ideological vacuum that arose after the collapse of the old system is now being filled with futile disputes about the advantages of various "isms." Too often they become symbols of confrontation and hatred, signs of disaster.

We must all realize that a state cannot be built on ideas that cause schism and polarization in society. It must be based on natural values and concepts geared to the whole people and to every person individually. Such as security, freedom, prosperity, and solidarity.

Our strategic aim is to make Russia a prosperous country inhabited by people who are free, proud of their ancient history, and look boldly to the future; a country in which authority is based on law and does not oppress the citizen; a country with an efficient economy combining national features and world achievements.

This aim is cherished and understood by all Russian citizens regardless of their convictions, political orientation, social and property position, age, and nationality. We will be able to achieve it if we rally around the common practical task of strengthening the Russian state. We have the main condition needed to perform this task—the Constitution. It outlines the legal framework of a strong and stable democratic state.

For us the main guideline in this work is the Constitutional formula—Russia is a democratic, federative, rule-of-law, social, and secular state.

We must strengthen the Russian state because strengthening the state means:

—reinforcing its institutions and establishing normal collaboration among them;

—creating a normal mechanism for its interaction with society;

—finding the optimum means for it to participate in economic processes;

—creating effective mechanisms to ensure and defend the rights and freedoms of every person regardless of nationality, religion, or social position;

—providing Russian citizens with confidence and tranquillity in their country, on the streets of its cities and villages, in their homes and apartments;

—securing a fitting place for Russia in the world community.

Russia will not be strong unless it is united. The most lasting guarantee of the country's unity and the equality of the peoples inhabiting it will be the implementation of the principles of federative relations enshrined in the Constitution.

Ordinary human values, respect for democracy and for the law will become ingrained if the state actively promotes the formation of a civil society, supports civil democratic initiative, shows farsightedness during the complex transitional period by supporting culture, science, and education, and establishes dialogue with various religions and faiths.

A rule-of-law state must be strong in order to guarantee people's security, fight crime, and take the offensive against corruption.

A strong state is the basis for continuing reform, overcoming the crisis, organizing the structural reorganization of the economy, and creating the conditions for its stabilization and development.

Russia has an interest in ensuring economic, cultural, family, and ordinary human ties among the new independent states. A highly important condition for this is for each of these states to acknowledge the priority of human rights and the need to defend the interests of ethnic, cultural, and linguistic minorities.

It is in Russia's interests to create favorable external conditions for the country's development. This must be achieved by a proper and friendly but at the same time firm and consistent foreign policy in which the desire for cooperation does not conflict with the country's national interests and Russian citizens' sense of national pride.

The country is at a historical crossroads. One path leads to heedless political confrontation, the breakup of the state, and human tragedy; the other leads to constructive accord and awareness of the immutable aim, common to all without distinction of views or political stance, of strengthening the Russian state for the good of its citizens.

We all need mutual understanding. It will be found if everyone, primarily the president, the Federal Assembly, and the government, is able to organize coordinated work.

This Russian Federation [RF] president's message marks an important step in this direction. The message declares the head of state's political course. The president is not encroaching on the competence of any federal body of state power. At the same time the political, economic, and social guidelines contained in the message are a basis for evaluating the activity of all state bodies.

In accordance with Point "F" of the RF Constitution and based on:

a desire to ensure a more balanced and better-considered approach when defining the basic guidelines for domestic and foreign policy;

the RF president's constitutional duty to ensure the coordinated operation and interaction of state bodies,

I am sending the RF Federal Assembly my annual message "On Strengthening the Russian State (Basic Guidelines for Domestic and Foreign Policy)."

1. The Rule-of-Law State

1.1. The Constitution and Legislation

The Constitution adopted by national ballot 12 December 1993 created the preconditions for building a strong state in Russia. The new system of state power enshrined by the Constitution accords with democratic standards.

The formulation of the Constitution took place amid the most severe political confrontation. That could not help having an impact on the legal quality of some articles.

In the new political situation and on the basis of the adopted Constitution the continuation of stage-by-stage constitutional reform is a justified and lawful process. But it is at the same time important to act without haste, not to give in to the transitory political situation, and to take into consideration the practical experience that will be accumulated in implementing the provisions of the Constitution as society develops.

The important stage of Russia's transformation into a democratic state is now coming to a close. A democratic system of power is being shaped on the basis of the Constitution.

The institution of the presidency, whose powers are designed to strengthen the state system and defend constitutional values, has acquired new political and legal substance.

The role and place of the government take new expression in the Constitution. It is an autonomous constitutional institution, capable of bearing full responsibility for the decisions it adopts. At the same time the government acts within the framework of the laws and edicts and in accordance with the policy of the president.

In December 1993 a parliament appeared in Russia—the Federal Assembly. Without developed parliamentarism, full-fledged democracy is impossible.

The justice system will be renewed and reformed in the very near future. Its role hitherto has been far-removed from that which the judiciary should play in a rule-of-law state.

The Constitution created a favorable basis for the interaction of all branches of power, primarily the president and the parliament. However, the Constitution only defines the legal conditions for the joint work of the president and the Federal Assembly. A desirable psychological climate for mutual relations is also essential. That is political culture.

Annual presidential messages are one element in this. The message is not a directive, but nor is it a collection of good intentions. The president possesses sufficient constitutional potential to influence the state of affairs. A parliament respecting the president's powers will not put up artificial barriers to the implementation of the Basic Guidelines for Domestic and Foreign Policy. That is the accord which the people expect from the authorities. It is on this that the strengthening of our state and civil peace in the country primarily depend.

The stability of society, the defense of its basic values, primarily human rights, and the safeguarding of Russia's national interests in many respects depend on how effectively the democratic power works, whether it is able to overcome the gulf between constitutional principles and real practice.

One of the reasons for this gulf is that a deep struggle is still under way in society and the state apparatus between the supporters and opponents of a democratic system. A clash of interests is characteristic of any free

society. But it is fruitful as long as it is conducted within a system of democratic values.

That is a necessary restriction, and it must be the criterion for the legal assessment of any politician, any political organization, any state institution. In particular, we cannot in the future permit the activity of parties, movements, or other associations that encroach on the foundations of the constitutional system or advocate and sow social, ethnic, and religious enmity and hatred. Likewise, such anticonstitutional manifestations cannot be permitted under cover of a deputy's status or a state post.

Disregard by the authorities of infringements of the constitutional system means either an inability or a reluctance to defend democracy by means of state coercion even though this be directly dictated by the Constitution.

Another fundamental reason for the gulf between democratic principles and state practice is that, having renounced the command principle of exercising power, the state has not been able to fully master the rule-of-law principle. This has elicited such threatening phenomena as:

—an uncontrolled increase in managerial personnel in all spheres, which reduces the effectiveness of authority and distorts the whole system of government;

—flourishing bureaucracy, which is stifling the growth of new economic relations, distorting the state's social policy, and having an oppressive effect on people's social state;

—the involvement of officials at various levels of government in the political struggle—which causes state decisions to be sabotaged;

—corruption, which has infiltrated the state and municipal apparatus;

—a dangerously low level of executive [ispolnitelskaya] discipline;

—lack of coordination in the work of ministries, departments, and other state bodies.

It must be openly admitted that democratic principles of organizing power are increasingly being discredited. A negative image is developing of democracy as a weak, amorphous authority that does little for most people and primarily upholds its own corporate interests. Russian society has acquired freedom but has not yet perceived democracy as a system of strong state power which is at the same time wholly accountable to the people.

It is therefore essential during the new stage to create and fine-tune the practical mechanisms of democracy. This problem can be resolved if we radically boost the effectiveness of state power, ensuring precise and unswerving observance of the Constitution and the laws, employing if necessary the mandatory attribute of authority—state coercion—based solely on the law.

This is a problem of paramount importance, and it must be tackled by the joint efforts of the president, the Federal Assembly, the government, and other bodies of state power. It is necessary in the near future to formulate and adopt laws which establish clear rules for the functioning of state bodies, primarily executive bodies. They must make provision for effective mechanisms of supervision and accountability, making it possible to adopt legal acts which are really feasible and which thus eschew arbitrary interpretation—legal acts which are economically costed and which incorporate concrete penalties for their nonimplementation. These include the laws On the Government, On Federal Executive Bodies, On Normative-Legal Acts, On Federal State Service, On the Basic Principles of Organizing Representative and Executive Bodies of Power in RF Components, and On the Status of State Duma Deputies and Federation Council Members.

It is necessary to revise normative acts at federal, regional, and municipal levels with a view to radically reducing the sphere of operation of the so-called authorization [razreshitelnyy] principle and replacing it with the notification [uvedomitelnyy] principle.

In the practical activity of executive bodies supervisory functions and officials' personal responsibility for failure to implement legal acts must be a top priority. The work of state bodies and officials must be assessed not only on the results of their managerial influence on the situation but also, first and foremost, on the standard of their implementation of legal acts and decisions of higher-ranking bodies adopted within their remit.

In a rule-of-law state authority is associated with the law, which is a mandatory feature of such a state. Therefore the development of the law is a pressing avenue in a policy of strengthening the Russian state.

The main role in this important matter is played by the Federal Assembly. It is necessary to single out the following as priorities in legal reform:

—the creation of effective legal mechanisms which guarantee the rights and freedoms of the individual and the citizen. Today the most urgent matters in this sphere are the Housing Code, the Code of Labor Laws, the Law on Public Measures, changes to the Law On Defense of Consumer Rights, and the Laws on State Social Insurance, On the Subsistence Minimum, and On Resolving Collective Labor Disputes;

—the development of the legal foundations of a market economy (primarily the adoption of a new Civil Code);

—the improvement of procedural, criminal, administrative, and other sectors of legislation designed to ensure the rights of the individual and of society and to

protect them against organized crime, corruption, and other criminal manifestations.

Those sectors of the law which are just beginning to develop or are lacking at present require particular attention. These being banking law, law on bills of exchange [vekselnoye pravo], tax law, corporate management law, information law, computer law, etc.

Legal reform must be based on the following principles:

—systemic new legislation (the adoption of packages of legislative acts, the exclusion of duplicative acts and legal loopholes, etc);

—legal economy (the adoption of fewer normative acts, the use of methods of codifying legal acts, etc);

—the unity of the legal system (the establishment of a clear hierarchy of legal acts both at federal level and within the system of mutual relations with Federation components).

1.2 Judicial Reform

If a state has a strong judicial system, then the state itself is strong. It is strong because the legislative and executive authorities do not expend enormous amounts of effort on struggling for the implementation of their respective decisions, and they are delivered from the temptation to act by illegal means.

The judiciary fulfills the main role in defending the law everywhere. Its strength is that it is devoid (at any rate it should be devoid) of any political interests. Its main and sole interest is the law as an independent value.

In Russia today judicial institutions are fragmented, their jurisdiction does not yet extend to all legal relationships, and in many ways the legislative base of justice is obsolete and incomplete.

The federal authority is thus faced with the pressing task of deciding how to carry out judicial reform as soon as possible. Its objective is the formation of effective justice operating on strong legal and democratic principles.

Judicial reform should ensure:

—universality of legal protection (the chance of protection against any manifestations of arbitrariness or violence);

—access to justice;

—prompt legal protection for rights and legitimate interests;

—certainty that legal decisions will be implemented.

Citizens' legal protection is weak. Many courts do not regard constitutional provisions as norms for direct action. For various reasons, citizens frequently refuse to exercise their right to legal protection.

Judicial decisions, primarily in the civil legal sphere, are frequently not implemented and are ignored by those to whom they are addressed.

The principle of the independence of judges and their subordination to the law alone has still not become the norm. A number of levers that can be used to exert pressure still remain in the hands of officials. Judges' working conditions, level of social protection, and day-to-day backup depend to a considerable extent on how well disposed the local leadership is.

The interests of strengthening the state demand reform of the work of the RF Constitutional Court. Apart from resolving the issue of electing more constitutional judges, we also need to finalize and adopt a new law on the Constitutional Court as soon as possible. At the same time we should also take account of the defects of the previous law, which distorted the essential nature of this important democratic institution.

We need to reform not just the competence of the Constitutional Court, not just the guarantees that its decisions will be implemented, and not just the status of the judges, but also the actual process of constitutional justice.

We also need to adopt laws which enshrine these new procedural principles in criminal, civil, administrative, and arbitration proceedings, primarily the principles of an adversarial judicial process and the equality of the two parties.

The jury system is one of the most democratic forms of legal procedure. The appropriate bodies should therefore summarize the results of the experiment begun in 1993 as soon as possible and submit proposals for the possible full-scale introduction of this institution into legal practice.

We need a law on judicial administration which establishes general principles for constructing the Russian legal system and the particular features of legal regulation of the various subsystems of the judiciary. We should also restore progressive institutions such as justices of the peace and appeal proceedings.

A pressing need has developed to isolate administrative justice as an autonomous subsystem. It should be composed of courts or the judicial offices of general courts with the purpose of examining cases relating to the legitimacy of actions taken by state and municipal organs and officials.

In order to democratically reform the activity of the highest court within the system of RF general courts, we need a law on the RF Supreme Court.

In order to create effective justice we need to adopt without delay a legislative act that establishes guarantees for state protection of judges, jurors, witnesses, victims, and other participants in the judicial process.

Courts need to be fully financed. This is important not just in order to lift the prestige of the judiciary but also to ensure the courts' full independence of government bodies at all levels.

1.3 Protection of the Citizen, the Law, and the State

Strengthening the state is inconceivable without curbing crime. An enormous difficulty, however, is that a strong state is needed in order to combat crime effectively. The problem is so acute that it cannot be postponed. We are talking about a realistic assessment of the situation and the adoption of all possible measures to change it for the better.

The unbridled growth of crime is creating a major threat to the state and society and to the life, health, and property of citizens. Crime currently constitutes a threat to Russia's national security.

Over the last four years the overall level of crime has almost doubled. Dangerous trends in the dynamics and structure of crime have been getting stronger.

The situation is complicated by the crisis which is also being experienced by the law-enforcement organs. Their professional cadre nucleus has been significantly weakened. All this is having a negative impact on crime detection and the prestige of the organs engaged in maintaining law and order, which in turn means that lawbreakers go unpunished and the criminal world increases its aggression.

Recent measures have been taken that are designed to concentrate the state's efforts on this important area, and a federal program for combating crime in 1994-1995 has been prepared. Its objective is to establish additional guarantees for the protection of citizens' lives, health, and property and other rights, and also to ensure public safety and law and order.

The implementation of these planned measures is dependent on appropriate financing, which requires the Russian parliament to make difficult budget decisions. However difficult the state's economic position, we need to do everything we can to satisfy the most urgent financial and material requirements of the bodies engaged in maintaining law and order.

The Ministry of Internal Affairs is to adopt cadre and organizational measures to ensure the normal functioning of the law-enforcement organs. We need to free them from implementing functions and bureaucratic work that are alien to them, and we also need to break down departmental barriers and eliminate legal and organizational confusion in the activity of the law-enforcement organs.

We need to form within the structure of the Ministry of Internal Affairs a rigidly centralized system of subunits for combating organized crime, and first and foremost we need to supply these subunits with the best cadres, hardware, and financial assistance.

The interests of the fight against crime demand the implementation of a single legal policy by all bodies and officials empowered to carry out criminal prosecutions, be they examiners or investigators, prosecutors or judges.

We need to ensure social protection for the personnel of bodies engaged in maintaining law and order, and at the same time we need to strictly monitor how far they measure up to professional and moral requirements.

The effectiveness of the fight against crime presupposes consolidation of the legal base. To this end the Federal Assembly must examine and adopt an appropriate package of laws as urgently as possible.

We need to find legislative solutions to a number of issues relating to the fight against organized crime and corruption, including:

—reinforcing criminal and other juridical penalties for all persons involved in organized criminal groups, particularly the ringleaders;

—widening the base of evidence;

—protecting those taking part in criminal trials;

—adopting measures to prevent the "laundering" of money obtained by illegal methods;

—adopting measures to prevent the emergence of organized crime within the state apparatus.

These issues must be reflected in federal laws designed to combat organized crime and corruption and in the laws on the federal state service.

We need to eliminate loopholes in the legal regulation of the fight against economic crime. First and foremost, there should be equal legal protection for all forms of property. We need acts designed to protect persons engaged in honest business activities, and at the same time we need acts on liability for dishonest competition and unscrupulous enterprise, false bankruptcy, misleading publicity, acquisition of credit by deception, violation of tax, customs, and licensing regulations, commercial bribery of people in unofficial positions, and computer fraud.

We need to formulate a fundamentally new system for warning us about instances of lawbreaking and neglect among children, adolescents, and young people, and we need to set up a network of state and social organizations to ensure social protection and corrective behavior for this section of the population.

We need a raft of measures to offer social assistance to people left without a permanent income or the means to survive. We need a legislative act that clearly regulates social rehabilitation measures for people released from jail.

The active integration of domestic crime with the international criminal world requires us to strengthen cooperation between Russia's law-enforcement organs and those of foreign countries. Russian accession to appropriate international conventions as soon as possible could serve as the legal base for this enlargement. We also need to ratify the Convention on Legal Assistance and Legal Relations in Civil, Family, and Criminal Cases, signed over two years ago by the CIS heads of state in Minsk.

The adoption of new Criminal, Criminal Procedure, and Criminal Enforcement Codes based on the principle of the priority of common human values are a measure that cannot be postponed. These codes should reflect the specific characteristics of new Russian statehood and stipulate proper protection for all its institutions.

2. Man in the Democratic State

2.1. Human Rights

The RF Constitution juridically guarantees the state's attitude toward human rights in line with contemporary perceptions of democracy and the principles of a civil society.

Man and his rights and freedoms are a supreme asset. The recognition, observance, and protection of human and civil rights and freedoms constitute the state's main obligation.

Power in a democratic state pursues neither the oppression of freedom nor external expansion. All its attributes of force are needed not for the self-assertion of authority but in order to ensure that every person is protected against all types of arbitrariness and violence, is conscious of his dignity, and plays the part of the state's equal partner. In other words, all the state's might must guarantee the safeguarding and protection of individuals' rights.

The Constitution defines the path which must be followed by state bodies. Specifically, it is no longer permissible for bodies of state power and local self-government to ignore in their practical work the provision that the RF Constitution has a direct effect throughout the RF's territory. This makes it possible to base judicial decisions directly on the Constitution, including cases when current laws are either lacking or are at odds with it.

The universally recognized principles and norms of international law and the RF's international treaties are a component of its legal system. Thus, state bodies and officials must organize their activity in compliance with international standards in the sphere of human rights and the legal protection of individuals.

But, following the Constitution's adoption, the gap between it and the current legislation in the sphere of human rights and the protection of individuals widened. Edicts of the RF president have partly filled the legal vacuum in question, but they cannot and must not constantly replace the laws. Thus, the task of bringing legislation in line with the Constitution is on the agenda.

With a view to normatively guaranteeing human rights, over the next two years it will be necessary:

—to elaborate and adopt the laws directly envisaged by the Constitution;

—to improve the federal laws currently in force;

—to elaborate and adopt normative acts establishing a mechanism for the implementation of federal laws;

—to bring the legal acts of the RF and the Federation components in the human rights sphere in line with the Russian Constitution.

2.2. The Safety of Individuals

A democratic state has no right to invade citizens' private lives, but it must guarantee each person's individual safety and the protection of his dignity.

One of the most acute problems in the life of the state and society is the headlong rise in crime. This is one of the main factors hindering the implementation of reforms, and is alarming citizens as regards their lives and prosperity. The situation has become intolerable. Many correct words have been uttered about a war against crime. The results are far fewer. It is time to get down to specific deeds.

The idea that the democratic power is incapable of imposing order is being firmly implanted in the public's mind. It is necessary to overcome this dangerous misconception. On the contrary, people must gain confidence that only the democratic state is capable of guaranteeing their safety.

The problem of the safety of individuals must be solved immediately by applying effective legal, organizational, cadre, and financial measures.

Russia's citizens also need legal protection against arbitrary rule by the state structures themselves. It is necessary to create a developed and accessible system of legal aid for the population.

The level of the legal profession's [advokatura] development is an accurate indicator of the legal guarantees of human and civil rights and freedoms. It is necessary to legislatively guarantee the legal profession's independence and high standing and rule out any interference in its activity by bodies of state power. At the same time it is necessary to enshrine conditions for subsidized provision of various legal services to citizens in financial difficulties.

It is incumbent on the state to show concern for the population's health by recognizing the intrinsic value of the health of each one of Russia's citizens.

At the same time, the qualitative indicators of the state of the population's health have been steadily declining over the last 10 years. Demographic processes are developing negatively. Life expectancy is declining, the mortality rate is rising. There is a growing threat to citizens' sanitary and epidemiological safety. Only 60 percent of the population's needs for medicines were met in 1993.

The government's minimum task in 1994 is to prevent any further decline of the volume of medical and medicinal services to the population by pooling the various sources of finance and concentrating them along the most important avenues of health care: accident and emergency medical services, intensive care and resuscitation, family medical practice, and provision of medicines.

The reform of the medical services system is designed to stabilize and improve the situation in the health care sphere. Its objective is to satisfy the population's needs for high-quality and accessible medical and medicinal services and to create conditions promoting a healthy, active, and long life.

The reform must primarily make provisions for:

—a structural restructuring of the sector and a transition to mandatory medical insurance for all citizens of Russia;

—support for the state and municipal health care systems.

World experience shows that the introduction of medical insurance instead of a centralized health care system is the most rational and most reliable form of medical service. Under such a system, the patient's interests are protected not only by health care bodies but also by the insurance companies.

Medical insurance is only just coming into being in Russia. Nonetheless, the initial experience of work by territorial funds of mandatory medical insurance has shown that the set amount of insurance contributions is clearly inadequate and not in a position to fully compensate the rising prices of medical and medicinal services for the socially unprotected population groups. The government will have to find a way to gradually raise the insurance contributions.

High-quality treatment and preventive medicine are possible only on the basis of applying highly efficient medical technologies and the achievements of medical, biological, and technical sciences which require a modern production base. One of the important tasks of federal bodies of power is to promote its development by all possible means. It is necessary to involve on a large scale the country's enterprises, primarily those undergoing conversion, in the production of modern, high-quality medicines and medical equipment.

It is necessary to retain duty-free centralized imports only for vitally important medicines which are not produced in Russia. These measures will provide serious support for our country's medical industry.

The transformations in the health care system require legislative backup. In the near future the RF parliament will have to examine laws on the health care systems, on patients' rights, on medicines, on protection of the family, and a series of other laws.

For a very long time our country practiced a feckless approach toward the creation of new production units and the construction of industrial facilities, using predatory methods for the utilization of our natural wealth. Nowadays people have to pay for these miscalculations.

Vast regions in the country have become ecological disaster zones. The lives and health of tens of millions of people inhabiting these territories, as well as their flora and fauna, are under grave threat. A critical situation prevails in a series of places, especially in major industrial centers.

The public is perfectly justifiably alarmed about the condition of the environment and is making fair demands for urgent specific work to improve the situation.

The citizens' right to enjoy a favorable environment is enshrined in the Constitution. Therefore, it is the constitutional obligation of all bodies of power to create conditions promoting environmental recovery. It is necessary to be guided by the principle that ecological safety is a component of Russia's national security.

The government has elaborated a series of immediate ecological programs, but their implementation is progressing extremely slowly. The effect of inadequate financing is felt. The Federal Assembly and the government will have to give serious attention to this problem.

The ecological situation in many regions can be repaired by federal services exercising ecological monitoring, protecting natural resources, and regulating their utilization. For this purpose it is important to ensure that their work is not limited to just identifying violations and that they make full use of all the potential at their disposal.

A decisive turnabout in environmental protection work must be ensured through a long-term state strategy for protection of the environment, whose main provisions were ratified in early February 1994 by edict of the RF president.

Attention in it is focused mainly on:

—guaranteeing ecologically safe and stable development in conditions of market relations;

—protecting the environment (including alleviating the critical ecological situation in major cities and industrial centers and guaranteeing the population's radiation safety);

—ensuring the recovery and restoration of Russia's disrupted ecosystems;

—actively participating in the solution of global ecological problems.

In line with this strategy, the government has been instructed to elaborate within two months an action plan for environmental protection in 1994-1995. This year the government has also been instructed to elaborate a concept of the RF's transition to a model of stable development ensuring balanced solution of socioeconomic and ecological problems.

The complexity and scale of these problem demand constructive collaboration between federal and regional bodies of power, bodies of local self-government, entrepreneurs, and public associations. We will need a considered application of both economic and administrative regulators within the law's framework, developed legal backing, and pursuit of targeted socioeconomic, financial, and taxation policies.

2.3. State Support for the Institutions of Civil Society

Without a developed civil society, state power will inevitably acquire a despotic and totalitarian character. It is only thanks to the civil society that this power starts serving man and becomes a protector of freedom.

It is a specific feature of the Russian situation that the foundations of a new democratic state are being laid in parallel with the establishment of a civil society.

Since a democratic state cannot exist without a civil society, the state is objectively interested in supporting public institutions. This does not mean the state interfering in the life of civil structures or vesting state authority powers in public associations; it means selectively helping those civil society institutions which are capable of directly boosting the democratic potential of authority.

The mass media have an invaluable role to play in shaping the civil society. The protection of their freedom is a strategic task. While this freedom exists, democracy is defended by one of the most important protective factors.

The Russian mass media today are undergoing major qualitative changes associated with their transition to market tracks. Numerous problems have accumulated. Just as in the last two years, finances remain a key issue. Under no circumstances should the press be left without subsidies in 1994.

It is necessary to gradually undertake the destatization of the mass media, primarily of newspapers and journals. The state authorities must hand their functions as founders over to editorial offices and journalists' collectives.

It is clear that the state will be unable to cope with the financial maintenance of television and radio broadcasting companies. The package of presidential edicts on television and radio broadcasting issued in December last year defined the course of state policy in this sphere. It is important, however, to ensure that Russia's information area is not broken up and fragmented in the process of implementing practical steps. The state television and radio channel must be retained.

The time has finally come to develop the legislative base of mass media activities. A law on the right of access to information must come first in this sphere. It is also necessary to prepare draft laws regulating the activity of television and radio broadcasting companies, especially since some sound work has already been done in this regard.

One of the factors which complicate the formation of a democratic political system and a civil society is the weak and amorphous nature of parties and public organizations. There is the great inertia of interparty and intergroup struggle, in which the citizens' interests are relegated to the back burner.

The Federal Assembly elections in December 1993 demonstrated significant shortcomings in the legislative backup for the activity of parties, public associations, and mass media during the election campaign.

It is necessary to ensure that the next presidential and parliamentary elections are held on the basis of new and updated laws. It is equally important to define at federal level the main provisions of electoral legislation in Federation components.

A special role will have to be played by the law on political parties which, in parallel with general democratic provisions, must boost the development of a multiparty system.

It is important that this law should guarantee:

—the strengthening of the parties' role as main channel of political activity associated with the shaping of power;

—the creation of conditions encouraging the consolidation of parties and the formation of a stable party system;

—the orientation of party activity toward ascertaining and expressing the opinions of different strata of society.

It is expedient to ensure that the law on political parties and the law on elections are coordinated and complement each other.

Laws on elections ought to be elaborated on the basis of a critical interpretation of the experience of the first multiparty elections and the dominant participation of major political blocs in the elections.

An important avenue of lawmaking should be the procedure for using the mass media both during the election campaign and in the period between elections. Here we cannot avoid a legislative regulation of television and radio airtime allocated for election campaigning. In this regard, the provision of free airtime by state-owned mass media must become one of the forms of state support for the multiparty system.

It is expedient to utilize the experience accumulated during the last elections. The Information Arbitration Court, now the Court of Appeal, must sum up this experience and submit relevant proposals to the president.

The adoption of separate legislative acts on parties and on public organizations (associations) will draw a line between political activity as such and the activity of organizations and citizens aimed at solving nonpolitical problems. This will bring public organizations into the implementation of the state's social policy. The state will have to partly finance the activity of public associations engaged in resolving priority social tasks. This will make it possible to partly ease the burden of the state and cut back the state apparatus. A considered and legislatively enshrined procedure for the use of state funds by public organizations will help to enhance the efficiency of their utilization.

State support for public organizations must take the following forms:

—providing subsidies on a competitive basis;

—giving them the right to utilize state property;

—granting them tax concessions and full or partial exemption from payment for services rendered by state-owned enterprises.

While helping, the state must have the right to monitor the utilization of any financial or other resources that have been made available.

This mechanism must be embodied in laws on public organizations (on freedom of association), on trade unions, on noncommercial organizations, on charitable foundations and charitable activity.

One of the signs of a developed civil society is the system of institutions of self-government. These institutions make it possible to impart a constructive meaning to people's free activity and link it with self-responsibility.

This is precisely why the Constitution singles out a separate sphere of civic autonomy and activeness—local self-government—and lays down that bodies of local self-government are not part of the system of state power but function autonomously and are accountable to their population.

But this does not mean that the state can completely distance itself from legally regulating the structure, functions, and powers of local self-government. It is impossible to ignore the fact that this is not only a sphere for residents' self-organization but also a specific level of power.

3. Federalism—a Territorial Form of Democracy

3.1. The Integrity of the State and Regional Policy

Strengthening the state means above all the strengthening of its territorial integrity. The problem does not boil down merely to ensuring the inviolability of state borders and protecting the country from external threats. For all the importance of these tasks, what causes alarm are manifestations of the country's disintegration, and internal tendencies which threaten its territorial integrity.

These misgivings are caused by the fact that the radical transformations in the economic and political spheres have coincided with the crisis of unitarism which has outlived its time. For Russia, which has begun democratic transformations, the only real method of strengthening Russia is the creation of a modern federative state.

The task of the federal authorities is to find the kind of form of state structure such that the regions' natural desire for greater autonomy does not create a threat to the integrity of Russia.

The first steps along this path have already been taken. The Constitution itself has been prepared with the direct participation of the components of the Federation. During the Constitutional Conference many contradictions were successfully eliminated and it proved possible to find juridical formulas by way of a compromise which have become the basis for further progression forward.

The regions are actively arranging coordinating and managerial links with each other. A mechanism of "self-attunement" has begun to function thanks to which new socio-economic complexes, undivided by administrative boundaries, are beginning to take shape in Russia. Prototypes of interregional structures of management have appeared and these have taken over a proportion of the functions which previously used to be fulfilled by the unitary center. These are interregional associations whose activity encompasses the entire Russian Federation.

The growth of the regions' autonomy and the reduction of the powers of federal authority do not signify a weakening of the state and do not create a threat to the country's unity. The constitution lays down the basis principles which guarantee:

—the immutability of the state's territorial integrity;

—the equality of the rights enjoyed by the members of the federation between themselves and with respect to the federal organs of state power;

the unity of the foundations of the state system (observance by each region of such fundamental principles of statehood as sovereignty of the people, separation of powers, multiplicity of parties, and equal electoral rights of citizens).

—freedom of movement for people, for the dissemination of information, and for the movement of goods and money throughout the state's territory (internal administrative boundaries cannot be transformed into state or economic borders);

—the supremacy of federal legislation;

—the impermissibility of actions directed at the unilateral change of status of a component of the Federation.

Like all the other articles of the federal Constitution, these principles are mandatory for implementation by the authorities and citizens in any region of Russia. In everything which does not conflict with these principles and which does not fall within the competence of the Russia Federation, the regions have freedom in regard to their own development.

The time of the struggle of the regions with the "center" for their rights is receding into history. The Constitution has granted all regions of Russia broad rights. Those regional politicians who are still demanding powers are breaking through a brick wall right next to an open door. The chief problem is to proceed to the real assimilation of these rights as soon as possible.

The broad handover of powers to regional authorities does not in any way mean that the federal authorities are withdrawing from the exercise of any influence whatsoever on the regional life of Russian society. On the contrary, under the new conditions there is a growing need for the development and implementation of the Russian state's new regional strategy.

This task was set by the president back in April last year although its implementation was rendered difficult until after the constitutional crisis was overcome.

The basic principles and aims of regional strategy consist in the following:

—overcoming sharp differences between regions in terms of the standard of living and levels of development;

—the development of interregional cooperation and the maximal use of the potential deriving from the regions' diversity;

—the use of methods of incentive and regulation and the renunciation of administration by injunction;

—the prosperity of citizens;

—the transition from narrowly economic toward broader—societal and social—goals;

—ensuring territorial fairness (no region must acquire any unjustified privileges).

An important instrument for perfecting the fundamentals of federalism must be a law on the general principles of organizing the representative and executive organs of state power in the components of the Federation.

In the political sphere direct elections of regional authorities are the guarantee for regional autonomy. Regional authorities must be subordinated not to the federal authorities but to the federal Constitution.

The division of sources of taxation receipts among federal, regional, and local levels must become a guartantee for the economic autonomy of the regions. Then each level of state power will be really independent from the others. Citizens and enterprises can function as tax-payers.

Ensuring the rights of local self-government is one of the most important conditions for preserving territorial integrity. The competence of its organs encompasses the satisfaction of the most crucial, everyday, vitally essential needs of the people which neither federal, nor regional authorities are able to provide.

Local self-government has deep historical roots in Russian political culture, taking the form of the zemstvo. For the young Russian democracy local self-government can become an effective means of galvanizing citizens and a means of involving them in constructive political work which yields real practical results.

It is precisely at the level of local self-government that various forms of the national-cultural developoment of the peoples of Russia can acquire pratical embodiment..

Federal power is faced with a very important task—to strictly delimit the functions, rights, duties, and responsibility between the organs of state power and local self-government. At the same time their material and financial sources have to be divided. For this purpose it is essential to adopt a federal law on the general principles of organizing local self-government. Taking this as a base, the organs of power of the components of the Federation must adopt legal acts regulating the structure and powers of the organs of local self-government in their own regions taking account of national and local traditions.

The president, the Federal Assembly, the Government, and the components of the Federation must participate in drawing up and implementing regional policy. Possibilities now exist for legislative and executive authorities to exercise a proper influence in this sphere. The appearance of the Federation Council—the first "chamber of the regions" in Russia's history—will help substantially to raise the standard of discussion of regional problems. This chamber has a big part to play in developing laws connected with resolving a whole range of the country's regional problems. Committes for Federation affairs and

regional policy have been set up in both the Federation Council and in the State Duma.

During the development of genuine federalism new problems will surely crop up and we have to be prepared to solve them. One of them is the possible growth of contradictions between the regions. Such contradictions existed before but they were resolved by administrative means from Moscow. But now, by an large, it will be the regions themseves which will have to overcome these contradictions. When an impasse is encountered the president will use conciliatory procedures and set up conference commissions to resolve disagreements between the organs of state power of the Russian Federation and the organs of state power of its components, and likewise between the organs of state power of the federation's components themselves.

Treaties between the federal authority and the subjects of the Federation concerning the demarcation of areas of responsibility and powers operate as a most important mechanism for the self-attunement of federative relations. A treaty of this type has been signed with the Republic of Tatarstan.

The regulation of relations between the federal authority and the Chechen Republic represents a special problem. The holding of free democratic elections in Chechnya and talks on the demarcation of powers with the federal authorities could become a basis for this.

An immediate task is to draw up and adopt basic laws which will make it possible to convey the constitutional principles of the new federative relations into the real pratice of the application of the law. The following laws are necessary:

—on the principles of the demarcation of areas of responsibility and the mutual delegation of powers between the federal "center" and the components of the Federation;

—on the procedure for the admission to the Russian Federation of a new compnent or for the formation of a new component within its composition;

—on the procedure for changing the constitutional-legal status of a component of the Russian Federation.

3.2. Russia's Economic Unity

The divergent starting conditions and nonidentical economic policies of local authorities are intensifying the divergences between different regions, thus forming the potential for the disintegration of Russia. It is intolerable that, when coming into conflict with the Constitution, the authorities of the regions:

—limit the freedom of economic, scientific, technical, amd other contractual relationships between enterprisers of different components of the Federation;

—create obstacles to the movement of goods, financial resources, and to the movement of people across administrative boundaries of territories;

—violate the unity of the principles of taxation.

Each region of the Federation is entitled to apply its own tactical methods when implementing the strategic tasks of economic reform. But no region has the right to use these methods in such a way that in fact they would cancel out the common goals, separate it from the Federation, and would inflict direct or indirect harm on other regions. The unity of the Federation's economic space is inviolable.

In order to strengthen it, it is essential to ensure the priority development of a unified infrastructure (energy, transportation, communications, information science), and to provide for rigorous sanctions against regions which impede the transfer of taxes to the federal budget or fail to discharge other obligations to the federal organs.

The federal authorities, finally, must take exhaustive steps to complete the process of the demarcation of state property both between the Federation's components themselves and also between the federal "center" and the regions. Russia's government should within a very tight timeframe make an inventory of the legal arrangements for the management of federal property located on the territory of the components of the Russian Federation, and of its material condition.

The concessions which have been granted to certain regions, some of which are economically inexpedient or simply unfair in relation to the country's citizens living in other territories, ought to be revisited. A system is necessary based on unified criteria for granting concessions with regard to federal taxes and credits. It is essential to render support to enterprises working in accordance with federal programs and create incentives for the development of Russian interregional corporations. It is essential to ensure the unconditional fulfillment of the Constitution by sweeping away any regional barriers in the way of the movement of goods, money, and services.

Regions cannot be the subjects of economic relations. Their authorities are not entitled to supplant the true subjects—the citizens and enterprises—merely because they are located on a territory which is administratively subordinate to the regional authorities.

At the same time it cannot be allowed that the struggle against economic separatism should infringe the rights of the Federation's regions or should lead to the restoration of a unitary state. The course toward the handover to them of an increasingly large volume of powers must continue.

Federal authority will undertake support for economically depressed regions through the Federal Regional Development Fund. The main source of money for the

support of the weak must be the territorial rent which is emerging in a number of regions on the strength of more favorable natural and geographic factors, and also as a consequence of former preferential state capital investments.

While ensuring the minimum necessary level of support for the systems of education and health care and for the institutions of the labor market, the federal authorities must not limit the autonomy of the regions in the choice of their own system of social support for the population adapted to local conditions.

It is very important that the efforts of the federal organs of power should be supplemented by energetic and all-around activity by the components of the Federation. The general path for state influence on regional development is not to make direct transfers of money from the federal budget to the regional budget but to use these resources in joint programs on a parity basis. The development of small and medium cities, highway construction and so forth ought, for example, to be approached from this angle. The program for the development of small and medium cities that is with the government ought to be examined, taking this into account.

A big role must be played by the territorial organs of federal executive power envisioned by the constitution. It is they that will shoulder the main burden in devising and implementing federal and interregional programs for the territories. Support will be needed for interregional associations operating for the purposes of economic integration. It is a question of the comprehensive utilization and protection of natural resources, regional programs and their financing on a shared basis.

3.3. Federalism and Interethnic Accord

The strengthening of the Russian state is unthinkable without accord among the peoples inhabiting it.

A multitude of national problems has been engendered by the contradictory nature of two principles which, right from the beginning, were made the basis of the Russian Federation's state structure: the national-territorial principle and the administrative-territorial principle. This is being manifested clearly today when the redistribution of the functions and powers of the authorities between the federal organs and components of the federation is taking place. Under present conditions the historical necessity for their coexistence persists. At the same time the contradictions between them will be smoothed out on the basis of a new concept, enshrined in the Constitution, of the nation as a community of citizens [sograzhdanstvo].

The Constitution proclaims the self-determination of the Russian Federation on behalf of all its multiethnic people as the vehicle of the sovereignty and single source of authority in the state; and likewise the source of authority in the republics, krays and oblasts is their entire population regardless of nationality. The division of inhabitants into representatives of so-called "indigenous" and "nonindigenous" nationalities is unconstitutional and therefore inadmissible.

The equality of rights and freedoms of all citizens regardless of their nationality, as provided for in the Constitution, must be strictly guaranteed. No ethnic group may possess an exclusive right of control over territory, institutions of power, and resources. The equality of rights calls for the necessity to adopt coordinated decisions which take account of the interests of the various national groups.

The integrity of the state is based to a significant degree on maintaining the unity of the civic society and the preservation of the diversity of its ethnic components. This is why a democratic nationalities policy is vitally necessary. It must be aimed at solving the following most urgent issues:

—nationalities problems when building the federal state;

—the defense of citizens' rights and of the ehtnic, religious, and linguistic communities which they make up;

—the enthno-cultural development of the peoples of the Russian Federation;

—the prevention and settlement of interethnic conflicts.

Above all the state is obliged to create conditions enabling the representatives of various nationalities to independently determine and implement their own social and cultural objectives and to form associations, unions, and other institutions of a civic society. In the economy this means above all the freedom of enterprise and equal rights of property for the citizens of all nationalities. In politics it means maintaining the national groups' diverse forms of self-government.

The self-organization of ethnic communities which do not have their own national-territorial entities on the territory of the Russian Federation or which live outside the boundaries of such entities is possible in various forms of national-cultural autonomy. The legal foundations of their activity is to be determined by the government and Federal Assembly.

The Federal, republic-regional, and local authorities are obliged to defend human rights in the ethnic sphere and give preferential support to the least protected ethnic groups. It is the state's task to preserve vulnerable ethnic cultures and communities, especially in the regions of the European North, Siberia, and the Far East. The pursuit of economic reforms in these regions must be accompanied by a package of measures to defend the rights of numerically small peoples, including:

—budget financing of traditional sectors of the economy and social sphere;

—the development of the social infrastructure of national settlements and the development of special

forms of medical services and education taking into account the specific features of the way of life of numerically small peoples of the North;

—the preservation of language, culture, and traditional habitat.

Priority state support is also essential for all ethnic categories of refugees and enforced exiles from zones of interethnic conflicts. Such problems are especially acute in the North Caucasus.

This year will see the 50th anniversary of a tragic event—the forced resettlement of many peoples of Russia from their native localities. Overcoming the consequences of a repressive nationalities policy is one of the priority tasks of organs of power at all levels. Interethnic accord, readiness for dialogue, and a quest for compromise are especially important in solving these very complex problems.

The preservation and strentghening of the federative state depends directly on the national self-awareness of the Russians. In Russia Russians constitute the absolute majority of the peoplation—83 percent. They are not threatened by assimilation, a tendency to forget their mother tongue, or by the loss of their national originality.

At the same time it is impossible to deny the existence of a number of problems which are being encountered by Russians especially in certain republics of the Federation and in regions bordering on zones of interethnic conflicts. The same basic principles of a democratic nationalities policy are being applied in their regard, to wit:

—national parity with other peoples on the territory of all components of the Federation, and in particular equality in the use of one's mother tongue in official relations and in social and cultural life;

—the right to ethnocultural self-organization; for example, by setting up regional-cultural associations on territories where Russians are in the minority;

—state support for programs for the revival of the regional diversity of Russian national culture and, of course, for Russian settlers. The state will strive to accept all migrant fellow countrymen and to give priority help in accommodating and finding job placements for socially unprotected groups of migrants and also for those of them who are headed for regions whose development is of special significance for the country.

In Russia the Federal authorities have displayed sufficient reserve and prudence which have made it possible to avoid a situation whereby constitutional conflicts with a number of republics might develop into interethnic confrontation. The organs of state power have still to devise a concept of state policy for Russia for averting and settling interethnic conflicts. It must be based on the principle of the primacy of peaceful political means of resolving contradictions that crop up. At the same time the state is obliged to use all legitimate means, including force, to immediately localize armed clashes, to disarm illegal military formations, and to nip in the bud the activities of organizations and persons preaching ethnic strife and calling for violence.

On the whole the policy of interethnic accord must occupy one of the leading places in the state strategy for the development of the Russian Federation. In order to implement this policy the following package of draft laws needs to be elaborated:

—on national minorities;

—on the status of national councils, rayons, okrugs, and settlements and on national-cultural autonomy;

—on the development of ethnic cultures and languages;

—on forced migration and refugees from zones of interethnic conflicts.

4. Toward A Social State Through Market Reform.

4.1. Reform Reserves

The economy of the transition period is always unstable. If a state is weak, instability grows, reform grinds to a halt, and economic activity is destroyed. In a strong state, stabilization is achieved more quickly, and reform creates the preconditions for economic revival. Unless the state is strengthened, Russia will find it impossible to overcome the crisis and implement a profound reform of the economy.

Right now, the situation in the economy is highly alarming. Mutual nonpayments are bringing enterprises to a halt. Prices continue to rise. In January 1994 the rate of inflation rose again to hit 22 percent. People have not been paid for months. Social tension remains high.

In August 1993 the government adopted an action program, which it is trying to carry out. The authorities of many regions, now in possession of sufficient freedom to effect market transformations in which millions of people are taking part, are taking vigorous action. However, the economic situation is not improving. An analysis of what is happening is required.

Real economic reform in Russia was inevitable. Any deviation from the strategy of reform will place the country on the brink of catastrophe. The state's political line must be single-minded: There will be no turning back.

The reform is intended to transform the economic mechanism in a radical manner, to render it efficient, and to make it work to people's advantage. Now, two years on from its beginning, it is possible to sum up the results, to compare the gains and the losses, and to define the reserves.

The reform can be credited with the dismantling of the basic elements of an outmoded administrative system, and the switch to economic methods of regulation. The

first stage of privatization, without which reform would have been impossible, is drawing to a close. Within a short space of time private ownership, almost wholly eradicated in past decades, has once again became a reality.

There is evidence of changes in the economic psychology, the gradual adjustment of producers and consumers to market conditions. Economic activity, prices, and foreign trade have been liberalized. Business activity is moving from the state to the nonstate sector. A consumer market has started to function.

Russia has a sizable foreign trade surplus. For the first time in many years grain imports have dropped significantly. There has been success in achieving the domestic convertibility of the ruble for current transactions, and in creating specific currency reserves allowing us to maintain vital imports and the minimum required payments against the foreign debt. Gradually, Russia is becoming integrated into the world economy.

The results observed are considerable if compared with the situation on the eve of reform. They have been achieved primarily through the efforts of the millions of people who have accepted reform. Despite all the difficulties of the first years of market reforms, people do not want to return to the old ways.

The results are modest if you think of what might have been, given normal political conditions and without major errors on the part of the authorities.

The reform of the economic mechanism is far from over. Its reserves are significant, and they must be utilized in full in 1994:

—the institutions of a market economy;

—a system of state management;

—demonopolization;

—taxation;

—economic legislation.

Upon completion of the check stage of privatization, a qualitatively new stage of this process will begin. An increase in investment activity, a weighty contribution to the structural overhaul, the creation of a competitive milieu, and the formation of a full-fledged stock market will become the central problems.

Although Russia already has the bases of a market economy infrastructure, this infrastructure is distributed highly unevenly. In particular, the country does not have effective institutions guaranteeing the operation of markets for equipment, land, accommodations and other immovable assets, securities, and wholesale trade. The Federal Government and the regional authorities have no right to be indifferent to this. What is more, the institutional aspect of the reform must become the vanguard.

The Federal Assembly will be acting correctly if it lays a firm legal base for Russian enterprise. The main thing is that it should be stable. The bodies of state power need to simplify considerably the procedures regulating private business activity. The complexity and inconsistency of regulation hinders the development of enterprise and nurtures corruption. Preferential state support is required by those entrepreneurial structures which are operating in priority areas of the reform. The Federal Program of State Support for Small Enterprise is to guarantee this in 1994.

The most pressing tasks for 1994 include the formation of a modern system of accounting and the start of the far-reaching reform of the Central Bank with the aim of creating a Russian Federal Reserve System. Given that the actions of the Central Bank have key significance for the fate of the reform and wide sociopolitical consequences, the process of reforming it will be under the president's control.

The year 1994 must become the year of the formation of Russian financial-industrial groups. It is for the government to monitor that they are set up on a strictly voluntary basis, and to guard against the resurrection of the old ministerial structures, the misappropriation of state property, and unjustified monopoly. Such institutions are capable of maintaining a sufficient level of investment activity and technological innovations, and of ensuring the concentration of resources in areas of growth and the necessary competitiveness both on the domestic Russian market and on the world market.

The alternative is only too clear: The rapid suffocation of Russian entrepreneurial structures by the foreign multinationals, with the exception, perhaps, of those operating in the raw material sector. It is necessary to set in place without delay institutions guaranteeing the implementation of state structural policy.

In the agrarian sector it is time for the government and the regional authorities to set up mechanisms to realize the right of private land ownership, and to help construct a modern banking infrastructure. A rational protectionist policy is required, protecting the interests of national producers but without perceptible damage to consumers.

In 1994 it is necessary to begin a radical alteration of the entire system of state support for the agrarian sector. This does not mean meeting any financial requests from the sector, but instead a real reform of its economic mechanism—this must be the main principle.

The state has as yet failed to bring about the effective regulation of the economy, in particular the management of enterprises belonging to it.

Owing to this, many enterprises to this day do not bear full liability for the results of their activity, hoping to get support from the budget even in the event of continuing with clearly inefficient production. Everybody knows where this kind of support leads—to new spirals of

inflation, the slowing of the structural overhaul, and a drop in economic efficiency. It is precisely for this reason that reform is not progressing as quickly as it might at the level of state enterprises.

In place of the old links of the administrative system, new administrative structures have emerged and strengthened, many of which are by no means obligatory in market conditions. Although a bureaucrat no longer doles out plans and allocates funds, he is no less powerful insofar as he distributes centralized credits and investments, allocates export quotas, and issues licenses. As a consequence of this, not only is management efficiency lost but the economic base of corruption is reproduced.

The government has been unable to impose the requisite order here. The de facto nonownership of property and the management "vacuum" in the state sector must be eradicated in 1994. Serious changes in legislation are overdue: the norms prescribed for an economy of centralized planning and economic accountability are now inappropriate. The state's attitude toward its own enterprises must be that of a proprietor. This will stop the squandering of state property to the advantage of the mercenary interests of certain economic managers, increase the efficiency of its utilization, and, by shedding nonviable production facilities, maintain the viable ones.

The creation of a regulatory system for the market econmy is not a retreat but a move forward, a development of the reform, a strengthening of the Russian state. In a badly managed economy there will never be true market-based order.

As before, its formation is hindered by loss-making monopolism. So deeply have monopoly structures taken root in the Russian economy that demonopolization will take some considerable time. The task in the coming years is to reform the monopolized economy—this circumstance has to be taken fully into account.

In order to make rational use of the antimonopoly reserve of the reform it is necessary to broaden the appropriate legislation and to demand greater accountability from the state bodies implementing it. The formation of a competitive medium will be aided by measures stimulating private enterprise and the formation of multiprofile companies, and by a well-balanced foreign trade policy protecting the economic interests of Russia, not by inefficient monopolist formations.

The effective transformation of the tax system will help economic reform along considerably. It should be clear and stable, at least, for the duration a year. The number of taxes should be reduced, and the procedure for levying them should be considerably simplified. The changes to the taxation system must support the producers, particularly those working in the consumer market; they should also stimulate investment and prove highly effective for the economy as a whole.

We should also think hard about bringing into play mechanisms that will make it impossible and disadvantageous to evade taxes. Massive attempts to conceal income from taxation are more intolerable. In the final analysis we must learn to collect everything that is due to the state. The budget will feel the benefits of such a policy immediately, and the budget deficit problem will become less acute. This is especially important inasmuch as it is becoming ever more difficult to resolve this problem by cutting expenditure.

The government should put forward legislative initiatives that envisage shifting the center of gravity onto taxation of natural resources and real estate. We need to tighten up financial penalties for those who pollute the environment, without, however, undermining the competitiveness of Russian output on the world market. The substantial consolidation of tax breaks for capital investment and innovative activity is in the interests of production.

We urgently need to make a breakthrough in the sphere of legal backup for market reform. Economic legislation lacks unity. Hitherto it has proved impossible to fully regulate legal relationships between the Federal Government and the regional authorities. The competence of state bodies at one level has not been demarcated.

Draft laws slated for submission to the Russian president and State Duma in 1994 include the RF Civil Code, which includes a general and a specific section. Its adoption would create an all-embracing legal basis for a market economy, a society of civilized property owners, economic freedom for the individual, and partnership relations between the citizen and the state. The Civil Code embodies new principles of entrepreneurship, relationships between economic players, and other key reform issues.

Draft codes on housing, labor law, joint-stock company law, and contractual partnership are being prepared. The same goes for taxation and agrarian legislation, and for changes and supplements to laws on bankruptcy, competition, limitations on monopoly activity, and the peasant (private farmer) economy. Of extreme importance are legislative acts regulating the circulation of securities, foreign investment, concessions, and the functioning of free economic zones. A new law on the banking system is also needed.

4.2. The Price of Reform and Ways of Reducing It

Economic reform is not painless and free of charge. Losses are inevitable, and the central political problem is to ensure that the cost of market transformations is not too great for society. We have not managed to achieve this.

The high cost of reform is explained, first, by the unfavorable starting position. At the end of 1991 the economy was in an extremely grave state. The effective abandonment of the totalitarian system's mechanism

coincided with the USSR's disintegration and the severing of economic ties. The consumer market was devastated even earlier, foreign currency reserves were exhausted. The production slump deepened. The ruble was washed out of circulation and barter flourished. By postponing necessary reforms for decades the totalitarian regime exacerbated all problems to the utmost and exhausted the national economy's durability margin.

Russia inherited from the past a cumbersome production structure dominated by the military-industrial complex and monopolism, and exports geared to raw materials.

Inflation began much earlier than 1992. This disease ravaged our economy for many years, taking the form of a universal commodity shortage, distribution by ration coupon, and waiting lines kilometers long. When price liberalization was launched, inflationary energy that had been pent up for years burst out.

Second, the price of reform is determined by political circumstances. Two years of reform in Russia were accompanied by a most acute confrontation between the branches of federal power during which they weakened each other, and that means the state as a whole. The transfer of the struggle to the sphere of economic policy had very grave consequences for the country and especially for reform: weak legislative support for market transformations, delays in reform, accelerated inflation—this is by no means a full list.

Third, the downside of the reform was attributable to mistakes by the bodies of state power responsible for reform. The government took poor account of the consequences of some decisions, postponed the adoption of others, was slow to make considreed corrections to reform, and underused the reform's reserves. This was especially noticeable in recent months, when the government not so much advanced the reform as reacted to the problems arising. The pause in reformation became protracted. It is time to end it.

The experience of the past two years shows that it is not only the reform itself that is turning into the well-known losses. Even greater harm is being done by delaying overdue amendments to the structure of the economic mechanism.

One of the main ingredients of the cost of Russian reform is persistently high inflation, the endless rise in prices. This is inflicting enormous damage on the reform itself, the poulation's quality of life, and the economy as a whole. In conditions of unrestrained inflation the crisis is insurmountable.

The capital investment situation remains extremely grave. The basis of the investment crisis is high inflation, as a result of which money is going not into production but into brokerage. There is practically no more budget investment, there is still no share market—such is the inevitable combination of the transition period, the negative consequences of which for investment are perfectly clear. Because of inflation credit has become not only expensive but also primarily short-term. Consequently the future of Russia's economy is under threat.

The inertia of the economic slump persists. In a number of sectors the real degradation and destruction of production is under way, with a fall in output in 1993 by 25 percent and more.

High-technology machine building is in a very difficult situation. Some plants are surviving only by switching to production of technologically obsolete equipment, slipping to the level of the sixties. Although we are producing less than before, consumption of raw materials, fuel, and energy remains considerable. Efficiency is falling. The reality of the transitional period is that Russian industry could become a market industry, but one that is primitive and inefficient. Such a payment for market reform would be inordinately high.

In two years of reform the government has simply been unable to elaborate an effective structural policy. This inaction will cost the Russian economy dear.

Production is being greatly harmed by the crisis of mutual nonpayments. Not only the economy but also the social sphere is suffering, because hidden unemployment is increasing, wages are not being paid on time, and local budgets are failing to collect a considerable proportion of taxes. If we delay a solution to the problem, massive nonpayments will continue to promote the closure of enterprises and intensify the production slump.

The social cost of reform proved to be very great indeed. On the one hand the reforms cannot be allowed to founder, which will merely intensify the difficulties being experienced by the people. On the other hand the threshold of social shock must not be exceeded. Otherwise the population's willingness to support market reform will come into sharp conflict with the fear of being crushed by it. The greatest fears are caused by poverty, glaring inequality, and unemployment.

The country is suffering losses because of weak control over the export of resources and unfavorable foreign trade conditions. The general economic instability and deficiencies in foreign currency control are having the effect of leaving a considerable proportion of export earnings sitting in Russian enterprise accounts abroad. The state is obliged to reliably protect national interests. Otherwise citizens' confidence in any of its actions, including reformatory actions, is undermined.

The cost of reform has proved to be high. The trajectory was correct but the flight was accompanied by serious mistakes. Not only the Russian economic mechanism remained largely expenditure-driven. Likewise the political mechanism.

The failings of the reform and its reserves are clear. The most important task now is to make market transformations less onerous for society without reducing the pace of reform—and even increasing it.

Despite the fact that the rate of price increases is high, there are possibilities of restraining inflation. A monthly inflation level of 3-5 percent by the end of 1994 specified in the Government Program should serve as a guideline. If it is possible to reach this line and sustain it and make price dynamics predictable, according to current Russian standards such inflation could be considered acceptable.

The aim is achievable only given joint constructive work between the Federal Assembly and government. Other prerequisites are: coordinated actions between the Finance Ministry and Central Bank in the sphere of credit policy, scrapping wasteful subsidies and support for unprofitable production facilities, cutting the budget deficit and setting its maximum size every quarter, swiching to deficit financing by placing the state's debt commitments in domestic and foreign financial institutions, and only granting credits to CIS countries which are secured on property and other assets.

The slowing of the rise in prices will be assisted by a considered pricing policy in those sectors where monopolism is a natural characteristic and is attributable to the specific features of production, for example in electric power engineering and railroad transport.

The prices race cannot be halted without a consistently anti-inflationary monetary and financial policy. But the government must also use other anti-inflationary levers, specifically any reserves in structural investment and taxation policies, and the mechanisms of social partnership.

Any economic policy actions of the federal authorities must be tested for inflation safety. The maximum permissible level of inflation must not be exceeded. This requirement must be strictly observed. Otherwise intervention from the president right up to the use of his constitutional powers cannot be ruled out.

The government will not find it easy to fulfill this requirement. Especially now, when it is faced with clearing debts to the defense sector, the agro-industrial complex, and budget-funded institutions, and repay debts to northerners. But if the government requires others to observe financial discipline then it must start doing so itself. Commitments assumed must be met. And greater responsibility must be shown in the future.

Another serious problem is the setting in motion of mechanisms which make it possible to overcome the nonpayments crisis and to stop the closure of viable enterprises. It cannot be ruled out that, relying on the law, it will be necessary to take tough administrative measures against leaders of state enterprises who, while having funds available in accounts, refuse to pay suppliers and demand money from federal authorities. The nonpayments crisis is taking on a political hue and is becoming a threat to the country's national security. The president's actions will be commensurate with the situation.

The lack of real action by the government and Central Bank on the problem of enterprises' mutual indebtedness is more inadmissible. We must introduce the elaborated scheme for clearing the state's debts to commodity producers and implement other planned measures. Let us hope they operate effectively and help break the chain of mutual nonpayments without fueling inflation. In 1994 we must start to register debts in the form of securities, to reorganize and revitalize economically insolvent enterprises, and in some cases to apply the bankruptcy procedure. This is especially necessary because, the government believes, the stabilization of the investment process can be expected this year.

It is essential to halt the technological regression of Russian industry, to prevent this process becoming irreversible, above all in sectors which are highly competitive in the world market—the aerospace, laser, and atomic industries, shipbuilding, space services, and those devising software programs. The government should clariy the prospects for the defense order and meet the financial commitments it has assumed without delay. The carefully conceived conversion of the defense complex is no less important. There are also other priorities, which are contained in the Government Program adopted 6 August 1993.

If market forces alone are relied on, the solution of structural problems will be something for the distant future, an extremely expensive process associated with considerable expenditure on restoring what has been lost. An effective structural policy will help to reduce the costs of reform. The government must establish a uniform procedure for the granting of state support and strict control over how it is used. The distribution of centralized investment resources should be carried out on a competitive basis. The distribution of benefits on an individual basis must be kept to a minimum and regulated. This applies to both industry and agriculture.

Under the Constitution, Russia is a social state. Therefore Russian citizens must be confident that the legislative and executive branches will exercise control of the observance of the individual's basic social rights. I am referring to the length of the working day, a guaranteed minimum income, the situation of the unemployed, protection for mothers and children, prohibiting the use of child labor, housing provision, the right to a vacation, etc. What is needed is a firm legislative base which specifies the state's duties and responsibility to citizens and the mechanisms for their implementation.

Ensuring the requisite level of social protection will become an immutable requirement made of government economic policy. Only a state program which does not cause an intolerable reduction in basic social indicators must be adopted for implementation. If the government

is incapable of ensuring compliance with the social rights of citizens enshrined in the Constitution, it means it is not working skillfully enough. The population's legitimate interests will be protected by the authority given to the president by the Constitution.

The state's efforts should be concentrated on the following main areas.

—stabilization of the population's living standard;

—broadening of incentives for labor and entrepreneurial activity by economically active citizens;

—targeted support for the least protected social strata;

—a more equal sharing of the burden of the economic crisis among various groups of the population.

It must be recognized that there is an urgent need for a package of documents relating to the social protection of the population, which will be based on the Law on the Subsistence Minimum and other enactments of the Federal Assembly. Every citizen of Russia must be ensured the necessary minimum level of goods and services. And this should form the basis for determining the level of the minimum wage, pensions, grants, and allowances. A unified system of social guarantees will thereby be built.

Support for the needy, an effective income tax, and actions by the state to speed up the structural improvement [strukturizatsiya] of the consumer market, a review of concessions for certain enterprises and regions, and, needless to say, a reduction in inflation will be needed to reduce unwarranted differences in real incomes.

Comprehensive reform of the system of social services is needed, making provision for social guarantees for the needy, along with the introduction of charges [platnost]. A switch to a two-tier system of pension provision is needed, whereby state pensions will be supplemented with payments from citizens' individual accounts in pension funds accumulating personal savings.

It is necessary to create financial reserves in good time, using them to fully provision federal, regional, and other employment funds. The proper amount of unemployment benefit and other payments linked with the loss of jobs must be issued, and without delay. In 1994 employment policy will have to be considerably stepped up. Urgent economic measures may also be necessary in areas where the level of unemployment exceeds socially tolerable limits.

The government must continue to provide gradual compensation for private savings wiped out by price liberalization. Mechanisms are needed to curb and delay the effects of inflation. The task must be performed not just because in early 1992 most holders of savings did not have the slightest chance of rescuing them from depreciation. The problem goes deeper than that, affecting the authorities' prestige and the degree of government and parliamentary responsibility for their predecessors' social pledges.

The state and society cannot do without social partnership institutions which enable tasks to be performed on a national scale. This may include, for instance, the regular coordination of the positions of the government, entrepreneurs, and trade unions within the framework of a tripartite commission.

The federal unification of foreign trade procedures, the abolition of unwarranted concessions for regions, sectors, and certain enterprises, and a move to the sale by tender of export quotas will help reduce the cost of reform. It is necessary to continue the policy of liberalizing exports as well as tightening up state control of exports of strategically important raw material and energy resources. A targeted state program providing incentives for science-intensive commercial exports will be needed.

The government must step up currency control. Tough penalties are needed for offenders who illegally stash hard currency resources abroad. At the same time private holders of hard currency must be given state guarantees to protect them against having these assets confiscated or frozen.

Russia will escape from the crisis and continue reform autonomously and develop economic relations with other states and international financial organizations on the basis of equality and national interests. The Federal Assembly and the government have much to do to ensure that investment in the Russian economy becomes more appealing to foreign firms. At the same time it is clear that the latter will refrain from major investment until stabilization is established and until Russian entrepreneurs start investing capital in the Russian economy. The Russian state must consistently uphold the interests of Russian companies on the domestic and world markets.

Thus, in present conditions economic policy must be structured in such a way as to ensure that two strategic objectives are met, to whit:

—continuing reform and changing the actual structure of the economic system;

—reducing the cost of reform, i.e. combating inflation, structural crisis, poverty, unjust inequality, and enforced unemployment.

In 1994 there will be tough sociopolitical restrictions and little freedom for maneuver. It is all the more necessary for the state bodies responsible for economic policy to pool their efforts. These must be concentrated on the main task—the reform of the economic mechanism.

Reform will gain a second wind if we energetically implement urgent institutional transformations, start a qualitatively new phase of privatization, lay the foundations for an effective system of state regulation, use the available reserves of demonopolization, reform taxation, adopt vitally necessary legislative acts, and provide the mechanisms for their implementation. It will then be

possible with the help of a well-considered economic policy to steer the Russian economy between hyperinflation and a drastic decline in production, avoiding both, and render market transformations less cost-based. There is no other way to restore the economy than by continuing reform.

Russian state bodies must do everything to ensure that 1994 is the year that sees the rate of inflation gradually drop, the fall in production diminish and come to a halt, vigorous structural transformations based on the removal of inefficient production units and support for points of growth, and the stabilization of living standards for the bulk of the population. This year the preconditions may be created not only for economic stabilization but also for the start of steady economic growth.

Only a professional and responsible Federal Assembly and government can do this. That is precisely what the country expects of them.

5. From a Monopoly Ideology to Cultural Diversity

5.1 Development of Culture, Science, and Education

Russia's wealth lies in its unique spiritual and intellectual potential. At the most difficult points in our history, our inexhaustible reserve of spiritual strength has saved our country and allowed it to withstand and overcome inconceivable obstacles.

But today problems in the cultural sphere are being felt more and more keenly. The totalitarian state ideology, whose mouthpiece was the CPSU and which held sway for decades, has collapsed.

It has been replaced by the realization of a natural historical and cultural continuity; an understanding of the realities of the modern world and Russia's place in it; the value of the individual and his dignity; an effort to bring the state into line with human nature; and the restoration of natural proportion with regard to society and the individual. But these improvements signaling a return to spiritual health have still not been transformed into a system of social and cultural standards.

The result of all this is that there has been a loss of moral reference points. This is manifested in:

—a loss of interest in questions of principle concerning our life in society overall, and in particular among the intelligentsia;

—an undermining of people's moral foundations, a dehumanization of life and culture, and an increase in extremism in literally all spheres of social activity—from economics to culture;

—the destruction of a core world view, a readiness to believe in any random illusion, any speculative idea, and at the same time in nihilism and absolute nonbelief.

All these trends are alarming, and the Russian State's main task is to overcome them. If this is not done it will not be possible to regenerate the country or the Russian people's dignity.

It is time to recognize that culture cannot survive without the state's taking an active part in its future. During the whole of Russia's thousand-year history, culture and people working in the cultural sphere have not enjoyed so much creative freedom and political independence as today. But it is at this very moment that the problems of the "country becoming culturally impoverished," the "destruction of talent," and poverty among writers, artists, scientists, and museum and library staffs have reared their ugly heads. Creative people are becoming hostages to commercialization. Culture and art are beginning to lose their old role in public life.

The vital issue for 1994 is the establishment of the best possible relations between the state and culture. The extreme positions which should be avoided at all costs are well known:

—freedom in itself is no guarantee whatsoever of flourishing creative activity;

—if cultural activities are even in part maintained under duress, they will sooner or later grind to a halt. Creativity and coercion are incompatible. No directives coming from above will genuinely be able to improve culture.

Russia has a vital need for a national cultural policy. It is not a question of the relevant ministry or ministries having a program of measures or of the Federation components having a certain set of plans of action for culture. Cultural diversity never fitted into any framework laid down by government departments or into the administrative-territorial organization of the country's activities.

The state should propose federal programs for preserving and developing national culture and stimulating its diversity.

Our opportunities are limited in the context of the economic crisis. But the budgetary obligations which the state is taking on should be carried out. Society should know what proportion of the budget will be spent on culture, science, education, and public health.

One task for the future is to go over in practice to a multichannel system of financing culture. The federal and regional authorities and the organs of local self-government should bear its costs. Charity may provide significant backing for culture, especially if the government is finally able to stimulate this by tax incentives. A law on charitable funds and charitable activities is necessary for this.

Our immediate tasks include developing a legal base for culture, in particular providing a legislative definition of the legal status of cultural organizations. And preparing

a draft law on noncommercial organizations. Its adoption will permit us to put the resolution of many acute social and cultural problems on a strict legal basis.

In the context of privatization and the transition to new land relations, a task for the authorities at all levels is the conservation of historical and cultural monuments, historical complexes, reserves, archives, museums, and libraries. The cultural heritage is a special kind of state property which requires special regulation.

It is necessary to elaborate and adopt laws protecting the cultural heritage of the Russian Federation's peoples and museums and their collections and to take the specific nature of culture into consideration in general laws. This affects first and foremost tax legislation, in which it is necessary to switch to a comprehensive system for supporting culture, people involved in culture, and their professional associations.

It is necessary to make appropriate changes to the Criminal Code, the Code of Penal Procedure, and the Code of Administrative Violations, making provision for stiffer penalties for crime against the country's cultural heritage.

Strengthening Russia's statehood is inconceivable without science's development, the sense of which is absolutely clear now: There has to be a natural integration of science and the new market conditions.

It is a question of creating the conditions for introducing academic developmental work of an applied nature, of carrying out various types of scientific and scientific-technical work and services to help execute major projects.

It is essential in 1994 to pay particular attention to the fate of the so-called science cities like Arzamas-16. Having at their disposal a unique scientific and technical potential, they can become centers for generating new knowledge, technology, and modern education, conduits for innovative technology to all areas of the national economy, a basis for developing state scientific centers and the conversion of industrial plants.

The Russian Federation's system of scientific research institutes was created over many years through the work and talent of many generations of Russians and as a whole is very advanced. In a number of areas of knowledge, particularly technology, our science is falling behind world standards, but to a much smaller degree than in other spheres (agriculture and industry).

However, changes are required in the forms of scientific management which developed in the context of the unitary state. They cannot be transferred to market conditions in their previous form. The basic aim of all restructuring in science is to create favorable conditions for the creative activities of primary scientific collectives—not of institutions and departments—and for free competition among different schools and tendencies.

The scientific-technical revolution resulted in a serious overrating of the relative values of the material and intellectual components of the national wealth. It is intellect, represented among other things by the high technology of the technotron age, which is a decisive source of rapid industrial and agricultural growth. Without the development of fundamental scientific research as a matter of priority, this decisive source will dry up or will become less active.

Fundamental theoretical research in the fields of philosophy, history, sociology, psychology, and law is needed to bring the humanities side of our culture up to a level worthy of the best traditions of Russian thought in the humanities and, in the present crucial period in Russia's development, to create a spiritual and intellectual basis for social change.

The state must continue with the budget financing of fundamental research and fundamentally new technologies. Permanent state support for the universally recognized fundamental scientific research center—the Russian Academy of Sciences (understood as a system of scientific institutes)—is also required.

It is important to adopt a law on science and scientific-technical policy. It is also necessary to elaborate legal measures which would make it possible to expand the inflow of funds from republic and other regional budgets for the financing of projects being carried out in the interests of republics and regions.

Legislative acts on scientific research organization, on scientific and technical expertise, and a number of other topics must also be prepared.

A regime of full public information is necessary in terms of the volumes and deadlines for the allocation and distribution of state budget funds at all levels, and also full and open accountability for all expenditure. Budget financing should be supplemented by competitive financing, which, in the face of a deficit of resources, will promise the most effective use of funds.

While not underestimating the significance of broad international cooperation, all the necessary conditions (earnings, equipment, libraries) must be created for our scientists to be able to work efficiently in their own homeland.

The situation in colleges and universities is no less difficult. Young teachers are leaving Russian institutes of higher education, the prestige of this profession is falling, and the socioeconomic position of scientific-pedagogical and research cadres has deteriorated sharply.

Resolute steps to ensure more effective use of both the educational and the scientific potential of colleges and universities must be taken in 1994-1995 and not put off until the future, and the existing forms, as well as the integration of science and higher education, must be expanded. This applies to fundamentally new forms of

mutual relations between science and institutes of higher education—the creation of scientific education complexes and the preparation of joint scientific programs, projects, and text books for schools and institutes of higher education.

The Russian higher education system must be given greater stability. Regional scientific educational programs must be funded on an equal basis from the state budget and territorial budgets. The active participation of local budgets in resolving questions of the development of the material base and the social protection of students and workers in higher education is required.

Spiritual and intellectual perfection will not appear on its own. The reform of our society must presuppose the fundamental reform of the education system, starting with the aims of education, its economic foundation, and the running of the education system, and ending with the system of training and retraining specialists, the structure of schools, and the content and technology of education.

The development of a modern society urgently and increasingly requires independence of thought and the ability to make decisions. The modern mass school is not geared to forming these individual qualities.

Solving educational problems is impossible without improving the running of the education system. The following must be singled out especially:

—the implementation of a federal program for the development of education;

—the demarcation of the competence of educational administration bodies at various levels;

—the transition to state-public forms of administration;

—the use of flexible mechanisms of administration, envisaging the attestation of workers in education and educational institutions and the licensing of educational activity.

A very important step has already been taken—the Law on Education has been adopted. This law has unfettered the school and de-ideologized it. But it is precisely in schools, more than in any other sector of industry, science, or culture, that we are not yet ready for freedom and creative work.

The centralized financing of the schools from the state budget has become an objective obstacle to their development. Obviously, even now some of the expenditure must be borne by the state budget. This primarily means capital construction. The other part should be covered by municipal funds. Russia does have experience of doing this. The practice must be revived in the law on local self-government. An enormous role in the funding of schools can be played by local educational funds and school boards of trustees if a sensible taxation concession system is drawn up.

Fundamental changes are also necessary in running the education system. So far this work has been carried out by the actual administration workers in their own interests. The overall number of administrative workers per student has increased continuously. The new education system must be geared to the child, a more comfortable life for him, and his optimum development.

Federal laws must be elaborated and adopted on:

—high school education;

—college and university education;

—further professional education;

—the privatization of state and municipal educational institutions.

5.2. Inter-Religion and Multiconfessional Dialogue in a Secular State

Russia is a state with a variety of religions; dialogue among them is one of Russia's traditions. Russia's history shows us experience of this dialogue, conducted both by religious figures and through contacts among believers from different religious groups.

The experience of neighborly coexistence, mutual understanding, and mutual assistance among communities and spiritual centers of different religions and faiths is particularly important for us today. The experience of Russian state policy, developing as it does in a multiethnic, diverse religious environment, is equally important.

For over 70 years Russian society lived in conditions of effective state atheism. However, the age-old people's principles were not totally destroyed. The revival of interest in religion is a fact of modern life. Consideration of this factor in the activity of state bodies and the maintenance of interreligious peace in the country are an abiding value and a long-term task.

The actual rather than merely verbal renunciation of the policy of state atheism; religious dialogue; and proper relations between Russia's churches and religious associations is one of the conditions for civic peace and general conciliation in society.

The legislative and executive authorities must do everything to preclude the very possibility of ethnopolitical conflicts developing into interreligious conflicts especially since, strictly speaking, none of Russia's peoples is entirely uniform in religious terms.

State bodies at all levels must rigorously observe the adopted norms, which are designed to ensure genuine freedom of conscience in Russia, restore the justice with regard to Russia's churches and religious associations that was violated during the postrevolutionary period, and help normalize their traditional activity. At the same time it must be borne in mind that the church is separate from the state but not from society, with which it historically is closely interconnected. Special attention must be paid to the legal and property status of churches

and religious associations, their centers, parishes, monasteries, spiritual education establishments, and other establishments.

6. Russia and Security in the World

6.1. Military Security

One of the most important aspects of strengthening the state system is to ensure the military security of the Russian Federation.

The RF Armed Forces and other troops are designed to:

—defend the sovereignty, territorial integrity and other vital interests of the RF in the event of aggression against it or its allies;

—suppress armed conflict threatening Russia's vital interests and any illegal armed violence within Russia, on its State Border, or on the borders of other states in accordance with treaty commitments;

—conduct peacekeeping operations by decision of the UN Security Council or in accordance with the RF's international commitments.

In view of the changes in the geopolitical situation a tremendous amount of work has been carried out on the organizational development of the Armed Forces: Combat strength has been determined, new groups of troops (forces) have been created, mobile forces are being formed, strategic, operational, and mobilization planning for the use of the Armed Forces has been completed, and the number of fully manned, combat-ready units and combined formations has been increased.

As a result the RF Armed Forces are combat capable and by and large fulfill their assigned tasks. The main attention should subsequently be geared to military-legal reform, continued organizational development of the Armed Forces, and their in-depth reform.

The fundamental principles of legal support for the Russian Army have already been created; however, some of the provisions are not in force owing to the lack of a mechanism to implement them and the lack of sources of funding. Amendments and addenda must be made to military legislation.

Basic Provisions of Military Doctrine have been adopted for the first time in Russia's history as a normative-legal act, establishing the main guidelines for the development of the Armed Forces and other troops in the military-political, military, and military-technical spheres respectively.

The adopted military doctrine effectively represents the concept for military security—an integral part of the unified concept for Russia's national security. Military organizational development must be conducted in strict accordance with the Basic Provisions of RF Military Doctrine. Around 20 new draft laws will also have to be prepared and examined.

On the basis of constitutional principles it is necessary to step up legal protection for Armed Forces servicemen and civilian personnel, military command and control organs, and troop units.

Effective interaction among the appropriate structures of the Federal Assembly, ministries, and departments must be ensured in the interests of implementing military-legal reform.

The formation of the Armed Forces in line with the new conditions must be completed in full in the period 1994-1995 and a base created for their in-depth transformation.

In view of the special features of the RF's geopolitical position, reform of the Armed Forces is based on the principle of mobile defense—the creation of relatively small but relatively powerful forces, ready for immediate use in areas where a real threat to Russia's security arises.

The strategic nuclear forces will continue to be the main means of deterrence against war being unleashed.

Experimental-design work will be vigorously developed in military-technical policy, making it possible to provide a suitable response to existing and potential military threats and military-technical breakthroughs [proryvy]. The tasks of ensuring the country's nuclear security and equipping the Army and Navy with state-of-the-art combat command and control, communications, reconnaissance, and radioelectronic warfare systems are regarded as being of paramount importance.

The Program for Military Organizational Development is to be implemented in the immediate future. It is advisable to formulate and adopt a package of normative-legal acts defining the procedure for the implementation of military organizational development as a whole.

In 1994 the withdrawal of troops back to Russian territory is to be completed in the main. This task is being performed in a systematic manner, taking the real situation into consideration. The troop withdrawal is, however, still considerably outstripping the pace of structural development for servicemen. It is necessary to ensure the rigorous implementation of the State Housing Program for Servicemen and Their Families. The government is assigned the main supervisory and organizational functions here.

The planned reduction in manpower is being carried out. However, the manning problem remains one of the bottlenecks in military organizational development. It can only be resolved over the next few years by employing the mixed method of manning (by contract and draft).

The reorganization of and force reductions in the Armed Forces are making it possible to change the structure of the military budget considerably and confer on it a greater social thrust.

One of the most important tasks on the state scale is to ensure the prestige of service in Russia's Armed Forces. A person in military uniform must be perceived as the guarantor of security, stability, and order in the country.

Strengthening the Armed Forces is an important task for all branches of power. Its resolution will require people to rise above party bias and standpoint and unite all the wholesome forces in society. Nor can the components of the Federation remain aloof from this work.

6.2. Russia Within the System of International Relations

The strengthening of the state system is an essential condition if Russia is to occupy a proper place within the system of changed international relations.

The generally recognized principles and norms of international law form the basis of our foreign policy course. Russia respects the sovereignty, territorial integrity, and independence of other states, including, naturally, those of our neighbors, and demands the same of them. Within the framework of these universal principles we will protect our legitimate interests and, if need be, will do so with firmness and toughness. Any self-respecting state does likewise, particularly when the protection of human rights and people's honor and dignity is involved.

The consistent promotion of national interests through openness and cooperation and the guaranteeing of favorable conditions for internal development and the continuation of reforms constitute the main goal of the Russian state's foreign policy in 1994.

By virtue of its potential and its geopolitical situation and influence Russia bears special responsibility for maintaining stability in the modern, multipolar world—a complex and unpredictable world. Skillful work is needed in squaring competing interests and simultaneously promoting our own.

Global confrontation has disappeared into the past. For the first time in many years Russia has no military adversaries. The priorities in the sphere of our country's national security are eliminating centers of military conflict on Russia's borders, strengthening the arrangements governing the nonproliferation of mass destruction weapons and sophisticated military technologies, and enhancing control over the international arms trade while watching over Russia's commercial interests in this sphere.

The enactment of the START II Treaty and the Convention on the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons is on the agenda. The ratification of these documents by the Federal Assembly will mark a major stage in the implementation of Russia's new military doctrine, particularly as the Agreement between Russia, the United States, and Ukraine on the Complete Elimination of Strategic Nuclear Armaments on Ukrainian Territory has already been signed.

Relations with the new independent states on Russia's borders and the all-around development of the CIS are of paramount importance in foreign policy in 1994. This is a sphere of special responsibility and special mutual interest between Russia and its neighbors. Our country is bound up with them more closely than is usual with neighbors—that is a reality which must be taken into account if we are to maintain control over economic and social processes and guarantee an acceptable level of security.

In the preceding period we managed to avoid two extremes—imperial attempts to restore the Union state by force, with redrawing of the borders, or attempts by Russia to sidestep the problems of the former Union. Thanks to this no tragedy occurred on the nuclear superpower's territory. However, alongside the traditional opportunities which bind our contries by invisible threads in all spheres, new problems for Russia also lurk here. The centers of conflict close to its borders and the protracted crisis of the economy and indeed of the actual state system in a number of CIS countries do pose a serious threat to our country's security.

Practice shows that no one, apart from Russia, is ready today to assume the burden of peacemaking in the area of the former USSR. Nevertheless, the use of Russian peacemaking forces in CIS operations has hitherto been regarded with wariness in a number of countries.

It is essential that this be changed. In all CIS countries where Russia is involved in peacemaking operations it is doing so at the request and with the agreement of its neighbors, on the basis of international legal documents, and in full keeping with the sovereign rights of states as enshrined in the UN Charter. And that is why it does not need to ask the world community each time for authorization for a particular operation, although active UN and CSCE assistance in terms of personnel and finance would make peacemaking in the CIS more effective.

The year 1994 must see the start of practical implementation of the Treaty on Collective Security and the provision of backup for the activity of the CIS Collective Security Council. There is an urgent need to set up a Standing Consultative Commission on Peacemaking Activity in order to develop jointly with our partners practical forms and proccedures for cooperation in this sphere.

The Federal Assembly should soon examine the draft law on the participation of Russian military contingents in peacemaking operations, including operations within the CIS, CSCE, and UN frameworks.

Concern for Russians who have found themselves outside the bounds of the Russian Federation should invariably be at the focus of our attention in all spheres of

relations between the CIS and the Baltic states. Wherever they live, our compatriots should feel themselves to be citizens who enjoy full and equal rights.

The interests of Russians in the CIS and the Baltic states will only be guaranteed if internationally recognized standards in the sphere of hunman rights and the rights of national minorities are observed throughout the territory of the former USSR.

A start has been made here. On Russia's initiative the Declaration on International Commitments in the Sphere of Human Rights and Basic Freedoms has been adopted in the CIS and a Commission on Human Rights has been established.

The next step is to secure the signing by Commonwealth states of the Convention on Guaranteeing the Rights of Persons Belonging to National, Ethnic, Lingustic, Cultural, and Religious Minorities and to submit the draft Commonwealth Convention on Human Rights to the Council of CIS Heads of States. Its adoption is a sine qua non for the start of practical work by the CIS Commission for Human Rights.

The elaboration of a Program for the Protection of the Interests and for the Support of Ethnic Russians Living Outside the Bounds of the Russian Federation is drawing close to completion. It is essential that the sources of finance and the mechanism for coordination at government level be clearly defined.

Russia is not entitled to reduce the level of its activity in the question of guaranteeing the rights of minorities in the CIS and Baltic states. Russian representatives should continue persistently to raise this problem before international institutions and seek their participation in the defense of their compatriots. It is also essential to develop such cooperation with the CSCE high commissioner for national minorities.

The formation of the CIS has been accompanied by a host of problems new and old. Nevertheless, a trend toward economic reintegration and deeper political cooperation has already emerged.

The organization of joint defense, the joint protection of borders, the creation of a single information area, and the comprehensive tackling of problems of citizenship and the protection of migrants' rights are questions which must figure at the center of our attention.

The economy is a particularly important sphere of cooperation between Russia and the newly independent states. The new mechanisms of economic collaboration are developing with difficulty and at a far slower pace than life requires.

There are many disputes over the problem of national currencies. The possibility of introducing a single monetary system with Russia is under study in a number of states. The most active proposals concerning the unification of monetary systems are currently coming from the government of the Republic of Belarus.

The unification of monetary systems is a highly complex process. A different level of prices has already taken shape in the new independent states. Marked differences in the methods of state management of the economy also exist. But all these problems can ultimately be resolved. The main difficulty is how to structure the management of the monetary system—the actual circulatory system of the economy—while retaining two governments, two national banks, two autonomous budgets, and two parliaments with equal and sovereign rights. Another important question is the following: What powers should a state entering into a unified monetary system with Russia on the basis of the Russian ruble voluntarily delegate in so doing; and will it not subsequently call for the revocation of those powers with damage to the other party? Finally, it is necessary to determine what level of political integration will guarantee the viability of the re-created unified monetary system.

It is clear that unification of the monetary systems could be very costly for our country. However, in the future unification could not just bring advantages to Belarus but could also cover Russia's costs and bring it its own rewards in conditions where new political approaches are employed. The president and government will seek these political solutions and approaches in close cooperation with the Federal Assembly.

Life goes on, and, regardless of the monetary basis on which settlements among neighboring states are structured, they should work toward a single economic area with observance of the principle of the free movement of goods, services, capital, and manpower. Special attention should be paid here to meeting the immediate needs of ordinary people: guaranteeing the unrestricted transfer of pensions and wages and the unrestricted exchange of currency when traveling. All these painful problems demand a well-considered but prompt solution.

The president of Russia has been elected chairman of the Council of CIS Heads of State for the next six months. This opportunity will be utilized to the full to make Russian initiatives and step up the work of forming the Economic Union—the Commonwealth's common market.

The following items figure on the immediate agenda:

—concluding an agreement creating a multilateral free trade zone and a customs union and an agreement forming a mechanism governing payment and settlement relations and a payments union;

—ensuring the conditions necessary for the creation of the production and trade infrastructure of a common market (transnational associations and corporations, industrial and financial associations, brokerage firms, insurance companies, and joint banking structures);

—preparing agreements providing for the solution of the most acute social problems, incuding those regulating the processes of migration, ensuring maximum

freedom of movement of the population across the new borders, and providing joint measures for their social protection;

—creating an Interstate Cooperation Committee in which Commonwealth member-states would vest a number of regulatory and control functions, particularly as regards the fulfillment of agreements.

In accordance with the decision of the Ashgabat meeting, Russia has proposed to the United Nations that the CIS be granted observer status as an international regional organization in the UN General Assembly. It is essential to speed up the preparation of proposals on permanent links between the CIS and the CSCE and other organizations. This will not only strengthen the Commonwealth's general authority in the world but will also enhance the quality of its collaboration with the world community in ensuring security and stability.

Strengthening the United Nations and adopting a model for reforming the organization which would transform it into the most reliable and all-embracing institution of international cooperation are priorities for Russia's multilateral diplomacy.

Partnership has become a key feature of Russia's relations with other states. The new nature of ties with the West opens up favorable opportunities for more effective realization of Russia's interests in the sphere of security, the economy, trade, and business.

Russia has joined the main international economic organizations. The next step is the energetic establishment of proper collaboration with them.

Since the G-7 meeting in Tokyo Russian diplomats and financiers have begun participating in conferences of its experts. A G-7 mission has been set up in Moscow. But an effective mechanism for consultation with the West, particularly as regards consideration of Russian interests, has not yet been set up. This is causing increasingly appreciable harm not just to Russia but to our partners too.

We have the opportunity today to achieve a qualitatively new level of cooperation between Russia and the G-7. The basic guidelines of the strategy of Russia's cooperation with the G-7—in both the economic and foreign policy spheres—could be confirmed at the meeting in Naples. This strategy should clearly delineate the long-term plan for turning the G-7 into a G-8, starting with the sphere of politics.

The elimination of COCOM this spring will be the final step in removing restrictions on Russian foreign trade links. The new international arrangements for controlling the trade in military and dual-purpose technology demands the direct involvement of Russia and the United States as major arms producers.

It is essential to make full use of the new opportunities for Russia-U.S. cooperation in the political, economic, scientific, technical, and other sectors.

Participation in building a greater Europe that is peaceful, unified, and democratic is one of Russia's main tasks in the European area. The next meeting of CSCE members in Budapest will be a landmark event in that direction.

Russia has proposed and will contine to uphold its concept of pan-European partnership. The CSCE is required to be the main instrument in the political building of the new Europe, while in the military-political sphere the North Atlantic Cooperation Council must play that role. It could coordinate the work of the regional organizations—NATO, the WEU, and the CIS—in maintaining peace and stability in the European area and ensuring greater openness in military activity and in the sphere of the conversion of the military-industrial complex. Other elements of the concept include granting the countries of Central Europe cross guarantees by Russia and its West European partners and expanding the North Atlantic Cooperation Council by including the neutral states of Europe.

Russia advocates a qualitative and quantitative approach to the problems of European security. We respect the sovereign right of states to enter into any alliances and the sovereign right of alliances to admit them. But our neighbors in Europe should also know our opinion: We are opposed to an expansion of NATO without Russia. On the basis of this principle, Russia supports the Partnership for Peace program as a means of pan-European partnership that is open to all states of the greater Europe.

The practical study of the parameters of the agreement with NATO must be speeded up so that we not only do not lag behind other countries but are out in front, especially in establishing cooperation in the military sphere.

Major bilateral documents have been signed with the majority of West European states. The task now is to fill the accords with the real content of practical collaboration while continuing regular top-level dialogue. It is essential to complete the preparation of the agreement on partnership and cooperation with the European Union.

Stepping up efforts to form new relations with the states of Central and East Europe is an important area of Russian military policy in 1994. Experience shows that common interests in carrying out democratic and market reforms and traditional links among our peoples outweigh old grievances.

Russia intends to continue to play one of the leading roles in seeking a settlement of the crisis in former Yugsolavia. The main thing here is to mobilize the political efforts of the world community to end the war in Bosnia and, as a first step, to consolidate safe areas, including in Sarajevo. In any event it must be clear that the Bosnian conflict cannot be resolved by selective support or punishment for one side or other. All sides

must be persistently encouraged toward peace. The United Nations and its Security Council have a special role here.

Taking account of the FRY's fulfillment of the UN demands for a settlement of the Bosnia conflict, Russia will seek the dropping of the sanctions against that country.

Russia's mutual relations with the world are determined by its unique Eurasian status. In 1994 it is necessary to make use of the new opportunities for the development of cooperation with leading Asian states—India, China, and Japan—and with new partners—South Korea and the ASEAN and Persian Gulf countries.

The current level of mutual relations with China and the transformation of that country into one of Russia's main trading partners makes it possible to set the task of moving our relations to the stage of constructive partnership on bilateral and international political issues.

Japan holds a special place in Far East politics. Russia intends to consistently work toward the conclusion of a peace treaty with that country on the basis of respect for each other's positions, the finding of mutually acceptable formulas, and the resolution of all contradictions, including on the territorial problem. This must happen with due consideration of Russian national interests and complete compliance with its Constitution, along the path of respect for and compliance with international law and commitments under international treaties.

An immediate task is to make maximum use of the untapped potential in our cooperation and interaction with Russia's reliable partner, India.

A central dimension of Russian policy in the Asia-Pacific region is the involvement of areas of Siberia and the Far East in international cooperation in the region.

The continuation of our country's active role as one of the organizers of the peace process in the Near East is intended to promote its long-term national interests and the strengthening of its international influence.

Relations with such promising regions as Latin America and Africa must be raised to a qualitatively new level.

In general a new and graphically expressed inner philosophy has emerged in foreign policy recently. Cooperation structures in the Baltic, Black Sea, and Euro-Arctic regions have been created with active Russian participation. The objective is to activate mechanisms affecting the specific socioeconomic problems of vast areas of Russia. Through these mechanisms, while consolidating a unified state policy, federal organs must help the components of the Federation to realize their foreign economic interests.

The experience of the past two years has shown that any discord, be it departmental or regional, in foreign policy ultimately damages state interests and undermines Russia's positions in the world. The new Russian Constitution put everything in its place. The coordination of Russian foreign policy in the context of national security strategy must be strengthened.

The Federal Assembly must examine the following questions:

—the ratification of around 60 international treaties;

—the adoption of laws ensuring the effective functioning of the Russian foreign policy mechanism (a law on RF international treaties, a law on diplomatic service, and consular rules);

—the adoption of laws supporting Russian foreign economic relations (a law on the continental shelf and economic zone, a law on exports of weapons and military equipment);

—the elaboration of new laws or amendment of existing laws in the humanitarian field taking account of Russia's international commitments. The dual citizenship part of the Law on Citizenship must be brought into line with the Constitution. The status of foreigners in Russia must also be brought into line with international standards by the adoption of a corresponding law for this.

The sooner we adopt laws meeting present and future requirements, the greater will be the extent of the cooperation with foreign countries which we need so much and the more appreciable will be the return from the enormous opportunities offered by foreign policy.

Conclusion

An enormous country like Russia cannot be transformed rapidly and painlessly. We need a flexible long-term policy taking account of world experience, national characteristics and traditions, the developing situation, and changes in public interests and sentiments. Such a policy has nothing in common with either conservatism or reformist dogmatism.

What is needed is not to strive to achieve the impossible, not to dissipate forces but, on the contrary, to concentrate resources and political will on the key areas in order to achieve a breakthrough to something better. When reforming, things must not be left absolutely to their own devices. The Message proposes how to organize this work.

The primary task is to build cooperation. The time of political confrontation is past. The country needs consistent, creative, joint work. In December 1993 tens of millions of people with differing views voted for the Constitution in a nationwide vote. In Russia today it is impossible to find a stronger base for achieving accord.

The Constitution provides an opportunity to start a real process of unifying all society's constructive forces and to channel the energy which has hitherto been expended

on confrontation and fragmentation, into benefiting the country and its citizens and strengthening the Russian state.

Weak authorities will wreck reform and be unable to impose even elementary order in the country. But renewed estrangement between the authorities and people and their everyday needs must not happen either. Results can only be achieved if Russian people's enormous intellectual and spiritual potential and desire to live better are channeled into the nationwide cause of building [obustroystvo] Russia. The transformation of social life on this kind of scale demands self-restraint of everybody. But the authorities are obliged to start with themselves.

The legal basis of future constructive accord—the Constitution—must be supplemented by the formation of a stable political structure and a tradition of political tolerance in seeking common fundamental values and resolving nationwide tasks. Joint work by all organs of power to implement the program principles embedded in the Program will make it possible to lay the foundation of such traditions.

Russia needs social accord. This is why the Message takes account of the constructive propopals of parliamentary factions and other political forces and social organizations and of the views of academics, experts, and practicians in seeking the optimum way to extricate the country from crisis, strengthen the Russian state, and improve Russians' lives.

It is in our power to make 1994 the year of the building of creative cooperation, the year of the birth of new political traditions, the year of emergence from the crisis. It is our task, we have the chance, not to miss the opportunities which are opening up.

Federal Assembly

Federation Council Approves More Troops for Bosnia

LD2502181794 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1725 GMT 25 Feb 94

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Lyudmila Yermakova]

[Text] Moscow February 25 TASS—The Russian Federation Council, upper house of the Russian Parliament, approved dispatching an additional military contingent, numbering 300, to join U.N. peace-keeping forces deployed in former Yugoslavia to ensure control over the unconditional observance by the warring sides of a ceasefire agreement in the area of Sarajevo.

This problem was discussed by the upper chamber of the Russian Parliament in connection with the Russian president's address to the nation in response to the U.N. secretary general's appeal asking Russia to send an additional military contingent to former Yugoslavia.

The session of the upper chamber of the Russian Parliament was attended by representatives of the Russian Defence and Foreign Ministries, federal departments, a counter-intelligence department and a department for emergency situations. In accordance with the Russian Constitution, "a decision on the possibility of the use of the Russian Armed Forces outside Russia's territory" is within the competence of the Russian Federation Council.

A resolution passed by the Federation Council instructs the Russian Government to resolve problems connected with the formation of a corresponding military contingent on a voluntary basis and on terms envisaged by the resolution of the Russian Parliament of March 6, 1992.

The Russian Government was also instructed to urgently resolve the problem of giving a pay rise to the personnel of the Russian contingent.

Under the resolution, the Russian Defence Ministry, shall, jointly with the Russian Foreign Ministry, create a system of measures providing social guarantees to the Russian personnel taking part in peace-keeping operations in former Yugoslavia and coordinate these measures with the U.N. secretariat.

The Russian Foreign Ministry was instructed to institute additional posts for Russian officers in the headquarters of the U.N. peace-keeping forces. The Federation Council drew attention to the fact that it is necessary to step up the work of corresponding departments for the ultimate solution of the Bosnian crisis by political means.

Federation Council Approves Nikitov as Administration Head

LD2602162294 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1109 GMT 26 Feb 94

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Lyudmila Yermakova]

[Text] Moscow, 26 Feb—Federation Council deputies today approved Vladimir Nikitov as head of the chamber's administration. The 43-year-old candidate of technical sciences was adviser to Vladimir Shumeyko when he was first deputy chairman of the government. He has also had considerable experience of working in the Supreme Soviet.

In reply to deputies' questions about guaranteeing their parliamentary activity, Vladimir Nikitov said, in particular, that the question of deputies' badges had not yet been decided. The matter is being held up because of their cost: The proposed draft badge containing precious metals will cost half a million [currency not specified].

Federation Council Commission on Ossetian Situation

LD2502215994 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1840 GMT 25 Feb 94

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Lyudmila Yermakova]

[Text] Moscow February 25 TASS—A report of the Federation Council's Commission for Studies of the situation in Northern ossetia and Ingushetia was presented today to the Upper Chamber of the Russian Parliament by Commission head Valeriy Fateyev.

In his opinion, the main regional problem is refugees. Fateyev stressed the Ingush and North ossetian presidents can agree between themselves on the return of refugees to places of their permanent residence.

North Ossetian president Akhsarbek galazov supported the pronouncement and said "the interested sides should have a chance to agree between themselves and the federal bodies should listen to the opinion of regional representatives". He added they have agreed with Ingush leader Ruslan Aushev on further negotiations.

Aushev agreed with Galazov, but said "they should remember about refugees". In his words, the participation in the conciliatory commission has brought no results and the North Ossetian president should name the exact date of his solution of the Ingush refugee problem.

The Russian Parliament deputies decided to continue the problem analysis in committees and discuss their proposals at the chamber meeting.

Shumeyko Comments on Federation Council

LD2602172094 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1628 GMT 26 Feb 94

[By ITAR-TASS parliamentary correspondent Lyudmila Yermakova]

[Text] Moscow February 26 TASS—The third meeting of the Russian Federation Council, which lasted for only three days, has shown "the chamber proceeds from the urgent needs and its ability to help the reforms with laws," Council Speaker Vladimir Shumeyko told an exclusive ITAR-TASS interview.

A reason for active work of the chamber is the "absence of factionalism and division on party principle. It is not important for us who suggests a proposal if the latter is good," he said.

In the words of Shumeyko, the presidential message to the Federal Assembly will be discussed at a council plenary scheduled for March 15. The deputies have discussed some problems related to the message, including a resolution on measures against crime in the Russian Federation.

The deputies believe that order is even more important than the economic reform. In their opinion, it is a "comprehensive problem that starts from the question of power". They favor the creation of a solid system of vertical power in order to control implementation of resolutions.

Shumeyko thinks that anti-crime measures include aspects of the economic reform. While the old system has been ruined and a new one has not been formed, the use of laws to expand criminal activities should be prevented.

These also include the border issue which is to be settled by the Federation Council. Unestablished borders enable any person to penetrate into the Russian Federation and carry arms or drugs.

The introduction of a state of emergency is another prerogative of the upper parliament chamber. A lot of arms have been accumulated in the state of emergency zones, which also results in the increased crime rate. Shumeyko does not exclude parliamentary hearings on enhanced measures against crime may result in the parliament's proposal to the president to introduce the state of emergency in some Russian areas in order to remove arms from the residents.

Daily Carries Duma Amnesty Decree

PM2502211394 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 26 Feb 94 p 4

[Decree No. 63-1 GD of the Russian Federation Federal Assembly State Duma "On Declaring an Amnesty in Connection With the Adoption of the Russian Federation Constitution"]

[Text] In connection with the adoption of the Russian Federation Constitution and in accordance with the Paragraph "f" of Part 1 of Article 103 of the Russian Federation Constitution, the Federal Assembly State Duma decrees:

1. The following will be released from custodial punishment and also from noncustodial punishments:

(a) convicted persons who have performed military service in existing armies and combined units or who have taken part in combat operations to defend the Motherland, and also those who took part in the elimination of the consequences of the accident at Chernobyl Nuclear Electric Power Station;

(b) women;

(c) men over 60 years of age;

(d) Group 1 and 2 disabled persons.

2. Persons sentenced to up to five years' imprisonment for crimes of negligence, including those who have served at least one-third of the prescribed period of punishment, are to be released from their punishments.

3. Juvenile males sentenced to up to three years' custody, including those who have not served a previous sentence in educational labor colonies at an earlier date, are to be released from their punishments.

4. Persons who have been given a deferred custodial sentence or conditional sentence, and also persons sentenced to other noncustodial punishments, are to be released from their punishments.

5. Persons sentenced to up to three years' custody for premeditated crimes, including those who have served at least one-third of the prescribed term of punishment, are to be released from their punishments.

6. Proceedings are to be be halted in all cases and investigative cases that have not been examined by the courts and which relate to crimes committed prior to the decree's entry into force by:

(a) persons covered by Paragraph 1 and not falling within the purview of Paragraph 8 of the present decree;

(b) persons who have committed crimes for which noncustodial punishment is stipulated;

(c) juvenile males who have committed crimes for which the stipulated punishment is at most three years' custody and who have not served a sentence in educational labor colonies at an earlier date.

With regard to cases relating to crimes for which custodial punishment is stipulated and which were committed prior to the decree's entry into force, the court, if it considers it necessary to prescribe noncustodial punishment, will release the convicted person from his punishment.

7. The unserved term of a sentence will be reduced:

(a) for juvenile males not covered by Paragraph 1, 2, and 3 of the decree, and persons sentenced to custody for crimes of negligence who are not covered by Paragraph 2 of the present decree—by one-half;

(b) for persons sentenced to up to five years' custody for premeditated crimes, including those who are not covered by Paragraphs 1, 2, and 3 of the present decree—by one-third; (c) for persons sentenced to over five years' custody for premeditated crimes who are not covered by Paragraphs 1, 3, and 5 of the present decree—by one-fourth.

8. Paragraphs 1 through 7 of the present decree will not apply to convicted persons:

(a) who have committed crimes stipulated by Articles 64, 66, 67, 68, 74, 77, 77-1, 79, 87, Part 2 of Article 88, Parts 3 and 4 of Article 89, Parts 2, 3, and 4 of Article 90, Article 91, Part 3 of Article 92, Parts 2 and 3 of Article 93, Articles 93-1, 95, 102, 103, 108, 117, Part 1 of Article 125, Articles 125-1, 126-1, Parts 3 and 4 of Article 144, Parts 2, 3, and 4 of Article 145, Article 146, Parts 2 and 3 of Article 147, Article 148, Articles 173, 174, 174-1, 176, 176-1, 176-2, 177, 178, 179, 191-2, 193, Parts 2 and 3 of Article 206, Articles 212-1, 213-2, 218, 218-1, Part 2 of Article 224, Articles 224-1, 224-2, 226-1, and paragraph "c" of Article 240 of the RSFSR Criminal Code;

(b) who received earlier convictions for premeditated crimes and who have again been given a custodial sentence for premeditated crimes;

(c) who are considered particularly dangerous individuals;

(d) who are malicious violators of the terms governing the serving of their sentence;

(e) who were released from custody at an earlier date prior to serving the full term of their sentence as prescribed by the court following an act of amnesty or pardon and who have again committed premeditated crimes.

9. In respect of persons for whom, in addition to their punishment for a crime they have committed, compulsory treatment measures for alcoholism, drug addiction, and venereal disease have been prescribed, and who are eligible to be released from their punishment in accordance with the present decree, the act of amnesty is to be applied once the full course of treatment has been completed.

10. The present decree applies to persons convicted by Russian Federation and also USSR courts.

11. This decree comes into force from the moment of its publication and is to be implemented within six months.

[Signed] I.P. Rybkin, chairman of the Russian Federation Federal Assembly State Duma

[Dated] Moscow, 23 February 1994

Procedure for Implementation

PM2502211994 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 26 Feb 94 First Edition p 4

[Decree No. 64-1 GD of the Russian Federal Assembly State Duma "On the Procedure for Implementing the Decree 'On Declaring an Amnesty in Connection With the Adoption of the Russian Federation Constitution'"]

[Text] 1. Responsibility for the implementation of the Russian Federation Federal Assembly State Duma Decree "On Declaring an Amnesty in Connection With the Adoption of the Russian Federation Constitution" (hereinafter referred to as the amnesty decree) is placed:

(a) on the bodies responsible for enforcing punishment—for convicted persons kept in places of detention.

Implementation of the amnesty decree is effected in accordance with a decision of the chief of the corrective labor institution sanctioned by a prosecutor. The following are attached to this decision: a record of rewards

and sanctions, the convicted person's personal file, and other documents needed to decide on the application of an act of amnesty;

(b) on inquiry and preliminary investigation bodies—for persons whose cases and documents on whose crimes are being processed by these bodies;

(c) on courts:

for persons whose cases and documents on whose crimes are being processed by the courts and had not been examined prior to the entry into force of the amnesty decree, and also for persons whose criminal cases have been examined but sentences have not come legally into force;

for convicted persons for whom the enforcement of sentences has been deferred in instances and under the procedure stipulated by law and persons who have received a conditional sentence in accordance with Article 44 of the RSFSR Criminal Code (the question of the application of an act of amnesty is decided by a court following a submission by the internal affairs body monitoring the convicted person's conduct);

for persons sentenced to be fined, if the fine has not been paid prior to the entry into force of the amnesty decree (the question of the application of an act of amnesty is decided by the court which passed sentence);

for persons released on parole and persons who have had the unserved part of their sentence commuted prior to the coming into force of the amnesty decree (the question of the application of an act of amnesty is decided by the court which made the ruling to allow parole or commute the unserved part of a sentence);

for persons sentenced by Russian Federation courts who are serving their sentence on the territory of other states which were formerly part of the USSR (a ruling on the application of an act of amnesty is made by the court which passed sentence);

(d) on internal affairs bodies:

for persons whose sentences have come legally into force and who have been sentenced to imprisonment but who are not in custody;

for persons serving their sentence in the form of corrective work not involving custody or disqualification from the holding of given posts or from given activities;

(e) on the commands of disciplinary battalions—for servicemen sentenced to be assigned to a disciplinary battalion.

2. A decision on the application or nonapplication of an act of amnesty is adopted for each person individually. In the absence of necessary information on the convicted person examination of the question of the application of an amnesty is deferred pending the receipt of additional materials.

Bodies responsible for the implementation of the amnesty decree are granted the right to demand that the institutions in question provide court files and other materials needed to decide questions linked with the application of an amnesty. Such demands must be met immediately.

3. Decisions on the application of an act of amnesty adopted by inquiry and preliminary investigation bodies, internal affairs bodies, and also the commands of disciplinary battalions are sanctioned by a prosecutor.

When an act of amnesty is applied by courts the participation of a prosecutor is mandatory.

4. The amnesty decree applies to persons who committed crimes prior to the entry into force of the present decree.

5. It is to be explained that when an act of amnesty is applied:

(a) subparagraph "a" of paragraph 1 of the amnesty decree applies to persons who:

served as a serviceman or a civilian in the USSR Armed Forces during the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945;

participated in the Great Patriotic War as a member of a partisan detachment, people's volunteer militia, extermination battalion, or underground organization operating against the German occupationists;

served as a serviceman or a civilian in the USSR Armed Forces which participated in combat operations against Japan in 1945.

Subparagraph "a" of paragraph 1 of the amnesty decree applies to persons awarded the "Victory Over Germany in the Great Patriotic War of 1941-45" medal or the "Victory Over Japan" medal and also to persons who participated in combat operations to defend the interests of the USSR during the period preceding the Great Patriotic War or after it ended; to persons who participated in eliminating the consequences of the Chernobyl AES accident and are entitled to special benefits; and also to persons who have performed military service on the territory of the Transcaucasus and Baltic states and the Republic of Tajikistan;

(b) subparagraph "b" of paragraph 1 of the amnesty decree also applies to female minors;

(c) subparagraph "c" of paragraph 1 of the amnesty decree applies to males born before 1 January 1934;

(d) subparagraph "d" of paragraph 1 of the amnesty decree applies to persons deemed by the Medical and Labor Expert Commission of the Russian Federation Ministry for the Social Protection of the Population to be Group 1 and Group 2 invalids prior to the coming into force of this decree, and also to persons deemed by a Medical and Labor Commission of a Russian Federation Ministry of Internal Affairs medical department to be Group 1 or Group 2 invalids, following confirmation of

the group by a commission of the Medical and Labor Expert Commission of the Russian Federation Ministry for the Social Protection of the Population within six months of the entry into force of the amnesty decree;

(e) paragraph 2 of the amnesty decree does not apply to persons who, in addition to a crime committed through negligence, have also been convicted of a crime committed deliberately;

(f) paragraph 3 of the amnesty decree applies to males born after 1 January 1976;

(g) the served part of a sentence stipulated in paragraphs 2 and 5 of the amnesty decree is calculated to the date that the present decree comes into force.

6. The serving of a sentence in the form of noncustodial corrective work ends from the day that internal affairs bodies file a decision on the application of an act of amnesty approved by a prosecutor.

7. The amnesty decree does not extend to persons subject to administrative punishment, including persons culpable under administrative law but freed from criminal liability in accordance with the procedure stipulated by Articles 50 and 51 of the RSFSR Criminal Code.

8. When applying an act of amnesty to persons whose length of sentence has been reduced by pardon or amnesty, it is necessary to proceed from the length of sentence prescribed in accordance with the acts of pardon or amnesty.

9. Amnestied persons are released from both their basic punishment and additional punishment if the latter has not been carried out by the date that the amnesty decree comes into force.

10. In accordance with paragraph 7 of the amnesty decree the part of the sentence which has not been served on the date that the said decree comes into forces is eligible for reduction. This point applies to convicted persons whose sentences have entered legally into force prior to the entry into force of the said decree.

11. When applying the amnesty decree convictions which have been quashed or lifted in accordance with the procedure stipulated by law and also convictions for crimes which have been excised from the RSFSR Criminal Code are disregarded. Furthermore, the convictions of persons previously convicted for crimes of negligence, irrespective of the form of punishment, and also of persons sentenced for premediated crimes to noncustodial punishment are disregarded.

12. Malicious violators of the terms [governing the serving of their sentence] are to be defined as persons who:

(a) systematically violate established discipline and order while serving their sentence;

(b) have been convicted, interned in deportation colonies, or sent to other types of corrective labor colonies if, after the court ruling that they be sent to a corrective labor institution, they have been in custody for less than one year on the day that the materials relating to the application of an act of amnesty is examined. The term is calculated from the date that the convicted person is taken into custody;

(c) persons sentenced to noncustodial corrective work who, because they have deliberately evaded serving their sentence, have their unserved term of corrective work replaced by a custodial sentence, if they have been in custody for less than six months on the date that the materials relating to the application of an act of amnesty are examined.

13. In accordance with subparagraph "e" of paragraph 8 of the amnesty decree an act of amnesty cannot be applied to persons released early from custody since 1985 (irrespective of whether their conviction has been quashed or lifted) under the pardons procedure or on the basis of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium decrees:

"On an Amnesty in Connection With the 40th Anniversary of the Soviet People's Victory in the Great Patriotic War of 1941-45," dated 26 April 1985;

"On the Release From Detention of Certain Categories of Women," dated 6 November 1986;

"On an Amnesty in Connection With the 70th Anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution," dated 18 June 1987;

and also on the basis of the USSR Supreme Soviet decree of 28 November 1989 "On an Amnesty for Former Servicemen of the Contingent of Soviet Forces in Afghanistan Who Have Committed Crimes," the USSR law of 1 November 1991 "On an Amnesty for Servicemen Who Have Evaded Military Service," and the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet decree of 18 June 1992 "On an Amnesty."

Convicted persons who have been released in connection with the reduction of their sentence under the pardons procedure or on the basis of the aforementioned acts and persons who have had the unserved part of a term of detention commuted should also be regarded as having been granted early release from punishment.

14. Materials relating to persons affected by the amnesty decree who have had been ordered under the prescribed procedure to undergo treatment for alcoholism, drug addiction, or venereal disease are examined after the convicted persons have completed the complete course of treatment but no later than six months after the completion of the implementation of the amnesty decree.

The grounds for deeming that a course of treatment for venereal disease has been completed are a medical ruling

or—in the case of persons for whom a court has prescribed compulsory treatment for alcoholism or drug addiction—a court ruling on terminating the compulsory treatment.

15. The amnesty decree also applies to persons who were convicted by USSR courts on the territory of another state and are serving their sentence on the territory of the Russian Federation.

16. In cases when the question of the application of an act of amnesty arises after the expiry of a six-month period from the day that the amnesty decree comes into force, application of the act is effected in accordance with the procedure stipulated by paragraph 1 of the said decree.

17. The regulation personnel strength of corrective labor institutions and remand centers and also of the prisoner escort service is not to be reduced.

18. Organs of executive power of the components of the Russian Federation are to ensure monitoring of the implementation of the amnesty decree.

19. Organs of local self-government in cities and rayons are to:

(a) organize prompt record-keeping on all persons released from punishment on the basis of the amnesty decree and make everyday and job arrangements for them no later that 15 days after they arrive in their place of residence;

(b) find places in homes for the disabled for invalids and elderly persons who have been released from punishment and do not have relatives able to support them.

20. Organs of local self-government in cities and rayons are to ensure that juveniles released from punishment on the basis of the amnesty decree are promptly included in their records when they arrive in their place of residence, passed into the supervision of parents or guardianship and wardship agencies, and found places when necessary in children's homes, boarding schools, or vocational and technical colleges and to coordinate the work of commissions for juvenile affairs, internal affairs bodies, and social organizations to reeducate juveniles released from punishment.

[Signed] I.P. Rybkin, chairman of the Russian Federation Federal Assembly State Duma
[Dated] Moscow, 23 February 1994

Regional Affairs

Zhirinovskiy's District Says Election Returns Void

LD2502202694 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1909 GMT 25 Feb 94

[Text] The city court of Schelkovo, a district center in the Moscow region, today recognized the returns of the elections in the Schelkovo single-mandate constituency No. 114 which elected Vladimir Zhirinovskiy to the State Duma on February 12 null and void. By this decision, the court satisfied the suit against the regional election commission filed by a former candidate of the same constituency, head of the Moscow anti-trust committee, Doctor of Economics, Professor Oleg Novikov.

In an interview with Interfax, Novikov said his action was caused by "numerous gross violations" of the regulations for the election of deputies to the State Duma approved by the Russian president.

In particular, the candidate withdrawn by the election bloc "Yabloko" in favor of Novikov was not crossed out of the ballot paper.

In its materials handed over to the mass media the election commission described Novikov, who was nominated as an independent candidate and canvassed about 6,000 signatures in his support, as a candidate of "Russia's Choice."

In addition, the commission failed to provide all candidates with equal access to television so that they could lay down their programs. According to Novikov, he was not even given a 10-minute televised statement envisioned by the election regulations.

According to Russia's legislation, the court decision may be appealed against within a period of 10 days. Otherwise, it will be automatically enforced.

Chelyabinsk Prosecutor Resigns Over Amnesty Ruling

LD2802095894 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 0932 GMT 28 Feb 94

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Yevgeniy Tkachenko]

[Text] Chelyabinsk, 28 Feb—Chelyabinsk Oblast Prosecutor Gennadiy Likhachev has submitted his resignation. Speaking on local radio today, he stressed that this step was brought about by the fact that he did not agree with the political amnesty declared by the State Duma. In his view, "the procuracy has once again been made hostage to political intrigues."

North Caucasus Spokesman on Amnesty Resolution

LD2702193894 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1753 GMT 27 Feb 94

[Text] The General Secretary of the Assembly of Democratic Forces of the North Caucasus, Shmidt Dzoblayev, has said that the "economic and political situation compels the Russian president to impose a state of emergency and save the country from fresh political upheavals."

In a statement published on Sunday Dzoblayev said that the State Duma's resolution on granting amnesty to

participants in last October's riots poses "an act of absolute disrespect for the law, unprecedented in political practice."

According to him, as a result of it "the confrontation between the various political forces and branches of power will inevitably grow, and the consolidation of power institutions which began to take shape when the new Constitution was adopted will collapse".

As Dzoblayev said, Sergey Shakhray must share the responsibility for this with the "communist obscurantists". "His further being in charge of the ethnic policy department is absurd," the statement says.

Preliminary Results Show Ingush President Reelected

LD2702212194 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 2111 GMT 27 Feb 94

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Andrey Yarushin]

[Text] Moscow February 28 TASS—Ruslan Aushev has been re-elected to the post of Ingush president, ITAR-TASS learned from well-informed sources in the Ingush capital of Nazran. Vice-President Boris Agapov also managed to retain his post.

According to preliminary election results as of 10:00 p.m., the turnout made up over 70 percent.

The final results of the presidential and vice-presidential elections, as well as of the consitutional referendum are not to be available until Tuesday, March 1. Results of parliamentary elections will be published in about a week and a half.

Ossetian President Rejects Federal Rule Idea

MK2602104094 Moscow SEGODNYA in Russian 26 Feb 94 p 2

[Natalya Gorodetskaya report under the "Caucasus" rubric: "North Ossetia Against Introduction of Federal Rule, and Intends To Resolve Ossetia-Ingushetia Conflict Independently"]

[Text] Speaking before the republic's mass media yesterday, North Ossetia President Akhsarbek Galazov stated that the Russian parliament should produce a clear and well-considered nationalities policy in the Northern Caucasus. Mr. Galazov once again categorically turned down the proposal of Vasiliy Tarasenko, chairman of the Federation Council committee for federation affairs and regional policy, regarding the introduction of a direct federal rule over the entire zone of the Ossetia-Ingushetia conflict made upon the return of the parliamentary delegation from the Caucasus.

North Ossetia assessed this proposal as interference in the internal affairs of a sovereign state while, as Akhsarbek Galazov said, it drew indignation not only from the republic's leaders but also the entire Ossetian people.

So categoric a rejection of the parliamentary committee head's proposal is quite explainable because once introduced, federal rule would make it necessary to act on the Russian president's 13 December edict on the return of Ingush refugees to North Ossetia's Prigorodnyy Rayon—something vigorously opposed, not without success, by the Ossetians, who first ask the Ingush to repent, then demand a moral and political assessment of the last year's armed conflict. Also natural is the fact that Ingushetia leaders have supported the Russian parliamentarians' proposal.

The North Ossetia president thinks that the interests of both sides should be considered in resolving such an acute conflict. Forceful interference, even in the form of direct federal rule, would only spark a protracted and bloody war between the Ingush and the Ossetians. Mr. Galazov said yet one more time that the republics would be able to settle the Ingushetia-Ossetia conflict independently, gradually, and peacefully, and resolve the refugee return problem.

North Ossetian President Praises Yeltsin Reform Note

LD2702204394 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1948 GMT 27 Feb 94

[By ITAR-TASS Correspondent Valery Shanyev]

[Text] Vladikavkaz February 27 TASS—"The implementation of the message by Russian President Boris Yeltsin aiming to strengthen power at all levels is designed to speed up economic reforms in Russia," North Ossetian President Askharbek Galazov told ITAR-TASS upon returning from Moscow.

"The most important thing now is to develop a mechanism for implementing this message," Galazov stressed. "The president counts on the Russian Constitution. Boris Yeltsin has confirmed that the state's unity and integrity can be preserved on the basis of Russia's federated arrangement," he said.

The president shared gave his assessment to the activities of the parliamentary commission in the state of emergency zone in North Ossetia and Ingushetia. The North Ossetian and Ingush presidents are capable of settling their differences without any mediation, he emphasised. They can solve all complicated issues by themselves. "A negotiating process between the two republics has got underway, it should be continued," Galazov said.

Commenting on the results of the Zheleznovodsk meeting of North Caucasian leader with the participation of the chief of the Russian president's staff, Galazov described it as "another attempt to settle relations between North Ossetia and Ingushetia by peaceful means." According to him, "North Ossetia is ready to work consistently for establishing normal relations with all its neighbours. I insist that the problem of refugees cannot be solved by use of force. The final word is to be said by reconciliation commissions," he emphasised.

To Meet Ingush Counterpart

LD2802171794 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1356 GMT 28 Feb 94

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Valeriy Shanayev]

[Text] Vladikavkaz February 28 TASS—President Akhsarbek Galazov of North Ossetia has reiterated his decision to meet Ingush President Ruslan Aushev for discussing problems dealing with the settlement of relations between the two republics. Speaking today at a meeting with members of the government, the presidium of the republican Supreme soviet (parliament) and heads of local government bodies, he stressed, however, that the meeting should be carefully prepared, and questions to be discussed by the two sides should be thoroughly analysed. In his opinion, the return of refugees to the populated localities of the Prigorodnyy district is the most complicated of them. It should be tackled in a comprehensive way on the basis of Kislovodsk accords.

"The presidents of North Ossetia and Ingushetia will be able to tackle their problems by themselves, without intermediaries, to decide matters dealing with the settlement of relations between the two nations and to make all the problems clear. The negotiating process between the republics has been started, and it should be continued," Galazov said.

Speaking about the current situation in the part of North Ossetia, where a state of emergency will be in effect until March 31, Galazov pointed out that it continued to be comparatively stable. Russia's peace-making forces in cooperation with local law-enforcement agencies are keeping the situation under control.

Nenets Okrug Schedules Secession Referendum

PM2802105394 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 24 Feb 94 p 2

[Viktor Filippov report: "Divorce Nenets-Style. Autonomous Okrug Intends To Secede from Arkhangelsk Oblast"]

[Text] Arkhangelsk—Nenets Autonomous Okrug has scheduled a referendum on secession from Arkhangelsk Oblast for 20 March. Okrug Governor Yuriy Komarovskiy has officially informed Oblast Administration Head Pavel Balakshin of this event.

The Nenets Autonomous Okrug (capital—the city of Naryan-mar on the Pechora River near its mouth at the Barents Sea) was formed 64 years ago. Today it has 55,000 inhabitants—the overwhelming majority of the people are newcomers who came to open up the north. Arkhangelsk geologists discovered a major oil deposit on the territory of the okrug in the tundra, called Ardalinskoye, which is being developed jointly with the U.S. firm "Conoco."

The Russian Constitution, adopted 12 December last year, equated Arkhangelsk Oblast with the Nenets Autonomous Okrug within it—they are now equal components of the Federation. Proceeding from this legal base, the okrug leaders have prepared a draft edict of the Russian president "On Measures of State Support for the Socioeconomic Development of Nenets Autonomous Okrug." The key point in this document is the okrug's right to export 10 percent of all of the oil extracted on its territory.

The draft edict, which has acquired the necessary agreement by ministries and departments, has already reached the president's reception room, but its subsequent progress has been stopped in connection with an appeal by Oblast Administration Head Pavel Balakshin.

"We do not interfere in political, financial, social, or administrative decisions by the okrug's leaders," Pavel Balakshin said. "But even according to the new Constitution, Nenets Okrug is part of Arkhangelsk Oblast as a constituent of a single economic area. And our economic ties should not be broken if we are really thinking about the good of the people living on our territories."

However, this dispute about petrodollars has pushed Neneth Okrug's leadership toward separatism. Initially, it was only elections to the okrug parliament that were scheduled for 20 March. But now the referendum on the secession of Nenets Okrug from Arkhangelsk Oblast has been urgently added.

Planned Terrorist Attack on Sobchak Viewed

LD2602190994 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1759 GMT 26 Feb 94

[By unidentified ITAR-TASS correspondent]

[Text] St. Petersburg February 26 TASS—St. Petersburg newspapers reported today at a Friday [25 February] briefing at the Federal Counter-intelligence Service's department despite all the refutations. The briefing told correspondents about details of the detention of five terrorists on the eve of 2 February near the Kazan cathedral.

In the words of head of the service department's division against terrorism Aleksandr Kuznetsov, the detained, some of whom participated in the October 1993 events in Moscow, prepared an armed attack at a Petersburg police station. The attack was expected to seize arms to be later used in an attempt upon the life of Petersburg Mayor Anatoliy Sobchak and an attack at the Moscow government house. The information is taken from materials of the Petersburg counter-intelligence service.

According to mass media reports, the individuals were detained right after their attack at the sentry-box of the Zarya scientific-production amalgamation, where they seized five revolvers and 2,000 cartridges.

Kuznetsov did not comment on political hidden motives of the terrorists' actions in the interests of the investigation. However, he said intentions of the group, whose youngest member is 39 years old and the oldest is 47, were serious.

International Affairs

U.S. Begins Aid for Dismantling Nuclear Weapons

LD2502155894 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1517 GMT 25 Feb 94

[Text] Kiev February 25 UKRINFORM-TASS—The United States has begun implementing its aid programme to Ukraine within the frame of the agreement on Safety and Security in Dismantling Nuclear Weapons in Ukraine (SSD). This agreement was signed by the U.S. and Ukraine in October of last year. The American aid has arrived in the form of fuel for transportation and for the operation of equipment to be used in the dismantling of Ukraine's nuclear weapons.

Foreign Ministry Condemns Hebron Massacre

LD2602154894 Kiev Radio Ukraine World Service in Ukrainian 1300 GMT 26 Feb 94

[Text] Yesterday, Ukraine's Foreign Affairs Ministry disseminated a statement resolutely condemning the bloody event, which took place in the town of Hebron when Palestinians were at prayer. The statement by Ukraine's foreign policy department expresses deep sympathy to the families of those who died and the hope that the injured will recover. It emphasizes that any terrorist actions, whatever their aim might be, and whoever they are carried out by, are not justified.

Ukraine's Foreign Affairs Ministry has appealed to the Palestinian and Israeli sides with a call not to resort to self-seeking emotions, and expressed the hope for a continuation of the Arab-Israeli dialogue with the aim of achieving a peaceful settlement in the Near East.

Ukraine, China Sign Economic Cooperation Protocol

LD2602121794 Kiev Radio Ukraine World Service in Ukrainian 1900 GMT 25 Feb 94

[Text] The Foreign Affairs Ministry Press Center has reported that at the invitation of China's Internal Trade Ministry, a delegation from Ukraine's Agriculture and Food Ministry is over there. Employees from this department are in the delegation, and so are representatives from our state's business circles. The delegation has already held a number of meetings at the Ministries of Internal Trade and Agriculture of the People's Republic of China. The sides determined specific directions of joint work in the sphere of production and scientific-technical cooperation—setting up joint enterprises, introducing new agrarian technologies, and the exchange of information.

During the course of talks a protocol was signed on economic, scientific-technical, and production cooperation.

Zlenko Postpones Polish Visit Due to Lysenko Trial

LD2502222894 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1909 GMT 25 Feb 94

[Text] The Ukrainian and Polish foreign ministers had a telephone conversation on Friday during which it was decided to postpone the visit of Ukrainian Foreign Minister Anatoliy Zlenko to Warsaw from February 28 to late March.

According to sources close to the Ukrainian Foreign Ministry, the visit was put off due to the legal proceedings against an officer of the Ukrainian Security Service (the so-called case of Lysenko) continuing in Warsaw from January 19.

Anatoliy Lysenko and his family left for Poland in August, 1993, on a private invitation and was arrested immediately after he crossed the border.

Lysenko has been accused of spying for Ukraine. The Ukrainian Security Service refutes the accusations.

National Affairs

President Kravchuk Holds News Conference

LD2602130594 Kiev UT-1 Television Network in Ukrainian 1715 GMT 25 Feb 94

[News conference by President Leonid Makarovych Kravchuk with unidentified correspondents; place and date not given—recorded]

[Text] [Correspondent] Leonid Makarovych, as we have learned—from the foreign mass media, unfortunately—you do not intend to take part in the early presidential elections being held in June of this year. From the press service's explanation we may draw the conclusion that one of the reasons is the the extremely compressed time period for holding elections for all the power structures. The refusal expressed in the interview is not your final word, however. Please tell me under what circumstances you would be able to review your decision.

[Kravchuk] I (?will draw your) attention to the fact that our mass media and the foreign mass media are currently paying, well, solid attention, I would say, to this problem. Well, the press here is international. So I do not think that it is of special significance in which newspaper or at what microphone it was said first. The main thing is that it was said.

I would not like this problem to be viewed solely in the context of the president as an individual. I saw this when I drew these conclusions (?in the) interview, the context of the formation of power in Ukraine. For example, let us try to predict the variants. The issue here is not so much the compressed time period as the situation that might arise.

If, for example, on 27 March, the entire composition of the new parliament is not elected. Well, I'll say, for example, 200 deputies are elected, or even 150. The current parliament does not have 450 deputies at present, there are somewhat fewer than that. Thus if new deputies are elected in 150 districts, then there will be fewer than 300 in the current parliament; that is, less than two thirds. It will immediately not be competent, no matter what is said. I will refer to you to the Constitution, article 104—the Supreme Council of Ukraine is competent to adopt decisions if there are no fewer than two thirds of the actual number of people's deputies of Ukraine present at the sitting, whose authority is recognized and has not been suspended by established legal procedure, but more than half of its constitutional composition. It is clearly stated.

It cannot be that two people's deputies come to the Supreme Council, one from the old convocation and one from the new convocation. A collision arises immediately. Such a collision arises because there is in fact no old Supreme Council, you see, but there is no new one yet. The run-off elections take place, say, after two weeks.

The law on run-off elections is a complex one, a very complex one. How will it be, say, if another 100 deputies are elected— 150 [at the 27 March election] and 100 [at the run-off election]; we will have 250 altogether, or maybe 280, or 290. Again we do not have the necessary 300. We do not have them here, and we do not have them there. Ukraine does not in fact have a legislative body.

The elections move on to the next stage, that is elections of a president then, and elections of local chairmen of authorities. What happens? There is no Supreme Council as such. The new government is not formed. Its authorities have not been determined. The president is the only legitimate figure, who in fact can realistically manage the situation together with the local administrations and bodies of power in the localities—all of them—with councils, or rather the councils' executive bodies and representatives, and the president's administrations. There is no one else to do it.

If at this time the president also, the president who is in power, runs for election, clearly the danger of a collapse of executive power becomes probable. That is, in this case I am not speaking about my possibilities or my wish [to run] or not. I am driven into a corner—either to leave everything and run for election or to be responsible and not to take this step.

Thus my decision depends on many factors. The first one is the election of the Supreme Council and the creation of a new government—this without fail. Then the new government—the Supreme Council having, say, adopted a law on the cabinet of ministers, determines the government's powers, let us say, transfers executive functions to it, and the government begins to work. Executive power is in the hands of the government. This is the first thing.

The second thing is that it is still necessary to determine what kind of president is going to be elected and with what kind of powers. If this happens in accordance with the present Constitution, the president will again be elected as head of state and head of the executive authority with the relevant powers. You know how many questions there are with this. We must determine this; that is, the president or a person who is a candidate for the presidency, who runs for elections, knows what his future powers will be and who he will be in the state. This has not been determined at present. If he is elected in accordance with the present Constitution, then the issue will arise with the new Supreme Council of what sort of law there should be on the cabinet of ministers, what the powers and functions of the cabinet are, and the tugging of powers will begin again—from the president to the Supreme Council, from the Supreme Council to, say, somewhere else, between the president and cabinet of ministers. All of this vagueness is an important point.

The third thing: If, having elected a new president in June and chairmen of executive, rather chairmen of local bodies of power, we have not determined the powers once and for all of those chairmen, and have not determined when they could be suspended, or in some other way if they violate, for example, the Constitution or laws, who is to stop this? That law says this will be determined by a separate law, but when will we have this law? Before the election of those chairmen, so that they know their final powers, or will it be after that, when they have been elected and have begun to adopt laws? That is, we have been working in such a tight schedule over this.

I do not want to blame anyone, but remember how the preparation for elections proceeded—under pressure of strikes. A decision on a referendum was adopted. Then a decision on elections was adopted. Time went by. Time was short and an extremely complex political situation arose, or can arise. So I said that in this situation my responsibility for the state is greater than my wish to run in the coming elections for president. This is the logic. There is no need to, say, raise banners about this.

There is another aspect, and I must tell you about it. It is not so much political as moral. I studied, like all of us, in school and out of school, history and the fate of various presidents, but I have not come across such dirt, such lack of culture, such badgering as some people feel free to do, for example, in parliament and outside parliament, and certain mass media, as in Ukraine.

This could become a phenomenon of the history of the Ukrainian state, when the first president, he might be liked, he might suit someone, or he might not—one can elect one or elect a new one in a legitimate way, but to feel free to do such things, establishing in the consciousness of generations such a, I would say, boorish psychology, as some are striving to do and are doing, this

simply causes indignation, not just my own personal indignation, but I see in some of my colleagues, too.

Clearly as a person, in this case, not as president, I cannot understand this, and I do not want to understand this. Here is a factor that affects and will affect my decision. I cannot but say this to my people. These are two aspects of it, which I wanted to tell you about, so that you convey this to the electors, who naturally are also interested in this decision by the president and what has caused it.

[Correspondent] A question from HOLOS UKRAYINY. Leonid Makarovych, as is well-known, elections under conditions of a difficult economic crisis are always a risky matter. And Russia is an example of this. In addition, many of your political opponents connect our economic ills with Ukraine's course toward independence, and now are especially demanding the restoration of absolutely all links with Russia and CIS countries. And some people are even proposing the Belarusian variant, which we know about. What can you say about this?

[Kravchuk] Well, this is a subject of many aspects. Its first aspect, from my point of view, is that in our time—especially a year to one and a half years ago, thanks to the vigorous, say, political activity of certain political forces—we established in people's consciousness that the main reason for the economic and social suffering was the severance of economic links, and everything, say, boiled down to this severence of economic links with CIS countries. I explained then, if you remember, that if one is to restore all economic links, which existed previously, then one would have to restore the Soviet Union, to restore or to keep unchanged the whole structure of industry in every CIS country.

Yesterday Russia's president said in his speech that Russia should produce what Russians need and that which can be competitive. The same goes for Ukraine and for other states, and to speak of restoring all links is simply nonsense because a new, [illegible] states and new economic structures are being constructed. The point is to restore necessary links, to create a market, for example, within a CIS framework—whether a common market or a market is not important, so as not to lose this market and to trade on this market, to sell, to buy, to resolve customs issues, other issues, tax issues, price issues. All of this needs to be coordinated, generalized, and elaborated. This is a normal process, but to speak again about the previous links and to restore them all means restoring the military-industrial complex; this means restoring everything that we, Ukraine, produced as a part of a former great power. This is the first thing.

And at all meetings now, you see, links are not mentioned. Whoever wanted these links established them, for example Zaporozhsich, it has splendid links with Russian enterprises, and it works. There should be links between enterprises and not between one state and another. This is a normal phenomenon. States should create the right conditions between themselves, but entrepreneurs and businessmen, plants, factories, industrialists, agriculturists, commercial people, should establish links between themselves, trade and produce. This is the first thing.

The second thing: If a decision had suddenly been taken here, say, by Ukraine, like Belarus as you say, to enter the ruble zone, I am convinced that Russia would not want this. It would not have been able to carry our state, because what would it mean for Russia to take Ukraine into the ruble zone? This would mean giving Ukraine a considerable, even a very considerable quantity of rubles—I cannot even name a figure—and this is its wealth. This means it would be necessary for Ukraine to do [as heard] or Russia would have demanded such concessions on the part of Ukraine, which would have brought its economic independence to nought, to nought.

If one is to ask the question today, one should ask it directly, frankly, and sincerely, that Ukraine is changing its course with regard to its continued economic and political independence and is agreeing to such a decision—the formation of some other kind of, say, union, or whatever it might be called. That is, I am in favor of a common market, in favor of resolving all economic and political issues by way of coordinated actions by CIS states. Here an economic union can play an appropriate role, too.

Maybe, you see the Asian countries have created a single economic space, but they have not created a unified currency. (?I have in mind) CIS countries. We could have created a single economic space, for example, Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus, or the whole economic space, but this with one's own currencies, one's own banks, one's own independent credit and financial structures, that is, as an independent state. For example, the three Baltic states created what is called the Baltic Assembly, but no one is losing or taking steps to lose their independence.

Any kind of economic integration is a realistic process, but it should clearly determine whether states are integrating or whether some kind of autonomous or oblast structures are integrating. This should be clearly explained to people. Those who hint at something, that we should change our course, we should do this and do that, they are simply either afraid to say sincerely what they finally want—and we have such sirs, who were in power in their time, who are now hinting at various, say, variants, and want to win for themselves a post of national hero and savior of Ukraine. There are such people. Incidentally, they could have done this when in power, but one should then say directly, this is my surname, these are my first names and patronymic, and I am telling you that one should put an end to all of these problems of independence, unite in a single state, and may that state then live on. Why deceive people and say that some want this, and some want that, but I want

something, but do not know myself what, or maybe I know, but I am afraid to say what.

[Correspondent] A question from URYADOVYY KURYER, please. Leonid Makarovych, should one not view the program of actions and first steps of the new president of Crimea as the beginning of Ukraine's federalization? What is your attitude to the idea of Ukraine's federalization in general?

[Kravchuk] I think that when such a complex issue is to be resolved, one should always turn to history. See how federative states were formed. Well, take Germany and the United States for example. They were formed historically by way of annexation at a certain time, lands there, states there, to a state structure, which was already formed. For example, the state of Texas was annexed considerably later than, say, other states; that is, this was a process of annexing territories to a state structure, which were annexed on appropriate terms. And federations formed in this way.

We have a unitary state. Well, the Crimea, its special status, is simply, say, connected with its history surely. I will return to the Crimea later. So why now, when we have a unitary state, does one consciously suddenly begin to divide it into federative centers from above, well what for, when there is an undivided unitary state, not large in territory, if one is to compare it, for example, with other states, and is compact, having history in common. I am in favor of regions having the most extensive economic self-determination, the most extensive, in issues of, for example, the budget, finances, customs, I mean customs problems on the borders, and so on, influence on enterprises, powers connected with managing state property, of which there is a great proportion there now, that is the most extensive [economic self-determination], including Crimea. This is my point of view. It seems to me that this is the most realistic point of view at present, which will not cause another division and redivision of our political problems. Well, Russia's experience shows that Russia as a federation, and it was not formed yesterday, has problems, too. So we will begin suddenly, and we will begin with problems.

Regarding Crimea: Well, people often accuse the president and the Supreme Council chairman that we are supposedly the chief culprits for there being an Autonomous Republic of Crimea. I would like to refer you to 1990 again, to history, when the Soviet Union still existed, the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, the USSR Congress of People's Deputies, and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union existed then, too. And then the Crimeans, and the Crimean party—the Communist Party—and the oblast council put the question of a referendum regarding autonomy. And the second point—the issue of what kind of status was discussed, where was Crimea to belong—it was already beginning to be discussed then. Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev often hinted to me—you watch what is going on in Crimea. I knew for certain then that if I did not support what was happening there, if I banned it, then this would not mean that everyone there would suddenly listen to me.

Then Crimea would turn directly to the USSR, not to Russia, and the Supreme Soviet, having the powers, would adopt this resolution, because there was a unified Soviet Union, and all of this talk that Ukraine was a state in the Soviet Union, well we know what sort of a state it was, and Crimea would transfer from Ukraine. Now, when we have done this, it is not so simple now. The Union institutions, which could have adopted this, do not exist now, and Russia signed a treaty with Ukraine on us not having territorial claims on each other, back in 1990.

In this way this question sounds entirely different now, and now, and in the agreement, which we signed in Moscow with Bill Clinton and Yeltsin with regard to nuclear questions, there is a stance there that territorial integrity and inviolability will be respected both by the United States and by Russia, and so on. Already we, when—I say this frankly, I have never said this to my people, but there is speculation going on around this and people are speculating who know this well. Perhaps they are making use of this in an election campaign. God knows. Or perhaps they are simply showing ignorance, although I do not think that academicians can show ignorance in this matter. Although it happens. Therefore, I am saying sincerely that this was a considered step.

Now there have been elections for a Crimean president. People became so absurd as to ask whether I really have the right to meet the president of Crimea. Well, firstly, this is not a right that I am going to ask anyone for. This is the first thing. I could not have met him under one circumstance—if Ukraine's Supreme Council had revoked the law on elections of the Crimean president and they had taken place, then the Crimean president would have been outside the law and I would never in my life have met him.

But as this did not happen, that is, elections are elections, I meet him, and it is my opinion that it is better to meet than not to meet and it is better to resolve issues than not to resolve them and drive them into a dead end. It is better to go along the path of, say, mutual understanding, and not the path of confrontation. I am convinced that the new president of Crimea, the new government, and everyone will go along this path, because the other path leads to trouble. They would be the initiators of this trouble; they would assume the highest responsibility, because Ukraine, if we are looking at this, is fussing and bothering over Crimea so much that there is nowhere to go from here.

And we will talk about of how many violations there are of the (?letter of) the law, and the referendum law was violated, for example, which does not comply in the constitution to Ukraine's referendum law, the Crimean one I mean, the referendum law in Crimea. And the Supreme Council, the Presidium, and all of us, sent

documents, said that they should be brought into line with Ukraine's Constitution. They keep biding their time.

Yesterday, the Supreme Council adopted an appropriate document and gave explanations. I think that this should influence—influence reason, common sense—that Crimea is at the moment an autonomous constituent part of Ukraine and any actions directed against this most important political, say, pivotal issue, will necessarily be viewed as illegal, as illegal. This should be kept in mind. I think that we will manage to settle these issues, we will manage to settle them, and again we will resolve them by way of talks, by way of debates, by way of coordination both of legislative and executive power documents and structures.

[Correspondent] Leonid Makarovych, Ukrainian Radio, news service. I would like to return to our difficult economic and domestic situation and the related foreign economic policy of our state. In your opinion, why is privatization not occurring in our country? And what is it necessary to do to activate foreign investments?

[Kravchuk] Well, privatization has not occurred for many reasons. First, we worked on privatization legislation for a very long time. This is the first thing. The second thing is, legislation is all very well, but various political forces, and in the power structures too, in their time had varying attitudes to privatization. The previous governments, Kuchma's government and Fokin's government, did practically nothing for privatization, practically nothing. Everything was frozen.

Only now are the first steps beginning to be taken. Appropriate programs are being adopted. Appropriate actions have begun in the regions, but again this will depend on how people there, from the village council to the Cabinet of Ministers, will act and resolve these issues. That is, we were late with privatization.

Although, I should tell you that privatization in Ukraine, taking account of its heavy industrial structure—for example, 33 percent is concentrated in the military-industrial complex of the former Soviet Union. Well, you see, these are giants, and is it really so simple to privatize the Malyshev Plant or the Southern Machine-Building Plant. We smelted half the metal in Ukraine. Is it really so simple to privatize metallurgical plants, mines, and so on? One has to see all of this. This is a fearful structure—nuclear power engineering and so on, but we are late and now these steps have begun.

Second, taking account of our leaps I would call them, in such an acute issue as nuclear weapons, where we announced one course to begin with, said we would manage to become nonnuclear quickly, then started to refine it. There were such layers that it then became entirely incomprehensible to some what we really wanted. This led to economic assistance to us being frozen on the part of Western countries. I will give you only one example. You probably know it, but I will give it. For example, assistance to the Baltic countries—all of Western assistance in relation to gross national product comes to 25 percent. For Ukraine it is 0.5 percent, and only now, when we have determined our position with regard to this acute issue for the world, for humanity, has some kind of gradual progress begun somewhere. This does not yet mean that it is finished, but it has begun. For example, normal economic relations have begun to be established, and there is an entirely different attitude to us.

Therefore, there are many reasons here and what occurred was our fault. I am being frank. There are objective problems here, but the fault for the inconsistency and indecisiveness, both in privatization and in the entire sphere of politics, was severely marked in this sphere of life. [1 minute break in transmission] ...to work and earn money. I do not see that there is any other way. The situation regarding pensioners, doctors, and teachers is different. They are subject to the budget and there is a different attitude toward them. Let us say, Ukraine has up to 40 million hectares of land: We spend a lot of time deciding whether or not to give them land; we then make a decision to allow them to, let us say, build together with the land and make a decision not to let them build with the land.

As you see there are people with such a mentality who live constantly in fear that we will sell the land to somebody. If somebody wants to build a factory in Ukraine, and if we say that the land on which the factory is built belongs to the factory, then what is wrong with this? We must not think like this. We are always arguing about this. I repeat, we have 39 million hectares of land in Ukraine. This is practically 1 million hectares per person, or even more if we are only talking about adults. Where is the problem here?

Ivan Stepanovych Plyushch, during the Supreme Council sessions, mentioned figures of many countries, including Turkey and other countries, where the population is the same and where they utilize only half of their land and, as well as being self-sufficient, they also export their products. But we cannot even do this. Land must be utilized. I would advise that in life we must work and earn a living and produce. At present, the majority of the population has begun to earn in a different way, instead of producing and earning a living. This is our misfortune and I must not severely condemn this. If one-third of the population is traveling to the market on trains, then this is a particular phenomenon, although if you remember there was a similar situation six or seven years ago in Poland and Poles were everywhere in China, Jamaica, etc. They were buying, selling everything and transporting it, but now they have begun some other activities because there is an accumulation of funds and they have begun to work. One has to experience this. There must be a desire by everyone to find a way out. It is no use saying that the president has not found a way out. Let them elect a holy president tomorrow, if one could be found. He will not be able to solve anything on his own, unless, at first, there is a desire on the part of everyone to work and secondly, unless there is accord in society. We

should know that we must manage this land, this Ukraine, because nobody will do it for us.

Some are calling for (?dependency), and others are calling for a return to the old structures, and now there is an electoral campaign and it is arousing the people. You must understand that this does not give the people vigor, strength, nor optimism. There should be an objective. I understand that the people have become disillusioned. They even say: Why should I go and vote and who should I vote for? These are the kind of letters I am receiving. But I would like to say something with regard to my answer to your first question. Without fail, we must have elections, it is worse not to. There must be an authority. When there is authority there is also hope and let us say, levers that will not permit surprises. There will be somebody who will make the decisions.

For example, let us say that the Supreme Council cannot be convened. The president has authority with regard to executive power in Crimea. Elections have taken place. Certain processes of a legislative nature have taken place in Crimea. Who should repeal what has taken place in Crimea? How should the Supreme Council act? I would like the people to understand that it is all very difficult, very difficult. They ask: Who should I listen to? You are all promising something, why should I go and vote? But elections must be held in order to preserve the state and make an important step in forming the political and power structures.

Some say that the new Supreme Council will be worse than the present one. I will not say whether it will be worse or better. It will be a new parliament. Those deputies who do not want elections keep on saying that it will be worse. We will see what kind of parliament it will be, but the main thing is that the Supreme Council should be elected, and that it should begin to take steps toward a structural reorganization and political reconstruction, that it begins to take specific steps toward reforms, market and social protection. It should not go from one extreme to the other depending on polarization or political inclinations. It should be a Supreme Council with a clear policy that will form a government. The government will present a program and a process of normal work should begin. We have to go along this path. I turn to the people with a call to overcome these personal problems at the time of the elections. I know that when people go to cast their votes and, let us say a bus does not turn up, they come back and angrily say that if they do not want us to vote, we will not vote.

We must understand that we are talking about authority. The state must have authority. If it is no good, then we must reelect it. If there is anarchy then that will be the end and there will be trouble. There could be a collision or confrontation or something else. We must not allow this. I simply wanted to explain the situation because as I can see, it is taking on such a tone and there are various interpretations that do not precisely define my position or my views. Sometimes people say to me that I am interested in the elections not taking place. I have the most interest that elections take place. Perhaps those who want to preserve their positions for some considerable time are interested. Regarding myself, I have defined my position and have told you this frankly, and I tell the people and everybody else that I have no personal interests. My interest is that of Ukraine.

Supreme Council Supports Early Parliamentary Elections

LD2502134794 Kiev Radio Ukraine World Service in Ukrainian 0800 GMT 25 Feb 94

[Parliamentary appeal in support of early parliamentary elections, to be held on 27 March, read by Supreme Council Deputy Chairman Vasyl Durdynets, at the Supreme Council session in Kiev—live]

[Text] [Supreme Council Speaker Ivan Plyushch] The floor is given to Vasyl Vasylyovych Durdynets speaking from the commission...[correcting himself] from the Presidium, to read out the text of the Supreme Council Presidium statement that is being submitted for the Supreme Council's consideration. Attention please.

[Durdynets] The appeal by the Supreme Council of Ukraine: Esteemed Ukrainian citizens, Ukraine is experiencing hard times. The economic crisis has not been overcome. Social problems have become extraordinarily acute. Under conditions when trust in any branch of power has gone down, the Supreme Council of Ukraine, at the people's justifiable request, adopted the only right decision to hold early elections first to the Supreme Council in March and then to Ukraine's president and local authorities in June.

So, Ukraine is on the threshold of undergoing new important changes to its political and economic life. We have a chance to continue the transformation of Ukraine in a peaceful way, doing this as it was done in the majority of democratic countries in Europe and the world: From an election to an election, replacing the Supreme Council and therefore, the government, i.e. making changes in the body of those who will determine state domestic and foreign policy.

It is very good that Ukraine has avoided the use of armed force to change political power. However, in order further to ensure the peaceful way of revolutionary transformation in Ukraine, the elections to the Supreme Council of Ukraine on 27 March of this year have to take place successfully.

Some facts and statements, however, demonstrate that not everybody in Ukraine has an interest in holding these elections successfully. There is talk about some kind of vacuum of power. Some are even openly interested in the sabotage and disruption of these elections. If the elections to the Supreme Council of Ukraine do not take place, this will only increase political and economic instability and lead to a constitutional crisis in Ukraine.

However, there will be no vacuum of power. After all, the current Supreme Council convocation will retain its constitutional powers and work until March 1995. But do we really need to go back when a change in the body of the Ukrainian Supreme Council already can and must occur on 27 March 1994.

This is exactly why the Supreme Council of Ukraine appeals to its citizens, every official and authority who is involved in organizing and holding the election campaign and asks them to demonstrate high responsibility at this time so important to Ukraine. Any actions and statements that lead to the disruption or sabotage of the elections, are inadmissible. Nor are any violations of the law on elections are admissible.

The Supreme Council of Ukraine draws the attention of the central, district, and all area electoral commissions, state mass media and state TV and radio leadership, to the need essentially to improve their activity aimed at stepping up the preelection campaign, ensuring the objectivity and fullness of its coverage, and preventing restrictions of the rights of candidates for deputies and electors.

Dear compatriots, let us realize our chance of changes in the life of each of us and our society as a whole. [Deputies then adopted the above appeal in a vote by raising hands.]

Kravchuk Conditions Participation in Elections

LD2502154294 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1450 GMT 25 Feb 94

[By UKRINFORM correspondent Viktor Demidenko for TASS]

[Text] Kiev February 25 TASS—Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk conditioned his participation in presidential elections and said it is first necessary to elect a new parliament and determine the powers of the future president.

"My decision on participation in early presidential elections depends on many factors", he told reporters on Friday.

"First and foremost we have to elect a new parliament and appoint a new Cabinet of Ministers", he stressed and added that any candidate for the presidency "should know his future powers" before joining the election campaign.

"At present they (the powers) have not been determined. If the new president is elected according to the acting constitution, the new parliament is sure to raise the question about the powers of the president, the Supreme Soviet and the government. The powers of local heads of administrations have not been determined either", he said.

Diplomat Denies Kravchuk Refusal to Run

LD2702152694 Moscow Radio Moscow World Service in English 1200 GMT 27 Feb 94

[Text] Ukrainian ambassador to Russia, Volodymyr Kryzhanovshyy, refuted a report that Leonid Kravchuk has refused to take part in the upcoming presidential elections of the republic.

In his words, Ukrainian president came out in favor of postponing the election of the head of state. If his opinion is disregarded, he may refuse to run for presidency, said Kryzhanovshyy.

Kravchuk Decision Viewed

WS2502190794 Kiev KIEVSKIYE VEDOMOSTI in Russian 23 Feb 94 p 2

[Comments by Volodymyr Malynkovych, political expert; Mykhaylo Horyn, leader of the Ukrainian Republican Party; and Oleksandr Moroz, chairman of the Socialist Party of Ukraine Political Council, on the decision of Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk not to run for president; place and date not given]

[Text] [Volodymyr Malynkovych] Leonid Kravchuk is apparently very tired.

The situation in the country is catastrophic, and he understands that if nothing changes it will even deteriorate. Additionally, his ratings have been declining recently.

He would most probably lose the elections. To resign means to at least save face. I believe that his decision is serious.

[Mykhaylo Horyn] Leonid Kravchuk understands that a new stage of the building of the Ukrainian state has begun, which requires that definitely new tactics be worked out. A new president is needed for new tactics.

[Oleksandr Moroz] Leonid Makarovych [Kravchuk] has not yet officially announced that he will not run for president. If he decides to do so, this will be a politically correct act. The popularity of Leonid Kravchuk is decreasing. He and [Supreme Soviet Chairman] Ivan Plyushch are responsible for the failures of the Supreme Council. The refusal to participate in the elections is a political defeat, but participation in the elections would be an even bigger one for him, because he does not have any chances.

Cabinet Holds Meeting With Crimean Officials

AU2402124994 Kiev DEMOKRATYCHNA UKRAYINA in Ukrainian 22 Feb 94 p 3

[UKRINFORM report: "A Meeting Between Members of the Ukrainian and Crimean Governments"]

[Text] Under the chairmanship of Ukraine's acting prime minister, Yukhym Zvyahilskyy, Ukraine's Cabinet of Ministers held a meeting to discuss the fulfillment of the Ukrainian president's commissions on the results of his talks with the president of the Crimean Republic. Those present included Ukraine's vice premiers Vasyl Yevtukhov, Valentyn Landyk, secretary of the Ukrainian presidential administration Mykola Khomenko, and other members of the government. The working group of the Crimean government was headed at the meeting by acting chairman of the Crimean Republic's Council of Ministers Anatoliy Franchuk. The participants in the conference considered and discussed a whole series of questions, including problems associated with the implementation of the agreement on budget relationships between the government of Ukraine and the government of the Crimean Republic; on the allocation of 110 billion karbovantsi to clear the debt in financing the program for stabilizing the Crimean economy and in financing measures associated with the return of Crimean Tatars, Germans, and other deported peoples; on the division of state property among Ukraine and the Crimean Republic; on the determination of sources for covering the expenditure in hard currency of enterprises situated on the territory of the Crimean Republic; on questions of canceling restrictions for Ukrainian citizens' entering the city of Sevastopol; and on measures for stabilizing the functioning of a number of branches of the Crimean Republic's economic complex.

Cabinet Adopts Resolution on 1994 Social, Economic Plan

LD2602121694 Kiev Radio Ukraine World Service in English 2200 GMT 25 Feb 94

[Text] The Cabinet of Ministers adopted a resolution on the 1994 plan of Ukraine's social and economic development, the presidential cabinet press service reported. The plan specifies, in particular, the state contracts and orders amounts, including those of basic agricultural products and foods. It also specifies the amounts of centralized capital investments and new production facilities to be commissioned.

The plans reportedly contains provisions for enhancing state discipline by subjects of economic activities involving, in particular, pricing discipline in fuel supplies to Ukraine under intergovernmental agreements with exporter nations.

As the presidential cabinet press service disclosed, President Kravchuk provided a formal additional submission to the parliament of Ukraine's accedence to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.

Parliament Amends 1991 Law on Presidential Elections

LD2502201994 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1535 GMT 25 Feb 94

[From the "Presidential Bulletin" feature No. 39 (529)]

[Text] The Ukrainian parliament has amended and enlarged the law on presidential elections adopted in 1991.

According to the amended law, candidacies to the presidential post shall be advanced by parties, inter-party blocs and electors' conferences. (The old law envisaged the advancement of candidates on their own initiative, or by worker groups - Interfax).

The advancement of candidates shall begin 3 months before and end 2 months before elections. A candidate that has collected 100,000 signatures shall be allowed to run an election campaign.

The new law has a provision which obliges a candidate to collect at least 1,500 signatures in two thirds of the total number of electoral districts. Elections shall be held in 27 electoral districts - in all regions and the cities of Kiev and Sevastopol.

A candidate who has scored more than half of the votes shall be considered elected to the post of president. Elections shall be considered valid if more than 50% of the electors take part in them.

If none of the candidates scores the required number of votes, a second round is held involving two candidates supported by the largest number of electors. During the second voting, a candidate who scores more "pros" than "cons" shall be considered elected to the presidential post.

Presidential elections shall be held on June 26. Ukrainian president Leonid Kravchuk announced this week that he would not run for presidency.

Explaining his decision, Kravchuk said that presidential elections should hardly be held just three months after parliamentary elections, scheduled for March 27. He pointed out that although he did not oppose the idea of presidential elections, he believes that amid the current economic crisis such prompt elections might overly politicize society.

The president's and Cabinet's press service circulated a statement which clarifies Leonid Kravchuk's position.

It says, among other things, that Kravchuk's position reflects the current situation and prospects for its development.

The president does not rule out, it goes on to say, that elections to parliament and executive bodies may go beyond the allotted time limit and overlap with early presidential elections and elections to the local governments, all of which may cause vacuum of power, whereby the old parliament would cease to exist, while a new parliament and cabinet would not be formed up. Given this, only president can run the state. If the president announces early elections in such a situation, the executive bodies may fall part and the reigns of state power might be utterly lost.

Meanwhile, RUKH [Ukrainian People's Movement for Perestroyka] leader Vyachesav Chernovil (Kravchuk's rival during the elections in December 1991—Interfax) qualified Kravchuk's refusal to run for presidency as a tactical game. "This does not mean that Kravchuk has firmly decided not to run for presidency," he told Interfax. He also said that the press service's statement does not say a word bout his refusal to participate in the election campaign and that Kravchuk's moves are aimed at undermining presidential elections, at least in June.

Crimean Premier Details Economic Principles

PM2302145794 Moscow TRUD in Russian 22 Feb 94 p 2

[Interview with Republic of Crimea Premier Yevgeniy Saburov by Vitaliy Golovachev; place and date not given: "Yevgeniy Saburov: 'A Shortage of Common Sense and Professionalism'"]

[Text] Crimean President Yuriy Meshkov's proposal that the renowned economist Yevgeniy Saburov head the republic's government is being extensively commented on in the press. Not only is the fact of inviting a professional economist "from abroad" to take the post of premier interesting in itself, but so is the possibility of verifying in practice the efficacy of approaches to implementing reforms and overcoming the severest economic crisis other than those applied in Russia.

Saburov's name first became widely known when in August 1991 he took up the post of deputy chairman of the RSFSR Council of Ministers, and minister of the economy in I. Silayev's government. He executed this role for just a few months, however, and he was not invited to join the new Gaydar "government of reforms."

Yevgeniy Fedorov is 48 years old. He was born in Yalta (his mother still lives there). He graduated from the Faculty of Mechanics and Mathematics of Moscow State University, gained a profound knowledge of economics, and became the author of the economic program "Twelve Steps From the Abyss." He is a man of many interests, with a creative streak: He has published his own play, and he is fascinated by philosophy, and theology....

He has been the director of the Center for Information and Social Technologies under the Russian Government since January 1992. On becoming prime minister of the Crimean Government he decided to remain simultaneously the center's scientific leader: "The brain trust will help me resolve difficult problems...."

[Golovachev] Yevgeniy Fedorovich, to what extent has the experience of Russian reforms fitted you for Crimea? How do you, in general, evaluate what has happened in Russia in the space of two years?

[Saburov] The situation in which the Russian economy now finds itself is extremely complex. This, in my view, is the consequence of major errors committed while implementing reforms. What is most tiresome is that many errors could have been avoided, as the government was warned about them in advance; but, alas, the warnings were not heeded.

Take, for instance, the idea for the speedy integration of our economy into the world market system. In the overall scheme of things, this was an excellent, and right-minded idea—there is no argument about this. At the same time, however, it would have been necessary to take account of the fact that our economy is self-devouring, "inverted." The main economic "bricks"—prices, profitability, profit—are not compatible with the world market. Because cheap raw materials, cheap transport, and a completely different price structure lay at the basis of accounting in our country. In Russia, whichever example you may take—a sofa, a door handle, a gadget of some description—everything, by foreign standards, is loss-making, and elsewhere they simply would not undertake to do this because, according to that system of accounting and price structure, it is not profitable.

Our reformers, of course, knew that the economy was "distorted," but they did not understand the most important thing: So monstrous is the extent of this distortion that no monetarist methods, no financial manipulations will aid "recovery" here. Yes, a rigid monetary and credit policy was essential. But at the same time, institutional changes concerning the infrastructure of the market, property, and so on were also required. This sort of thing cannot be done in a month, nor in three months. Without understanding all this, they tried overnight, and without pause for thought, to combine incompatible systems, and the result was the destruction of the economy....

[Golovachev] Do you believe that there was an alternative route to the market?

[Saburov] It is not just that I believe this, but economic theory and the experience of other countries indicates this. To be brief, it was necessary from the very outset to apply a well-known tactic which is called "Go and Stop, Stop and Go." That is, to go part of the way, stop, adjust, and then move on.

It is easy to see that we are talking about a gradual, more harmonious restructuring of the economy. Take, for instance, the fact that the correlation of prices has altered. The price structure is, indeed, different, but it is still far from the foreign mold. Now the economy must be given a chance to adapt to these new prices, and specific structural changes in industry must take place....

[Golovachev] This is all very well in theory. But what about in practice? Prices were deregulated 2 January 1992, and they took off [oni i poshli]. So what you are saying to them is—stop, take time to adapt, and then we will move further....

[Saburov] But why just talk when it is essential to act? It is necessary to conduct reforms on the basis of a pact of national accord. All social forces should agree on price

reform, and on the most important stages. A situation whereby certain sectors, enjoying a monopoly position and the fact that it is impossible to manage without their products, pump up prices, profitability, and earnings for their workers while other sectors end up in a state of collapse and impoverishment—this is not what it is about at all. To avoid this, it was essential from the very outset to agree a restriction on the transition period for income growth, a restriction on profitability, and a number of other important things (including the "currency anchor," that is, smoothing out the fluctuations in the ruble rate against the dollar).

I am speaking precisely of a voluntary, conscious agreement, because you will achieve nothing through an order "from above." For 70 years directors learned how to deceive all controllers, how to get around any rules. So what is needed is self-regulation (within sensible, agreed frameworks) under the eye of the state. This will help to slow down inflation, and to render the process manageable.

But the reformers embarked on quite a different path. You will remember the declaration of market prices and market wages. This was a splendid slogan, but a profoundly erroneous approach. The market does not exist yet, and market regulators do not operate—that is, prices will not be balanced by the market, but "blown off course," and wages for some will be enormous while for others they will be miserly. A sizable wage, like an engine, will ultimately create a momentum in its wake, dragging along with it the salaries in other sectors—and an inflationary spiral is guaranteed.

In the majority of countries which have attained success in the economy it is obligatory at a specific stage to implement sensible restrictions on the growth of incomes and profitability. This, incidentally, was one of the fundamental points of Balcerowicz's program in Poland. But in Russia, for some reason, they decided to be "cleverer" than all the rest. Today, we are reaping the results....

[Golovachev] But how is it possible to restrict income even further, when one-third of the country is already on the poverty line?

[Saburov] This is precisely the result of the fact that there was no well-conceived incomes policy, there were no restrictions: some sectors "got fat," and others are on the brink of extinction.

Of course, the "Stop and Go" tactic—with its pauses, its delays—will not be ideal. But the economy needs a breather, it needs time to adapt. It is better to move slowly but surely toward a goal than to charge at something head on and find yourself in a dead end. Obviously, the former is far harder: It requires daily, difficult, and painstaking work, great skill, and professionalism—and not only in the economic sphere but also in the sphere of management. However, the road to success is never easy....

[Golovachev] Okay, what is done is done. But how do we get out of the crisis today? Nonpayments have almost paralyzed the economy. If you print a heap of money, you will present enterprises with hyperinflation. If you do not, the result is a financial clinch, production stoppage, and mass unemployment. What is the solution?

[Saburov] Indeed, it is always harder to extinguish a full-blown conflagration than a small fire. But we must not, of course, lose heart. Right now it is essential to steer the ship with particular caution and the greatest of dexterity. Credit must be issued very sparingly—by no means to everybody—and for specific projects (not flimsy "rough sketches," but genuine business plans.) Moreover, it should be issued under strict controls.

And there should be urgent talks between the government and the sectors, and between sectors and the various social forces, on the new "rules of the game": a temporary restriction on income growth, profitability, and so on. A great deal depends upon the professionalism of the government—it must come out with very precise, specific proposals, so that it is clear what needs to be agreed....

[Golovachev] In your view, is the economic situation in Crimea better or worse than in Russia?

[Saburov] Worse, of course. A lot worse. There are bread lines, there is poverty, electricity is cut off for long periods at a time, health sanatoriums are not heated....

[Golovachev] Can you employ in Crimea the "Stop and Go" tactic and other recommendations you have mentioned?

[Saburov] It is difficult to compare conditions for the pursuit of reforms in Crimea and Russia. There is no Central Bank in Crimea, and the Crimean Republic on its own is in no position to rein in the devaluation of the currency (although we will, of course, try to exert influence, pressure if you like, on the Central Bank of Ukraine). Economic instruments in conducting reforms are all we can use, as there are no others.

[Golovachev] Will the Russian ruble circulate officially in Crimea?

[Saburov] This would be sensible. And to some extent this situation already exists "de facto." However, it is vital to work out mutually acceptable projections.

[Golovachev] How much Russian currency will be required?

[Saburov] It is hard to say. It is essential to bear in mind that money for investments is one thing, and money in current circulation is another.... But, in general, we could be talking about hundreds of billions of rubles.

[Golovachev] Do you intend to bring in foreign capital?

[Saburov] Yes, and we will do everything possible to bring this about. It is a matter of approaching banks and

entrepreneurs in distant foreign countries, and in Russia. Their activity will be granted most-favored status. This concerns taxes, customs policy, and much more. It is very important to guarantee stability in the sphere of legislation and finances. It is wrong to alter the laws every quarter. If we create attractive, advantageous conditions, capital will come flooding into Crimea. After all, this is a prosperous region, one of the best resort locations, and it has considerable industrial, scientific, and agricultural potential.

Particular attention will be given to creating new and maintaining existing jobs, revitalizing sanatorium facilities and local industry, producing competitive goods, and developing the vacation industry and tourism....

[Golovachev] You talked to Russian Premier Viktor Chernomyrdin a few days ago. What was your conversation about?

[Saburov] It was about the need to restore economic links between Russia and Crimea, the possibilities for more extensive Russian interest in vacationing in Crimea, and other questions.

[Golovachev] Nowadays only millionaires can take a vacation in Crimean health sanatoriums.....

[Saburov] But why? There are Russian enterprises which pay for trips (either completely, or in part) and send their workers to Crimea. Moreover, this is cheaper than flying to Miami, where, as TRUD reported, Russian oil workers are taking their vacations. At the same time, there is quality medical provision available in Crimean sanatoriums, which you cannot get abroad.

[Golovachev] A few days ago, an official in Kiev announced that a citizen of another country (that is, you) cannot be prime minister of the Crimean Government inasmuch as a foreigner should not be given access to state secrets....

[Saburov] This is simply ludicrous. What state secrets are there in Crimea? A ravaged economy? People have known about that for a long time.... And what kind of "foreigner" am I? I was born and raised in Crimea, and I have never considered myself to be a "foreigner" there.

[Golovachev] When do you leave for your new job in Simferopol?

[Saburov] In the next few days.

[Golovachev] Now for a few purely personal questions. Are you a religious man?

[Saburov] Yes.

[Golovachev] I was told that you were christened by Father Aleksandr Men....

[Saburov] This was a great moment for me. Incidentally, this happened in 1968—at a time when the official authorities did not look upon the church particularly favorably.

[Golovachev] You realized, of course, that you would no longer be able to pursue a scientific career?

[Saburov] Just what is meant by a scientific career? I knew that I, as a nonparty individual, would not climb any higher than "lab chief" in the institute. This was my "ceiling." But the scientific work I did do was pretty good.

[Golovachev] You write plays, poetry. How well do the precise sciences—mathematics and economics—mix with the unfettered imagination without which poetry is impossible?

[Saburov] They mix very well. Poetic thinking is very specific. The poet sees not simply a bird but something quite specific—for instance, a white crane, sitting in a nest. On the other hand, economics is a very "creative" science. Indeed, is it a science at all? So in this sense I can see a combination, a harmony of interests, and not their differences. Incidentally, many poets in the pre-Soviet era occupied government posts....

[Golovachev] And one final question. How do you view the future—more with optimism, or with pessimism? Will we get ourselves out of this rut without bloodshed, and without concentration camps?

[Saburov] We have to. People have become highly resistent to "blood and concentration camps." And you cannot reverse the course of history. We are merely required to make fewer errors. Right now, an acute shortage of common sense and professionalism is seen in the conduct of the reforms. But I am convinced: Common sense will triumph, and good will be victorious....

Belarus

Deputies Discuss Constitution, Electoral Law, Trade

WS2502154894 Minsk Radio Minsk Network in Belarusian 1300 GMT 25 Feb 94

[Report by Mikhail Rutkowski]

[Excerpts] At the beginning of today's debate, the floor was taken by Supreme Soviet Chairman Mechyslaw Ivanovich Hryb. He appealed to people's deputies and journalists not to support abortion, while voting on the draft constitution that is to be adopted by our parliament. I will recall that in their ballots, deputies are being asked to define their position on the legislative, executive, and juridical authorities of the Republic of Belarus, and respond to whether our state should become a presidential republic. The results of the voting will be announced next week.

Having heard the speeches delivered in the miscellaneous section, deputies continued the debate on amendments to the electoral law. After that, they began to discuss the Supreme Soviet draft resolution on the volume of foreign debt and trends in the use and repayments of foreign credits. The draft resolution specifies that the volume of foreign debt of the Republic of Belarus will amount to $2 billion until the end of 1994. [passage omitted]

Because today is Friday, deputies voted to shorten the working day. The session concluded at 1700 [1200 GMT]. Deputies will reconvene at the Oval Hall of the House of Government next Tuesday.

Parliament Prepares To Adopt New Constitution

MK2502134094 Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in Russian 25 Feb 94 p 1

[Vitaliy Tsygankov report under the "Belarus" rubric: "Belarusian Parliament May Enter Guinness Book of World Records. Named Ballot Papers To Be Used To Vote on Constitution"]

[Text] With a number of personnel matters smoothly resolved, the next item on the agenda of the Belarusian Supreme Soviet session was the long-awaited report by the prime minister "On the Structure of the Council of Ministers of the Republic of Belarus." Vyacheslav Kebich has been promising the reorganization since last November. The parliament had tasked the prime minister with presenting the reorganization plan by 15 December 1993. The prime minister's report, however, has been postponed over and over again for various reasons. This time, too, it was announced at the session that Kebich was sick. It is evident to independent observers that Vyacheslav Kebich will not make his report public until the situation in Moscow regarding the unification of the monetary systems of Belarus and Russia is clarified. The parliament, for its part, turned to what may be the focal point of the current session—the adoption of the Republic of Belarus' new constitution.

Attempts to do so have been inconclusive at every succeeding session for as long as 18 months. Now, Vasiliy Sholodonov, chairman of the conciliatory commission tasked with drawing up a draft constitution, proposed that the fundamental law be adopted by voting with named ballot papers. The vote should be held for three days to adopt the three main sections of the constitution: on the Supreme Soviet, the president, and local authorities.

When Oleg Trusov, an opposition deputy, wondered if there has been a historical precedent of adopting a constitution in this fashion, Sholodonov responded: "History is created by people, and only then is it analyzed. If there has not been anything like that in history, then there will be." Another opposition parliamentarian, Vladimir Kakovko, retorted: "You have just fashionably explained to us how we can go down in history, but we may just enter the Guinness Book of World Records instead."

Be that as it may, the deputies approved the procedure for voting with named ballot papers and appointed a commission to count votes, which presented a ballot paper design. Upon receiving a ballot paper, a deputy is obliged to sign his or her name and subsequently confirm his vote by affixing his or her signature. According to the vote-counting commission chairman, the ballot papers offer splendid protection from forgery. Under this system, not only will the 250-270 parliamentarians present take part in this session, but also the deputies who are currently absent for valid or not very valid reasons (the Belarusian parliament comprises a total of 346 deputies). By introducing named ballot papers the parliamentary majority expects to win the requisite number of votes—231—to pass the section on the president first. Meanwhile, a draft Supreme Soviet decree on calling parliamentary elections on 20 November 1994 has already been handed to the deputies. Thus, the "party of power" has embarked on the practical implementation of its strategic plan to adopt the constitution, to elect the president, and only then to hold elections for the Supreme Soviet.

Most Deputies Vote for Presidential Republic

LD2602105094 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 0550 GMT 26 Feb 94

[By BELINFORM correspondents Vladimir Glod, Larisa Lazar for TASS]

[Text] Minsk, 26 Feb—It appears that on the first day of spring Belarus will change from being a parliamentary republic into a presidential republic. On the evening of 1 March the results will be announced of the secret vote by Belarus parliamentarians, with named voting slips, for or against introducing the institution of a presidency. And although officially the voting will end only at 1800 on 1 March, the BELINFORM correspondents have learned

from confidential sources that 230 voting slips have already been deposited in the ballot boxes and 210 deputies have voted in favor of introducing the post of president as the head of state and executive authority. For this decision to receive the force of law it needs to gather another 22 votes.

About 100 parliamentarians have not yet received their voting slips. And even taking into account that 40 deputies have said that they will not vote, one can predict today with 99.9 percent certainty that Belarus will have a new state structure.

Official on Deputies' Refusal To Vote on Constitution

WS2802105694 Minsk Radio Minsk Network in Belarusian 0400 GMT 28 Feb 94

[Text] Commenting on a statement signed by 40 people's deputies of the Belarusian Supreme Soviet, in which they refused to participate in the voting on the draft constitution, Vyacheslaw Kuznetsow, first deputy Supreme Soviet chairman, stated: "I think that the behavior of these people's deputies is very illogical, the more so since some of them were members of the Constitutional Committee. They have stated that they are against the form of voting. I, personally, believe that this is just an unwillingness to adopt the basic law," Vyacheslaw Kuznetsow concluded.

Shushkevich Criticizes Procedures for Constitutional Vote

WS2802105894 Minsk Radio Minsk Network in Belarusian 0400 GMT 28 Feb 94

[Text] I will either not vote at all or vote against it, because nobody has defined the subject of the voting, former Supreme Soviet Chairman Stanislav Shushkevich told an RID correspondent immediately after receiving his ballot for voting on three chapters of the Belarusian draft constitution. The point is that this is the wrong way to vote. It would be better to vote on separate chapters, and even better on separate articles. If the voting concerned separate articles, I would approve about 20 of them, the ex-speaker added. Asked why he did not join the statement signed by 40 deputies who refused to participate in the voting, Stanislav Shushkevich responded that he was simply not informed.

Shushkevich Calls For Early Presidential Elections

LD2702163894 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1620 GMT 27 Feb 94

[By BELINFORM correspondent Nikolay Nazarovich for TASS]

[Text] Mogilev February 27 TASS—Ex-speaker of the Belarusian Parliament Stanislav Shushkevich seems to have launched an election campaign for the republic's presidency. Over the past few days, he has been touring Belarusian cities and towns, calling for early presidential and parliamentary elections.

Shushkevich held at the weekend two meetings in Mogilev with the city's workers, stressing that "to make economic reforms in the country effective, democratic forces should unite on the basis of statehood, political and economic democracy, that is on the basis of transition to a free market".

Speaking about the merging of Russia's and Belarus' monetary systems, he came out for "a decent agreement, on equal terms, without any infringements upon Belarus' interests".

Prime Minister Praises Yeltsin's Annual State Address

WS2802105994 Minsk Radio Minsk Network in Belarusian 0400 GMT 28 Feb 94

[Text] Belarusian Prime Minister Vyacheslav Kebich has described the assessment of prospects for Russian statehood, which was made by the Russian Federation president in his annual address to the Federal Assembly, as deep and comprehensive. According to the address, the prime minister noted that it is important that Russia is not giving up its reforms. The fact that priorities of the reforms are to be slightly changed totally conforms to the Belarusian Government's position.

Moldova

Snegur Discusses Russian Mediation in Dniester, 14th Army

AU2602213194 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 2000 GMT 26 Feb 94

[Text] Chisinau Radio reports that at a news conference, President Mircea Snegur affirmed that he accepts a mediation offer made by Russia in connection with the Dniester problem, provided that Moldova does not put a finalized document on the table. President Mircea Snegur announced that he has received a mediation proposal from Boris Yeltsin and that a Moscow envoy will arrive in Chisinau after tomorrow's parliamentary elections.

Insofar as relations with the CIS are concerned, Snegur expressed the hope that the future parliament will ratify Moldova's adherence to this community, but said that the problem of signing certain accords with it in the area of defense is not in question.

He also added that he wants the Russian 14th Army to begin its withdrawal from the territory of the Republic of Moldova this year.

The ambassador in Moscow, Anatol Taranu, told the INTERFAX agency that at the beginning of March, a working meeting will be held in Chisinau by military experts from Moldova and Russia to clarify the status of

the Russian 14th Army, as well as methods and a timetable for its withdrawal from the territory of Moldova.

He also mentioned that Chisinau will insist on the withdrawal of the 14th Army from Dniester by 1 July. This piece of news was also broadcast by Rossiya radio.

Snegur Previews Elections, Dniester Situation

AU2502212094 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 2000 GMT 25 Feb 94

[Text] During a meeting with foreign journalists, Mircea Snegur, president of the Republic of Moldova, examined the social and political situation in the country on the eve of the 27 February elections and said that it is very unlikely that the elections will fail to produce a majority capable of putting together a new government. He said that, if no consensus is reached, a parliamentary crisis will be solved through democratic means.

Mircea Snegur said that the terms for the withdrawal of the 14th Army cannot be made conditional on granting special legal status to the rayons on the left bank of the Dniester River and added that the secessionists are supported by pro-imperial forces, but that the revitalization of the empire can be ruled out.

The president of the Republic of Moldova reiterated the intention to sign the 'Partnership for Peace' program, after the public opinion poll scheduled for 6 March. Regarding the national army, he ruled out the possibility that it will be liquidated by a decision of the future parliament—our Chisinau correspondent Anca Florea reports, citing the press service of the presidency.

Discusses Electoral Issues

AU2602184594 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 1100 GMT 26 Feb 94

[Text] Early parliamentary elections will be held in Moldova tomorrow, 27 February. Our special correspondents in Chisinau report as follows:

[Begin Anca Florea recording] This morning, Chisinau Radio broadcast an interview granted by President Mircea Snegur. The questions and especially the answers convey the preelectoral picture of the Republic of Moldova. We will try to sum up what he said.

President Snegur assessed that the 27 February elections are linked to the opinion poll on 6 March. The first will create a parliament, the second an answer to a complex question that will form the foundation of the Constitution.

He called on the citizens of the Republic of Moldova to cast their vote urging them not to be indifferent to their fate, although, quote, even a small percentage will ensure the validation of the elections, unquote.

President Snegur expressed the hope that a parliamentary majority will be achieved, which, quote, could work actively, without useless discussions, unquote. Western interest in this country was explained by the President of the Republic of Moldova through the preservation of stability in a conflict area in the past one and a half years, contrary to other areas of conflict in the former Soviet Union, where this was not possible. He added that the separatist tendencies are also of interest, especially for the foreign observers who have arrived in Chisinau.

In connection with future relations with the future parliament, President Snegur said, quote: No parliament will be able to cooperate with the president if it tries to promote a more or less conservative line or to stop the reform process, unquote.

This is why President Snegur emphasizes the need to create a parliamentary majority.

The first event that will follow the elections is the signing of the 'Partnership for Peace' program in Brussels and the signing of the documents on its entry in the CIS, President Mircea Snegur affirmed.

Asked about the participation of the Gagauz people in the elections, the president of the Republic of Moldova affirmed that the differences with the separatists can be solved only through conciliation, quote: I am firmly convinced that solely compromise will help us reestablish the republic's integrity, unquote.

In connection with the current political, economic, and social situation of the Republic of Moldova, President Snegur stated that the people belonging to the nomenklatura are not the only guilty ones. He said, quote: The nomenklatura are those who are working, who are still able to do something, and therefore I do not agree with promoting the idea of only new people. We have had a revolutionary government, a reformist government, and a national reconciliation government. What the revolutionaries achieved in one year can be noted today: Ever since 1990-91 we have been unable to recover our senses because there was only destruction, unquote.

In concluding his interview granted to Chisinau radio stations, President Snegur did not reject the idea of a presidential republic, if necessary, reiterating that without a parliamentary majority there are no prospects.

As a general assessment, President Mircea Snegur said, quote: We have to be optimistic and compare the situation in the Republic of Moldova with the situation in other countries within the area of the former Soviet Union. Being supported by international bodies, we hope that we will elect a parliament which, in cooperation with the presidency, will give an impetus to the positive beginning which exists in the Republic of Moldova. [end recording]

Foreign Observers Visit Dniester, Meet With Smirnov

AU2602204894 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 1800 GMT 26 Feb 94

[Anca Florea report from Chisinau]

[Text] A group of 40 international observers representing the Council of Europe and the CSCE, in the Republic of Moldova to monitor the early parliamentary elections, visited Tiraspol today. The group of observers, of which nine are Romanian parliamentarians, met with Igor Smirnov, president of the self-proclaimed Dniester Republic.

To begin with, Smirnov presented a brief report on the socioeconomic conditions in the area, after which he answered questions asked by the observers.

Among the issues discussed were Dniester citizenship, which, I would like to point out, the separatist authorities attempt to force on the residents on the left bank of the Dniester River, and the use of the Romanian language as a state language; in this connection, I have to remind you of the pressure to which the three Romanian schools in Dniester are subjected—in the past weeks they have been obliged to return to the Cyrillic alphabet. And, of course, the main thing, the Ilascu case.

From the international observers we learned that Igor Smirnov said that Ilascu is, quote, a bandit, unquote, a terrorist about whom our state's laws have made a decision and no one may interfere or disregard the people's will. He also affirmed that due to contradictions between the legislation of the Republic of Moldova and that of the so-called Dniester Republic, Ilie Ilascu's possible election to the Parliament of the Republic of Moldova will not be respected.

According to the same sources, Igor Smirnov's attitude toward the observers representing the CSCE and the Council of Europe was one of detachment and indifference.

Also today, the same group of observers visited polling station No. 1 in Varnita, which is located on the right side of the Dniester River, where from 21 February to this afternoon at 1600 more than 2,000 residents from the other bank, the left bank of the Dniester River, had cast their vote.

First Multiparty Elections Begin

LD2702070794 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 0607 GMT 27 Feb 94

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Valery Demidetsky]

[Text] Chisinau February 27 TASS—The first-ever parliamentary elections on a multi-party basis are being held in Moldova today. Twenty independent candidates and 1,022 candidates from 13 parties and blocs contend for 104 seats in a new parliament.

Numerous public opinion polls taken on the eve of the elections forecast a convincing victory of the Agrarian Democratic Party headed by Parliament Speaker Petr Lucinschi.

Sociologists' view is that success is also expected to be achieved by the Socialist, Social Democratic, and Republican Parties, which, like the Agrarians, strive for Moldova's independence, a fair solution to the Gagauz and Dniester region problems, and for stronger ties with the Commonwealth of Independent States.

They will be opposed by movements which believe that Moldova must unite with Romania. Those movements have a following despite the unpopularity of such slogans in Moldova.

Snegur Votes

LD2702100294 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 0908 GMT 27 Feb 94

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Valeriy Demidetskiy]

[Text] Chisinau February 27 TASS—President Mircea Snegur on Sunday voted "for political forces which strive for Moldova's independence". In an ITAR-TASS interview at a polling station here, Snegur voiced hope that "those forces should form a parliamentary majority capable of leading Moldova out of the crisis and resolving the Gagauz and Dniester problems".

"If this does not happen, agonising attempts will again be made to get agreement between parties in parliament, between the parliament and president", he added.

Two thousand polling stations are functioning in Moldova. Polling will end at 20:00. The first preliminary results are likely to become known late at night.

All the 2,900,000 voters of the country got an opportunity to take part in the polling: on Saturday the Moldovan leadership managed to persuade the Gagauz into giving up the earlier declared boycott and opening polling stations on their territory.

The Dniester authorities refused to open polling stations but promised not to prevent residents from the left bank of the Dniester to cast their votes at special polling stations which had opened on the right bank a week ago.

The polling is being monitored by 150 observers from Euro Council, CSCE, and NATO.

Snegur Hopes for Parliamentary Majority

AU2702145594 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 1100 GMT 27 Feb 94

[Mircea Dascaliuc and Anca Florea report from Chisinau]

[Excerpts] In the course of a discussion I conducted about half an hour ago with Mrs. Raisa Botezatu, vice

president of the Central Electoral Commission, I was given the following information:

In connection with the data centralization system, Mrs. Botezatu told us that from local commissions data are passed on to a technical group, which in turn submits them to the Central Electoral Commission to be processed with the help of computers. Unfortunately, at that time, the Central Electoral Commission did not have any information on the number of participants in the elections. [passage omitted]

Insofar as the east rayons of the Republic of Moldova are concerned, up until yesterday 3,910 out of 400,000 possible voters had crossed the Dniester River to cast their vote.

A total of 2,278,959 citizens were registered in the list and confirmed; this number, however, does not include the voters in the south rayons; nothing was known about them either. So far, Raisa Botezatu told us, 163 foreign observers and more than 5,000 local observers have been accredited.

On the other hand, local special envoys and correspondents of the national radio broadcasting station of the Republic of Moldova report that control at the Dniester River crossing in both directions was particularly strict this morning. All those people who wanted to cross the river were registered. According to the same sources, the number of people who wanted to cast their vote in the course of the week was much higher than today, when local authorities made it difficult to cross the Dniester River.

We also want to inform you that this morning at 0745 [0545 GMT], Mircea Snegur, president of the Republic of Moldova, cast his vote at the Russian-Polish School. According to the national television station, on this occasion he reiterated his hopes that the elections will yield a parliamentary majority.

Yesterday, a completely unforeseen incident occurred. Following yesterday's visit by the international observers, the illegal authorities in Tiraspol confiscated the automobile in which Romanian Senator Adrian Paunescu was traveling and the driver of the automobile was detained. The vehicle is the property of Romania's Senate. Diplomatic sources we contacted told us that the real reasons for this incident are not known. [passage omitted]

Further on Snegur Vote

AU2702212694 Chisinau BASAPRESS in English 1850 GMT 27 Feb 94

[Text] Chisinau, BASAPRESS 27/2/1994—This morning President Mircea Snegur and his wife voted, between the first ten electors, at section No. 2 at Russian general school No. 37 of Chisinau. Asked to comment on his critical attitude towards the opposition, expressed yesterday on television, Snegur replied: "Critical attitude? Have you understood that the critical attitude at yesterday's broadcast was addressed to the opposition? Very well." Asked "can there be any free elections while Dniester is occupied by the 14th Army," the president said "it is a real situation we have at this moment. However, we believe that in the Republic of Moldova elections take place for the first time on the basis of democracy and pluripartitism. In what regards Dniester, the executive took a series of measures to allow citizens in this part of the republic take part in the voting. Nevertheless, if we would be thinking only of this, I mean wait first for the final solution of the Dniester problem and only after that run the elections, we would halt other urgent measures. It is necessary first of all to have a parliament that would contribute to the most urgent solution of Dniester's problem." Snegur declared that yesterday's release of persons who organized the October rebellion in Moscow "is an internal problem of Russians and they will manage without us." Inquired if it is significant that he voted in a Russian school, President Snegur said "with us, electoral sectors, like the lodging place, are not established on ethnic principles. I live in the immediate vicinity of this voting section." Asked by the BASAPRESS reporter about how will things evolve in case there will be no prevailing majority in parliament, Snegur estimated that "it is hard to suppose, but I believe a new hard process will start, with attempts of conciliation and cooperation firstly between parliament factions, then between parliament and presidency. It would be good, however, if we had a majority faction in parliament." Asked why he voted so early and if, in his opinion, enough voters will follow his example, Snegur said "elections will run in an organized manner and with an active participation of electors, and the fact that I came to vote in the very morning is due to my responsibility and because my today's agenda includes many questions. On the other hand, the most pleasant moment for me is meeting my nephew whom I can see only on Sundays."

'High Turnout' Reported

AU2702204994 Chisinau BASAPRESS in English 1850 GMT 27 Feb 94

[Text] Comrat, BASAPRESS 27/2/1994—Some 50 percent of 40,000 eligible voters in Comrat came to vote this morning at the 33 polling centres in this town. Piotr Ivanov, acting secretary of the district Executive committee, told BASAPRESS. Despite forecasts, there was a high turn-out at all polling stations. Ivanov pointed out that the voters did not follow the political games of certain local leaders who called on people not to participate in the elections. Ender Arat, general consul of Turkey in Moldova, arrived in Comrat a day before election day. He called on all political forces and movements during a meeting with local leaders to be reasonable. Also, Arat emphasized the importance of Gagauzians in creating the new Moldovan Parliament.

Partial Results, Preferences Reported

AU2802090494 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 0500 GMT 28 Feb 94

[Anca Florea and Mircea Dascaliuc report from Chisinau]

[Text] On 27 August 1991, the Republic of Moldova proclaimed its independence, thus making a first step outside the Soviet Union and outside the system to which it belonged more than 50 years.

On 27 February 1994, the first multiparty elections were organized, free elections whose final results will undoubtedly exert a tremendous influence on the future of the Republic of Moldova.

Since last night at 2000 [1800 GMT], when the polling stations closed, the Central Electoral Commission has constantly been receiving information from the 1,966 electoral commissions set up throughout the country.

A total of 1,751,278 voters participated in the current elections, representing 73.29 percent of the total electorate. In the east rayons, of the 400,000 citizens entitled to vote, 6,829 citizens of both Dniester and Moldovan citizenship cast their vote.

The Gagauz people participated massively in the elections, so that in the south rayons, where most of them live, the participation rate was 74-98 percent. The lowest participation rate was recorded in the four electoral districts in Chisinau and the city of Balti—somewhat higher than 50 percent.

The latest data provided by the Central Electoral Commission reflect a partial situation based on information gathered up to 0400 [0200 GMT] from the city of Chisinau and the south of the Republic of Moldova. According to this information, the options expressed by vote stand as follows:

For the Agrarian Democratic Party—49.65 percent,

For the Bloc of the Socialist Party and Edinstvo Unity Movement—23 percent;

For the Bloc of Peasants and Intellectuals 7 percent; and

For the Christian Democratic Popular Front Alliance 7 percent.

These partial results, as Chisinau radio commented, could be completed with a general assessment on the situation in the south rayons, where the majority of votes will go to the Bloc of the Socialist Party and Edinstvo Unity Movement.

A summarized review at 0400 [0200 GMT) revealed that the electorate is oriented toward just four political formations, namely the Agrarian Democratic Party, the Socialist Party and Edinstvo Unity Movement, the Christian Democratic Popular Front Alliance, and the Bloc of Peasants and Intellectuals.

We have to specify that the figures presented here will undergo changes, which will be made known to you.

And now my colleague will brief you on the final episode of the incident in Tiraspol yesterday.

The Romanian citizen Ilie Vaduva is outside any danger. Last night he was escorted to Chisinau by two diplomats of the Romanian Embassy. Our country's ambassador, Mr. Marian Enache, told us that he had enjoyed the support of the authorities of the Republic of Moldova in solving this case, together with whom, he hopes, that he will be able to clarify the problem of the automobile of the Romanian Senate that was confiscated in Tiraspol.

Ilie Vaduva expressed his gratitude to the Romanian Embassy in Chisinau, which, through the efforts it made, put an end to this unpleasant incident.

Early Returns 'Sensational'

LD2802093294 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 0640 GMT 28 Feb 94

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Valeriy Demidetskiy]

[Text] Chisinau, February 28 TASS—The early returns of the parliamentary elections in Moldova have proved sensational. Spot calculation of the ballots has shown that the despite forecasts, the coalition of the Socialist Party and International Movement Unity, mainly backed by the Russian-speaking population, are in the lead in Chisinau, some cities and rural districts of the republic

Together with the Agrarian Democratic Party headed by parliament speaker Petr Luchinschi, the socialists are ahead of all the other parties.

Judging by the preliminary results, the opposition in the new parliament will be made up of pro-Romanian coalition of intellectuals and peasants and the Christian Democratic Popular Front, which rank third and fourth but will be unable to for a majority in new parliament.

The above four parties cleared the four-per cent election hurdle and won seats in the new parliament.

If the forecasts based on the preliminary returns materialise, the Agrarian Party will have to team up with the socialists to form a majority in the parliament and form a new government to lead the republic out of the crisis. If this does not happen, "Moldova is in for difficult times", according to Petr Luchinschi.

Agrarian Democratic Party Wins

LD2802093594 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 0858 GMT 28 Feb 94

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Valeriy Demidetskiy]

[Text] Chisinau, 28 Feb—The Agrarian Democratic Party [ADP], led by Petru Lucinschi, speaker of the Moldovan parliament, has won a convincing victory in

Moldova's first parliamentary elections on a multiparty basis, which ended late on Sunday evening.

An ITAR-TASS correspondent learned from reliable unofficial sources that according to preliminary vote counts, the ADP gathered more than 43 percent of votes. In spite of forecasts, an unexpected success was achieved by the bloc of the Socialist Party and the Yedinstvo Intermovement, relying on the support of the Russian-speaking population, which received more than 20 percent of votes. Like the agrarians, this bloc also supports Moldovan independence, a just solution of the Gagauz and Dniester problems, and the strengthening of links with the CIS.

Judging by the preliminary election results, in the new Moldovan parliament their opposition will comprise the Popular Christian Democratic Front, supporting unification with Romania, which received approximately 7 percent of votes, and the bloc of the intelligentsia and peasants, led by Aleksandru Mosanu, ex-speaker of the Moldovan parliament, which gathered approximately 13 percent of the votes.

In the view of observers, these figures indicate that nationalistically oriented parties have won a major victory in the Moldovan elections.

Judging by the preliminary election results, of the 13 parties and movements that took part in the elections, so far only four have managed to pass the 4 percent barrier.

The Central Electoral Commission is still summing up the final results of the voting. However, in the view of party representatives, these are unlikely to differ from the preliminary results.

Kazakhstan

Yeltsin, Nazarbayev Discuss Issues Over Phone

LD2502152094 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1440 GMT 25 Feb 94

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Vladimir Akimov]

[Text] Almaty February 25 TASS—Russian President Boris Yeltsin invited his Kazakh counterpart Nursultan Nazarbayev to pay an official visit to Moscow in the end of March to boost bilateral relations.

The press service of the Kazakh leader said that the invitation was extended during a telephone conversation between the two presidents on Friday and that in Moscow it is planned to sign agreements "which would bring into the practical sphere the solution of many political, economic, military and humanitarian cooperation issues as it is envisaged in the Friendship and Cooperation Treaty between Russia and Kazakhstan".

Earlier the Russian foreign minister said that the issue of the disputed Baykonur cosmodrome is to be solved in Moscow.

The press service also said that Nazarbayev supported Yeltsin's ideas voiced in the message to parliament about the strengthening of the Russian statehood, invariability of the course of democratic transformations and economic reform and, especially, about an active integration in the CIS.

The press service of the Kazakh leader said that the two presidents positively assessed the results of the recent visit of Nazarbayev to the United States.

U.S. Inspectors: International Obligations Being Observed

LD2502160994 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1537 GMT 25 Feb 94

[By KAZTAG correspondent Ivan Zakharchenko for TASS]

[Text] Almaty February 25 TASS—Kazakhstan fully observes its international obligations, U.S. military inspectors told a news conference here today after visiting the Petropavlovsk heavy machine-building plant. The plant used to produce launchers for medium- and shorter-range missiles.

The inspection was made within the framework of the Treaty on Medium- and Shorter-Range Missiles joined by Kazakhstan after disintegration of the former Soviet Union. The republic has a quota on sending its inspectors to the United States and an obligation to admit U.S. representatives to Kazakh facilities liable for inspection.

The inspection was the first of the sort in sovereign Kazakhstan. It was held in an atmosphere of cooperation and mutual respect thanks to the correct stand of the Kazakh Defence Ministry's accompanying team on treaty obligations, said the Americans.

The experts are sure Kazakhstan will continue to fully observe its military obligations.

Tajikistan

Rakhmanov, CSCE Secretary General Discuss Cooperation

LD2502115994 Dushanbe Radio Tajikistan Network in Tajik 0500 GMT 25 Feb 94

[Text] Yesterday, Imamali Rakhmanov, the head of state and Supreme Council chairman of the Republic of Tajikistan received CSCE Secretary General Wilhelm Hoeynck who is on a visit to our republic. The latter is on a visit to some Central Asian states.

Imamali Rakhmanov highly appraised the assistance of the CSCE to Tajikistan in the course of the meeting that was held in an atmosphere of mutual understanding. Imamali Rakhmanov said that the republic is ready to use the assistance of this authoritative international organization to organize democratic structures and develop market economy relations.

Both sides unanimously expressed that cooperation between the CSCE and Tajikistan should be further developed.

Rashid Olimov, the foreign affairs minister of the republic and Karimjon Yuldoshev, the state adviser to the head of state on political and international issues were present at the meeting.

Abdulmadjid Samadov, the chairman of the Council of Ministers of the republic received CSCE Secretary General Wilhelm Hoeynck on the same day. Abdulmadjid Samadov familiarized Wilhelm Hoeynck with the present economic situation in the republic, and pointed out the adherence of the republic to strengthening market economy relations.

CSCE Secretary General William Hoeynck met Foreign Affairs Minister Rashid Olimov on the same day.

Wilhelm Hoeynck gave a news conference for local and foreign journalists after the end of his working visit.

Russian Border Commander Warns Afghan Side Over Shelling

LD2602111894 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1050 GMT 26 Feb 94

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Galina Gridneva]

[Text] Dushanbe February 26 TASS—Lieutenant-General Anatoliy Chechulin, commander of Russian Border Troops in Tajikistan, made a statement on Saturday concerning the growing number of armed provocations from the Afghan territory.

Tajik opposition militants shell both Tajik villages and Russian border posts, says the document circulated by the Information Directorate of the Tajik Foreign Ministry.

For instance, the border village of Parvar, Shuroabad District, which is in the area of operations of the 12th Border Post, Moskovskiy sector, was shelled with rockets for over 40 minutes on February 21.

The eighth border post, Pyandzh River sector, was shelled from trench mortars on the night of February 18. As a result, one Russian guard was killed. There are enough facts indicating that similar provocations are being hatched at other sections of the Tajik-Afghan border.

Taking into account the fact that Afghan authorities have no real possibilities to control and prevent these piratic actions and mindful of repeated statements made by the Tajik Government on its right to take resolute retaliatory measures, I must say that all weapons opening fire across the border will be immediately destroyed in future with the use of all types of arms in the possession of border troops.

The statement stresses that field commanders of Afghan Mujahideen can understand possible consequences of such artillery duels which will only add privations and sufferings to the defenceless population of Afghan border regions.

The general expressed hope that the well-being of their fellow countrymen is worth of bridling the presumptuous chieftains of Tajik armed opposition who do not give a farthing for the life of Afghan citizens providing shelter to them.

"I hope for mutual understanding from leaders caring for their people and am ready to conduct a dialogue within my competence at all levels," the statement concludes.

Foreign Ministry Denies Existence of Concentration Camps

LD2502140894 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1326 GMT 25 Feb 94

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Galina Gridneva]

[Text] Dushanbe February 25 TASS—The Tajik Foreign Ministry has bluntly denied recent reports, appearing in the foreign press with references to the "International Amnesty" human rights organisation, that there are secret concentration camps on the territory of the republic.

Tajik Foreign Ministry's Department Chief Zafar Saidov told a briefing here today that not a single official representative of the foregoing human rights organisation had addressed such information to the Tajik Foreign Ministry or other state bodies over the past six months.

"The leadership of Tajikistan," the diplomat said, "have asked representatives of the mission of permanent U.N. observers, currently visiting the republic, to undertake a fact-finding trip to the spots, where these concentration camps are allegedly located, and to carry out the most careful investigation."

"For its part," Saidov stressed, "the Tajik leadership, which has always honoured all the international human rights acts and which is now busy building a democratic law-government state, believes that no goals can justify the use of tortures, physical violence and other actions humiliating human dignity, about which the foreign mass media have reported.

Supreme Soviet Issues Decree on Regulating TV, Radio

LD2502213394 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1756 GMT 25 Feb 94

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Galina Gridneva]

[Text] Dushanbe February 25 TASS—The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of Tajikistan issued a decree on Friday on the regulation of television and radio broadcasting in Tajikistan. The two industries are now forbidden to use tv or radio time to propagandize or advertise erotic publications or alcoholic or tobacco products. They also may not broadcast programmes which conflict with the republic's national traditions or human moral norms.

In addition, until the adoption of a law on television and radio broadcasting, the draft of which is as yet only supposed to be worked out and discussed by the Supreme Soviet, the all television and radio studios which are not under state control are to be closed down and their wave lengths taken away throughout the entire Republic of Tajikistan.

It was emphasized that the decree was adopted in accordance with many requests received from the population of Tajikistan.

Armenia

Prime Minister, Israeli Ambassador Discuss Economic Ties

NC2502205894 Yerevan Armenia's Radio First Program Network in Armenian 1400 GMT 25 Feb 94

[Text] The Armenian Prime Minister Grant Bagratyan today received the Israeli Ambassador to Armenia Baruch Birenbaun, who also represents his country's interests in Georgia.

Trade and economic cooperation between the two countries were discussed during the meeting. Particular attention was given to the establishment of mutually advantageous ties in banking, agricultural, and energy, the basis for which has already been laid during meetings between Armenian and Israeli experts.

The ambassador handed a letter to Prime Minister Grant Bagratyan from the Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhaq Rabin. The latter affirmed the Israeli government's readiness and interest in developing Armenian-Israeli ties.

Baruch Birenbaun reiterated that he will exert every effort to speed up the establishment of economic, cultural, and scientific ties between the two countries.

Arman Kirakosyan, Armenian first deputy foreign minister; Vasili Gazaryan, head of the foreign relations department of the Council of Ministers; and other officials were present at the meeting.

British MP Calls Azerbaijan 'Aggressor' in Karabakh

NC2502200994 Yerevan SNARK in English 0556 GMT 25 Feb 94

[Text] Yerevan, February 24 (SNARK)—"Five factors, at least, can prove that Azerbaijan is an aggressor in the Karabakh conflict", Caroline Cox, the British Parliament's vice-speaker of Great Britain, said today to the SNARK reporter before her leaving for London.

She said, firstly, it was Azerbaijan that together with the former Soviet 4th Army carried out the forcible deportation of thousands of Karabakh Armenians in the spring and summer of 1991. Secondly, as she went on, it was Azerbaijan which imposed fierce economic blockades on Armenia and Karabakh that are gross violations of human rights. Thirdly, it was Azerbaijan which first used weapons of indiscriminate destruction against Karabakh civilian people, including Grad multiple-missile rocket launchers, that Baroness Cox witnessed herself while visiting Stepanakert. Fourthly, only Azerbaijan has used aerial bombardment of Karabakh populated areas. And, fifthly, only Azerbaijan has used ground-to-air missiles against civilians.

As Baroness Cox affirmed, all these ways were used by Azerbaijan to drive out completely Armenians from Karabakh. She reminded of former Azerbaijan President Elchibey's words: "If there is a single Armenian living in Nagorno-Karabakh in October, the people of Azerbaijan can take me and hang me in the central square of Baku". It is hard to find more convincing proofs of Azerbaijan leadership's real intentions, she concluded.

Yerevan Urged To Ratify Treaty on Status of Russian Troops

LD2602092194 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1814 GMT 25 Feb 94

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Tigran Liloyan]

[Text] Yerevan, 25 Feb—Armenia should ratify the treaty concluded with Russia in 1992 on the legal status of the Russian Federation Armed Forces on the territory of the republic, says a statement by the republican leadership of the Ramkavar-Azatakan Party of Armenia [name as received], published here today. The statement by this liberal democratic party says that the Russian Parliament ratified this document exactly a year ago, but meanwhile, it has not yet been examined by the Supreme Council of Armenia.

Stressing the importance of Armenian-Russian mutual relations, the leadership of the Ramkavar-Azatakan Party of Armenia expresses anxiety regarding the Armenian Supreme Council's delay in ratifying the treaty. The party's faction in the Supreme Council of Armenia will seek to have this issue included in the republican Supreme Council's agenda, the statement says.

The treaty was signed in Moscow on 21 August 1992 by Russian and Armenian Presidents Boris Yeltsin and Levon Ter-Petrosyan. It settles questions pertaining to the presence on Armenian territory of units and formations of Russian Armed Forces.

Military Situation 'Relatively Peaceful'

NC2502202394 Yerevan Radio Yerevan in Azeri 1430 GMT 25 Feb 94

[Text] No significant change took place at the front lines during the past two days. The confrontation has been mainly in the form of positional fighting. The disputing sides have refrained from carrying out intensive combat operations.

The Nagorno-Karabakh Republic [NKR] Defense Headquarters has disclosed that heavy artillery, Grad rocket launchers, and mortars in the eastern part of Agdamskiy Rayon pounded Armenian positions around Salakhly, Chengerli, Novruzlu, and Marzili from 0700 to 0800 on 24 February. The NKR artillery units were forced to open fire. Two enemy fire emplacements were destroyed.

Meanwhile, the NKR intelligence units have established that Azerbaijan is massing reinforcements and military equipment in various parts of the eastern front line.

The Azerbaijani military units have fired on the Armenian defense positions in Mardakertskiy Rayon. However, the situation at other parts of the confrontation lines between the NKR and Azerbaijan has been relatively peaceful. Several observers believe that tension is subsiding at the battlefronts.

Tension continues to exist on the border between Armenia and Azerbaijan. However, the situation is relatively peaceful. Provocative activities have been carried out on the Azerbaijani side of the border from time to time.

The Armenian Ministry of Defense press service has disclosed that the situation was peaceful on the entire border between Armenia and Azerbaijan from last night until this afternoon. However, the Azerbaijani military forces fired on Berkaber and (?Kirants) in Idzhevanskiy Rayon with various types of arms last night. No one was hurt. The Armenian border guards were forced to carry out retaliatory operations.

Azerbaijan

Aliyev in London, Comments on Karabakh

NC2402200094 Baku TURAN in English 1845 GMT 24 Feb 94

[Text] Moscow (February 24) TURAN—Azerbaijani President Aliyev delivered a speech at London's Royal Institute of International Relations, reports TURAN's Moscow's correspondent according to the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Moscow officials attentively observed several moments of President Aliyev's speech. In particular, President Aliyev mentioned that Azerbaijan is willing to consider the deployment of international peacemaking forces, under the auspices of the CSCE, on its territory. This can take place only after a complete withdrawal by Armenian troops from Azerbaijani territory.

A source in the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs reports that Russian troops will form the backbone of the peacemaking forces. Moscow's observers believe that since NATO and CSCE are totally preoccupied with the settlement of the Bosnian problem, they are unlikely to have the strength and means to put into place a peacemaking mission in the zone of the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict.

Russian defense minister mentioned that beginning on March 1, Russia will begin implementation of its peace plan for the settlement of the Karabakh conflict. This plan provides for bringing Russian peacemaking troops into the zone of the Armenian-Azerbaijan conflict.

Addressing the Royal Institute, President Aliyev mentioned that Armenians of Nagorno Karabakh full rights equal to those of Azerbaijani citizens and their security is guaranteed by the Constitution of the country.

In addition, President Aliyev said that Baku will begin discussions over the status of Nagorno-Karabakh. But it is connected with the complete withdrawal of Armenian armed forces from all occupied territories of Azerbaijan, including Nagorno-Karabakh, said President Aliyev. The observers of the Russian Defense Ministry noted that Azerbaijan does not exclude the possibility of exchange of territory with Armenia. In his speech President Aliyev said that issue concerning the exchange of "corridors" was repeatedly put forth long ago. But if such a necessity arises, we will resume discussion of this matter again, mentioned Aliyev. As known, in 1991 American politologist, Paul Goble, put forward a proposal concerning the exchange of corridors which connects Azerbaijan with Nakhichevan and Nagorno-Karabakh. At that time, Armenia and Azerbaijan rejected this variant.

Returns From London

NC2602211494 Baku TURAN in English 1657 GMT 26 Feb 94

[Text] Baku (February 26) TURAN—Late at night on February 26 President Geydar Aliyev returned from an official visit to London.

As reported, during the visit Geydar Aliyev met with the leadership of Great Britain. Treaty on Friendship and Cooperation, as well as a packet of protocols about the intentions were signed.

At London press conference on February 24 Geydar Aliyev assessed the visit as a "successful".

Commenting on the treaty, signed in Moscow by Defense Ministers of Azerbaijan and Armenia, Geydar Aliyev said that "this document infringes upon Azerbaijan's interests, but we signed it for the sake of peaceful regulation of the conflict".

Answering the question of the journalists about the perspectives of peaceful regulation of Armenian-Azeri conflict, Aliyev said "we adhere to the peaceful regulation, but the recent reports about the Armenian offensive on Tauzskiy region of Azerbaijan testify that Armenia is not ready for the peaceful regulation of the conflict". Aliyev also said that "in the light of the new Armenian attack upon the territory of Azerbaijan, the prospects of signing a long-termed peace agreement becomes hardly probable".

Result of Defense Ministers Meeting Uncertain

NC2602133094 Baku TURAN in English 1539 GMT 25 Feb 94

[Text] Baku, February 25 (TURAN)—"It is early to speak about the results of the meeting between Defense Ministers of Armenia and Azerbaijan", said the leader of press service of Azerbaijan Defense Ministry, Azad Isazade.

He said that both parties acknowledged their positions during the meeting. The conditions of Azerbaijan remained the same: cease-fire must be preceded by withdrawal of Armenian armed units from the territory of Azerbaijan. Until now this problem is left unsolved.

Isazade mentioned that presently the representatives of Defense Ministries of both countries maintain contacts. The terms of the truce and withdrawal of troops will be defined at the forthcoming meeting of the Presidents of Armenia and Azerbaijan. The functions will be divided as follows: Azerbaijan will have to cease hostilities along the whole front line, Armenia will have to leave all occupied territories of Azerbaijan outside of Nagorno-Karabakh, Russia will have to observe the implementation of the concluded agreements. The fate of Shusha and Lachin is unknown. This problem is expected to be settled during the forthcoming meeting of the presidents of Azerbaijan and Armenia in Moscow.

Having occupied the biggest in Nagorno-Karabakh Azeri city of Shusha, in May 1992, Armenian units completed the process of ethnic cleansing in the region. Having seized neighbouring with Shusha and Gorisskiy region of Armenia, Lachin town, Armenian units received the corridor connecting Nagorno-Karabakh with Armenia.

Armenian Request for Time To Withdraw Viewed

NC2502160894 Baku Radio Baku International Service in Azeri 1300 GMT 25 Feb 94

[Unattributed commentary: "Armenians Want Time To Withdraw"]

[Text] Talks have been held in Moscow on a cease-fire agreement to end Armenia's aggression against Azerbaijan. The Armenian side in the talks, which were held between the Armenian and Azerbaijani defense ministers with Russian Defense Minister Pavel Grachev in Moscow, asked for time to withdraw the Armenian forces from the territories they have occupied in Azerbaijan.

Reliable sources have said that Azerbaijan Defense Minister Mamed-Rafi Mamedov held talks with Armenian Defense Minister Serzh Sargisyan in the presence of Pavel Grachev. The two sides agreed on the conclusion of a cease-fire agreement. The Azerbaijani side stressed that the withdrawal of Armenians from the territories they have occupied is essential for the success of the agreement. The Armenian side responded by asking for 10 days for the withdrawal of their troops. However, the Azerbaijani side agreed to a period of two days.

Russia proposed to dispatch observers to Karabakh on the last day of the talks. However, Azerbaijan rejected that proposal.

Apparently, the Armenians, who have been quickly retreating in the face of recent Azerbaijan National Army attacks, have decided to call for a cease-fire in order to gain time. That is why they have asked for 10 days.

Several reliable sources have said that the Armenians are trying to gain time though dilatory tactics in order to receive aid from Russia and other countries and reorganize their military forces.

Foreign Minister Gasanov Visits Germany

NC2702195294 Baku Radio Baku Network in Azeri 1700 GMT 27 Feb 94

[Text] The Azerbaijan Ministry of Foreign Affairs Press Service has announced that Foreign Minister Gasan Gasanov has arrived in Germany on an official visit. Gasanov was invited to visit that country by Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel.

In a statement to Radio Liberty, the German ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary in Azerbaijan said that Gasanov and Kinkel will hold talks on the mutual cooperation between Germany and Azerbaijan in various fields. They will also discuss the situation in the region, how to end the dispute between Azerbaijan and Armenia, and [words indistinct]. The ambassador said that during their talks with Gasanov, the German officials will maintain the view that the dispute between Azerbaijan and Armenia should be resolved within the CSCE framework. He also stressed that the two foreign ministers are expected to sign an agreement on the safeguarding of Germany's interests in Azerbaijan and Azerbaijan's interests in Germany. In general, the prospects of mutual cooperation between Germany and Azerbaijan in various fields have inspired hope for the future.

Agreement Signed With Turkmenistan on Natural Gas

NC2502154094 Baku Radio Baku Network in Azeri 1900 GMT 24 Feb 94

[Text] An agreement has been signed in Ashgabat on sending 2.3 billion cubic meters of natural gas to Azerbaijan in 1994. In a statement to an AZERTAC correspondent, Zeynalov, vice president of the Azergas Company [Azerbaijan Natural Gas Company], said that Azerbaijan planned to receive 3 billion cubic meters of natural gas. The supply will be a little less because of Turkmenistan's request that we repay 700 million cubic meters of the natural gas we wish to buy in the form of diesel oil. However, there is a great demand for diesel oil in Azerbaijan. In view of this, we were unable to agree to that proposal. The sides are currently working to change the agreement. Our republic will receive another 700 million cubic meters of natural gas if an agreement is reached on repaying that amount with other products.

Zeynalov also said that Azerbaijan received 6.3 million cubic meters of natural gas from Turkmenistan on 22 February.

Military Said To Destroy 38 Armenian 'Chemical Projectiles'

NC2602165694 Baku Azerbaycan Radio Televiziyasi Television Network in Azeri 0930 GMT 24 Feb 94

[Text] Azerbaijan has disclosed that the Azerbaijan military forces have destroyed 38 chemical projectiles since the beginning of the clashes in Karabakh. The projectiles were fired by the Armenian military forces against the northern part of Karabakh.

Georgia

Shevardnadze Statement on Georgian-Abkhaz Talks

LD2602161294 Tbilisi Radio Tbilisi Network in Georgian 1310 GMT 26 Feb 94

[Statement by Eduard Shevardnadze, the head of state and Supreme Council chairman; place and date not given—read by announcer]

[Text] The third round of talks held in Geneva on the comprehensive settlement of the Abkhazian conflict has ended without success. Although through efforts taken by the Georgian party, the United Nations, and the Russian federation there appeared hopes that a consent could be reached over the return of refugees and the political statute of Abkhazia within the Georgian borders, the Gudauta group again took a destructive and uncompromising position thus, actually, failing the talks and making the situation extremely tense.

I consider it necessary to remind the world community that Abkhazian separatists have perfidiously violated agreements signed by them three times. This was nothing else but a disgraceful disregard of fundamental norms of civilized behavior. Regardless of these unacceptable activities of the Gudauta group, and in order to avoid further bloodshed, the Georgian side spared no efforts to use all possible means for the peaceful settlement of the conflict. In this respect, significant assistance was received from the United Nations Organization, the Russian Federation, the CSCE, and the Group of Georgia's Friends [a US-based group that includes former political figures Shultz, Baker, and others]. I cannot help thanking them for all they did in order that a settlement of the conflict by political means would become possible.

It is regrettable that in response to their efforts the Gudauta group launched a new wave of genocide of Georgians, the tragic effect of which we are already facing. Hundreds of people were killed and injured, while 15,000 joined those 300,000 refugees who were forced to abandon the land of their ancestors in order to avoid death. The Abkhazian separatists have again ignored universally accepted norms and did not permit a group of UN observers, including the head of the group, General (Videkaar), to go to Gali Rayon and give an appropriate assessment of the events taking place there. I believe that this scandalous act was not followed by an adequate reaction from international organizations and the whole world community. Fundamental international norms were disregarded and all this cannot be left unpunished if we are aspiring to build a just and harmonious world.

Despite all the abovementioned, the Georgian leadership regarded it possible to participate in the following meeting in Geneva in order to completely use even the smallest opportunity to settle the Abkhazian conflict peacefully.

It is evident that the Gudauta side failed the talks with the aim to exterminate or drive a small part of the Georgian population still remaining there out of Abkhazia, make the return of refugees impossible, and cut them off from their motherland Abkhazia forever.

The situation is extremely tense today. I can declare with all responsibility that in case the negotiating parties, the UN Security Council, and the Russian Federation fail to find the fastest way to come out of the crisis, a spontaneous explosion and renewal of large-scale combat operations will be unavoidable. This will be followed by a bloodshed the scale and cruelty of which will exceed everything witnessed by the much suffered land so far. The events will develop spontaneously and it will be impossible to keep them under control.

Therefore, we do agree to an immediate continuation of negotiations. I, personally, am ready to visit the UN Security Council, meet the UN secretary general, his plenipotentiary envoy, the leadership of the Russian Federation, and representatives of friendly countries in order that the catastrophic effects that will certainly follow the failure of the Geneva talks are avoided.

A dialogue that will be held in Washington and New York during my official visit to the United States following President Clinton's invitation will have to provide a substantial contribution to a political settlement of the Abkhazian conflict.

Says West, Russia Agree on Abkhazia

LD2702214194 Tbilisi First Program Television Network in Georgian 1900 GMT 27 Feb 94

["Excerpt" of address by Head of State Eduard Shevardnadze to a meeting of the Citizens Union party on 26 February; place not given—recorded]

[Text] Our prime concern is Abkhazia, our return to Abkhazia, and the resolution of the Samachablo [South Ossetia] issue.

Unfortunately, the Geneva meeting [Georgian-Abkhaz talks held 22-25 February] ended without result. Even so, one important thing happened there. When there was talk about Abkhazia's status—we should also make compromises—the positions of our delegation, the Russian delegation, UN representatives, and our friends—the United States, France, and Germany—coincided. This is very important.

It also emerged that separatism is what it is and that a different language would probably be necessary in talking to them. Not only at our level, but also at the Security Council, in Russia and elsewhere. This was very important as far as political settlement and political solution are concerned. By the way, speaking about status, we found Russia's Constitution and experience, as well as the world experience, rather useful.

Anyway, the fact that our positions coincided gives us an opportunity to work more actively.

To tell you the truth, what interests me most in my visit to the United States is to establish relations with the IMF, the World Bank and, especially, to visit the Security Council. I do not rule out the possibility that a Security Council meeting may be held on 8 or 9 March in which I will participate, provided we succeed in having this issue included in the agenda. Then, it is possible that the issue of peacekeeping forces will be decided.

Chief Negotiator Comments

LD2702214594 Tbilisi First Program Television Network in Georgian 1900 GMT 27 Feb 94

[Text] [Announcer] The Georgian delegation [to Abkhaz-Georgian talks] returned to Tbilisi from Geneva yesterday. Today our correspondent met the leader of the delegation, Jaba Ioseliani. We now present an excerpt from an interview which will be shown fully after this information program.

[Begin recording] [Ioseliani] We knew from the outset that they would not agree to talks. Well, they would agree to talks, but they would not sign anything. We knew this very well. We were meeting them anyway, so that the world would know who we are dealing with, what their demands are and what they want.

This is because people abroad do not understand what is happening. We are five million, while they are 70 [thousand]. How can they have done anything at all? We must be the culprits.

This is because they are using everything, while we are not using anything. If they were in our position, they would trumpet their cause abroad, they would shout, cry and all that. We are not doing this.

We knew the (?situation) very well and acted little by little. Still, they find it hard to understand the situation. There have been three meetings, right? British, Americans—our friends were there. They were sympathetic, but they also thought that we must be saying something wrongly. They thought: not everything is as they [Georgians] say. When there are two parties, both must be guilty of something. That is how it is in general.

But after they saw it this time, they went almost mad. Look what kind of people they [Abkhazians] are, they said, [words indistinct]. I did not say a word; I sat quiet.

Are you really giving them autonomy, they asked us.

Of course, we are, I said.

But what else do they [Abkhazians] want, they asked.

Ask them what they want, I said. [end recording]

Failure Blamed on Georgian Position

LD2502223094 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1625 GMT 25 Feb 94

[ITAR-TASS correspondent Vadim Byrkin]

[Text] Moscow, 25 Feb—The third round of talks to settle the Abkhazia-Georgia conflict, sponsored by the UN and SCSE and with Russia as mediator, ended today in Geneva without the signing of a final document. ITAR-TASS was told by the press service of the plenipotentiary representative of the Republic of Abkhazia in Moscow that the talks dealt with peace guarantees in the region, return of refugees, and Abkhazia's political status.

The Abkhazian side put the failure to sign a final document down to the Georgian delegation's "uncompromising position" over a political status for Abkhazia. According to the press service, this status amounts in essence to the relationship of imperial center and colony, a lack of desire to accept current realities. This toughening of the Georgian government's stance is attributed by Abkhazia to "the signing of a treaty with Russia and hopes that Russian troops will police Abkhazia, and also an attempt by certain circles in the West to preserve the Shevardnadze regime".

Despite the difficult nature of the talks, it was decided to continue the search for a political solution to the Abkhazia-Georgia conflict.

Abkhaz Official on Russian-Georgian Treaty

LD2702095594 Moscow Mayak Radio Network in Russian 0700 GMT 27 Feb 94

[Text] Vladislav Ardzinba, the Supreme Soviet chairman of Abkhazia, has expressed his fear that the realization of documents on the Russian-Georgian Treaty on Friendship and Cooperation which was signed would start, irrespective of the ratification of this treaty. Ardzinba underlined that he has already received information that the fulfillment of these documents has in fact started.

Talks With Armenian Leaders Focus on Gas Supplies

LD2402175394 Moscow Mayak Radio Network in Russian 1200 GMT 24 Feb 94

[Text] Our correspondent in Armenia, Karun Khumaryan, is here now with news from Armenia:

[Begin Khumaryan recording] For the fourth day running there has been no traffic on the railway linking Armenia with Georgia; no electric power is being supplied to the section between Tbilisi and Sadokhlo—this

is the last station of the Georgian section of the railway. Georgia's authorities explain the standstill of traffic by an accident at the Gardabani power station. Of course, this is a more than objective reason. But, after all, in the Georgian ports of Batumi and Poti cargo intended for Armenia, including food such as flour, oil, sugar, are traditionally unloaded.

A meeting between Georgia's Prime Minister Otar Patsatsia, who has arrived in Armenia, and President Levon Ter-Petrosyan and Premier Grant Bagratyan, was devoted to the question of the normalization of the operation of the railway and the transit supply of Turkmenian gas across Georgia to Armenia. President Levon Ter-Petrosyan also told representatives of the diplomatic corps accredited in Yerevan of the difficult situation which has arisen in Armenia because of the traffic on the southern section of the Georgian Railway grinding to a halt. Touching on this meeting, Vahan Papazyan, the republic's Foreign Minister, stated at the latest briefing: I don't think that the meeting with the diplomats will produce immediate results, but something will be done, because it is not advantageous to any of the countries whose representatives attended the meeting for there to be an unstable situation in Armenia and Georgia. The Minister also said, and I am now quoting from the "Armenian Republic" newspaper: Georgia, availing itself of its convenient geographic situation, is bringing pressure to bear on Armenia. In turn, other neighbors of ours are pressuring Georgia into bringing pressure to bear on Armenia. But, thanks to the fact that we have a positive balance with Turkmenistan—and that to date we should be receiving 12 million cubic meters of natural gas per 24 hours—Armenia agrees to sell half of its gas to Georgia so that it take upon itself the delivery of cargo from the ports of Poti and Batumi to our country. Georgia proved unprepared for this proposal of ours, and Patsatsia has returned to Georgia for consultations.

It is difficult to say how long these consultations will last, but one thing is clear: Without a railway link with the outer world Armenia will find it exceedingly difficult to live.

Estonia

President Meri Delivers 24 Feb Anniversary Speech

WS2502170094 Tallinn Ministry of Foreign Affairs Press Release in English 1205 GMT 25 Feb 94

[Speech by President Lennart Meri on the occasion of the 76th anniversary of the Republic of Estonia, in the "Estonia" Concert Hall on 24 February—received via Internet E-LIST]

[Text] Your Excellencies,

Honored members of the Riigikogu [parliament] and the Government,

Dear compatriots in Estonia and throughout the world.

Firstly permit me to congratulate you on the occasion of the 76th anniversary of the Republic of Estonia, and to thank you for the support which you have expressed to the Republic of Estonia on the occasion of today's anniversary - not only by letter and telegram, but also in your conversations and handshakes. These radiate hope - yet also concern, satisfaction about what has been achieved - yet heartache about what has not been achieved, a dignified confidence of a free people - yet an uncertainty, a willingness to make sacrifices - as well as the anxious question: For how much longer? How long will we be able to sacrifice ourselves, to feed ourselves on this immense longing for independence, which we accumulated into our hearts during the long night that was the fifty years of Soviet occupation?

Are these the first signs of weariness?

No, we are not weary, and we will not become weary. We have never tired, throughout the seven centuries, of carrying our country within ourselves, and therefore we will not tire seven months before the last of the foreign troops leave the holy soil of Estonia. No, it is rather impatience, which has been born of suffering. It is rather our illusionary optimism, that once totalitarian communism collapses, all our longings and wishes will magically come true. Fifty years outside Europe, outside the practicality of democratic politics, which daily teaches people the balance between rights and duties - has taught us only how to circle our wagons for protection, how to personally survive, the stealthy avoidance of the commands and instructions coming from the capital of the colonial empire. Our romantic optimism has been, and is still, a nurturing source, which has nurtured, and still nurtures, the dangerous illusion that the restoration of an independent state should be simple and speedy.

A nation is not born simply nor speedily. Even before I entered politics, when I spoke to you, my dear compatriots, in the language of a writer, I quoted Churchill, saying that the road we have chosen demands blood, toil, tears and sweat from all of us. The world can be proud of Estonia, because everything we have achieved in our 76 years has been achieved with hard work and patience, sweat and toil, but without a drop of blood being spilled, as is characteristic of a lawful nation. Today, standing here before you in this historic hall, I can assure you that our major difficulties are behind us, but that new trials await us. These, too, we will overcome if we unite our forces and abilities, instead of fragmenting them; if we soberly assess how much has been done and how much is yet to be done; and what is most important: No matter how many differing opinions there are between our political parties, and in ourselves, that the Estonian's calm confidence and friendly desire to cooperate must rise above all this, and unite us into a Republic of Estonia, of which we can be proud.

1. The Estonian Nation and Its People

The Constitution adopted by referendum declared the steadfast will of the Estonian people to safeguard and develop their nation. A nation which is founded on liberty, justice and law. A nation which defends internal and external peace.

It would now be an appropriate time to say that culture is politics, and politics is culture.

Culture is politics because it is primarily in culture where the national identity becomes apparent - identity is a necessary element, a substance which is difficult to describe, but from which nations are born.

Politics is culture primarily because the ultimate aim of politics is to defend the individual, to assist the individual to determine and deepen the characteristics of a person. The primary characteristic of a person is the phenomenon: That a person does not exist outside a culture.

The Estonian people have therefore created a nation for themselves. The supreme power of the state is held by the people. The state must secure the development of all the people, as well as the opportunity of every person for self-fulfillment. The mechanism for this is determined by the Constitution as the separate and balanced supreme bodies of state power - the Riigikogu, the Government of the Republic, the court system, with the President of the Republic as the balancing factor. During the last year, the supreme bodies of state power have been formed and have begun operations. The Riigikogu has done an enormous amount of work, and to date, as we heard in the speech by the Speaker of the Riigikogu Mr. Ulo Nugis, at the flag-raising ceremony this morning, the Riigikogu has adopted one-fifth of the body of legislation, and has therefore created a working legislative basis. All the components are there. But the total of this is not yet a state - at least not such a state, which has the usual characteristics of European nations.

And so we are confronted by a paradoxical problem.

The Estonian people, who have been liberated from a colonial yoke, have more idealism, more willingness to sacrifice in the name of freedom, than the peoples of

welfare states, who lack our tragic historical experience. Despite this, there is an increase in a skeptical attitude towards the Riigikogu and the Government. Demeaning law and order, the police in particular, has become almost a competition. The mentality of the Soviet-era serf-worker, which we have thrown out via the door, is now creeping in through the window - the attitude of: It's the master's rope, let it run loose.

Citizens do not understand the balance between their rights and obligations.

At this stage, my dear compatriots, we should ask: Is this the way to build the Estonian nation?

2. Post-Communist Nightmare

Let us try to soberly analyze the reasons for this problem.

My learned colleagues in the West see the reasons for the collapse of the Soviet totalitarian regime in the command economy. They say, this system was biased towards the armaments industry of the Soviet Union and simply collapsed due to the excessive burden.

This simplified explanation is only partially true. Rather, it is completely erroneous. The Soviet totalitarian regime was taken to the extreme. It commanded not so much the economy, but peoples' ability to think, the creativity of people. The ceiling for people's creativity was determined by the low ceiling of the Politburo's thinking prowess. The most tragic result of this was the complete and final liberation of people, the liberation of people from their heaviest burden—the obligation to think, to make independent decisions, and to bear the responsibility of their decisions.

In restoring our nation and economy, we must also simultaneously restore the citizen who thinks and voluntarily takes responsibility, because democracy can only be based on such a citizen. And only a thinking citizen comprehends the unavoidable dangers of belittling the Estonian nation: Economic success itself does not guarantee the security of the nation, and following on from this, does not guarantee the continued existence of a state, of the people, their language and culture, and, therefore, the continued existence of the world. Estonian society is currently resolving the problems of its own re-organization, a process that only few Western academics can appreciate. The transition to democracy and a free market economy is like a leap across a crevice: The feet no longer rest on the steep cliff edge, but they have not yet landed on the other side. This instant of unsupportedness, this moment, this frightening uncertainty, has brought about chaotic phenomena in our society and, if these tendencies persist, they could open a Pandora's box.

3. Let's Restore Order

I see crime as the prime domestic threat. Performances in the theater begin at 5 pm. because people are afraid of walking on the streets in the dark. Even during daylight people are afraid of walking in the park. People are afraid of country roads. People are afraid of a knock on their door. Estonians do not feel secure in their own country. This is only one step away from a nostalgic longing for the past, and of alienation from the state, when we prefer to peek out from behind the curtains in the evenings. If crime rules the streets and the stairwells, we must be honest and say: Estonia is approaching dual power. A year ago, at a meeting on state security on February 25, I indicated that our priority is to guarantee security for our population. I am very concerned that today, a year later, this task is even more important. There are many reasons for this: Firstly, lack of security may keep foreign investors away, because nothing will attract investors to a region of high risk; secondly, it places in doubt our trustworthiness as a partner; thirdly, it opens Pandora's box - the yearning for a strong hand. The recent rash proposal by some adventurers to use state terror to fight crime shames the Republic of Estonia.

From this podium, allow me to assure you: There is no fertile ground for either left or right wing extremism in Estonia. There is no fertile ground for the use of a "strong hand" in Estonia. But we have to reach consensus on strengthening features of our state which have become blurred. Let our first and common priority for the following year be to restore order. This is not a call to arms. This is the second article of our Constitution which guarantees basic rights, liberties and duties. Our principal right, our thousand year old right, has been, and is, to have a safe home in Estonia. No more, but not an inch less.

Nobody should waver from this goal. The establishment of order must start from the grassroots and end with the ministers. Here it is suitable to use the words of John Kennedy: Don't ask what your country can do for you, but what you can do for your country. And let us not forget that the Constitution and the rights derived from it can and should be defended only through legal means and with legal arguments.

4. National Security

The aforementioned forces me to discuss priorities.

A controlled border is one of the main features of a state.

I regret that negotiations with the Russian Federation have been progressing at a snail's pace. I am nevertheless convinced that the Russian Federation will fulfil the obligation that it has undertaken and that it will withdraw its armed forces from the Republic of Estonia by August 31st. In reference to this, I am pleased to recall that last year President Yeltsin based his congratulations on the 75-year continuity of the Republic of Estonia. During his visits to Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary, President Yeltsin distanced himself from the aggressive foreign policy of the former Soviet Union in a way that also corresponds to our hopes. Despite all this, we have preferred to build up our defense forces at the expense of effective border control.

Now we are suffering the consequences of this decision. The loss of the feeling of security and the rise in organized crime is a direct consequence of this miscalculation. If the Republic of Estonia becomes a corridor of illegitimate trade of human beings, radioactive scrap metal, precious stones and who knows what else, it will add international security problems to our domestic ones. The international community will have difficulty regarding the Republic of Estonia as a trustworthy partner and will find it difficult to integrate her into the collective security system. A controlled border should be understood here as a feature of the state, and not as some kind of Asiatic iron curtain, the task of which is to separate the Russian Federation from Europe. The foreign policy of the Republic of Estonia has always been open, open to all of the states with which we share common democratic ideals. Rapid integration is taking place in today's changing world. In a small country like Estonia, we must integrate our domestic and foreign policy into one Republic of Estonia security policy. That concept is based upon equitable economic integration, upon concentric circles, where the first circle is the Baltic states, the next the Baltic Sea states and the European Union. No matter how far away the goal may be, the time factor is stalking us like a bad dream. Like Alice in Wonderland, we have to run fast to stay in the one place, in order that we may survive. Up until now we have accomplished this, even if it has been through great effort and with great sacrifice. The highest price was paid by our older generations, our pensioners who have given life to the people, have brought them up and have fed them with the hope for independence. Now it is our time to say: Independence is not born, and will not live, merely through longing. Independence endures and grows stronger, if longing and will marry. Much depends upon will, and in difficult times everything depends upon it.

In Osterby village in Swedish north-western Estonia, Adeele Paavelt sat on the edge of her bed and knitted a pair of socks as an Independence Day present for an unknown soldier in the defense forces of the Republic of Estonia. Many decades ago she also knitted socks for her husband, who lies buried in Siberian earth. Now Adeele Paavelt asks you, my dear compatriots, have you knitted socks for the soldier boys. She has not run out of longing and will. Adeele Paavelt is 94 years old. We remain in her debt, and she remains our example. I hope that in ninety-four years time, someone will say the same words about our generations.

President on Priority of Baltic Cooperation

WS2502190394 Tallinn BNS in English 1327 GMT 25 Feb 94

[Text] Tallinn, Feb 25, BNS—Cooperation between the Baltic states is at present one of Estonia's first priorities, said President Lennart Meri in an interview to the Lithuanian RESPUBLIKA newspaper.

"If our cooperation is limited to questions of security systems or foreign policy, everything may remain at the level of mere rhetoric," Meri noted. He said the Baltic states must realize that, under their geopolitical conditions, issues of security and foreign policy can be solved only if they have a common economic basis.

In Meri's opinion, the Baltic states' cooperation must proceed from integrating their energy systems, which would set them free from dependence on Russia.

"Realization of our independence would allow us to regard Russia in a considerably friendlier light," the Estonian president stated.

Foreign Minister Concerned Over Yeltsin Address

LD2502180594 Tallinn Radio Tallinn Network in Estonian 1700 GMT 25 Feb 94

[Text] Commenting on the Russian president's address at the Russian parliament yesterday, Estonian Foreign Minister Juri Luik said that it had not recalled the need to withdraw troops from the Baltic states by 31 August. The foreign minister said that on several occasions the so-called protection of Russians' rights had been mentioned, and these are not the generally accepted human rights that are the case here but the rights of Russians. A threatening voice was used repeatedly in the course of the speech, firm and tough action was promised in protection of those rights. Russia did not make a reference to international law. Instead, she takes the liberty to interfere in the domestic affairs of others whenever she sees fit.

Luik is worried about the Russian president's (?statement) that regarding relations with the West there have been concessions made unilaterally, [word indistinct] in respect of the state budget. It seems that the idea of dismantling the totalitarian war machine has been abandoned and it is considered important to restore it.

[Words indistinct] that part of the speech devoted to Europe. The impression is that there is no desire to accept the standards that exist in Europe; instead, there is a desire to rework them. Such an approach is incomprehensible to Estonia. Estonia is fully satisfied with a Europe based on a market economy and a policy of consensus. It emerges quite clearly what Russia's interests are. It remains completely unclear, though, how Russia plans to consider other countries' interests, said Foreign Minister Luik.

Latvia

Chief of Defense Forces Participates in NATO Training

WS2502202494 Riga DIENA in Latvian 14 Feb 94 p 1

[Article by Baiba Melnace: "Turlais Returns From NATO Northern Group Training"]

[Excerpt] Riga, 11 Feb—For the first time, the Baltic states, Poland, Russia, and all Scandinavian countries, which thus far do not belong to NATO, took part—on partnership rights—in NATO Northern Group staff training "Viking rewiev '94" in Norway. Latvia was represented in this training by the Commander of the Latvian Defense Forces, Dainis Turlais.

All three commanders from the Baltic states had a separate meeting with the chiefs of the Scandinavian Armed Forces. The most important was the meeting with the Danish high-level military persons, D. Turlais told DIENA. During the talks, a decision was made that Latvian officers would begin their training with Danish assistance as early as this month. A plan was worked out to prepare the Latvian officers for the joint Baltic peace battalion. The Scandinavian states have decided to create a council with the aim of coordinating military aid for the Baltic states.

As DIENA was told by Turlais, this year the training had a special meaning—how to create new relations between the northern states and the Baltic states in the framework of the Partnership for Peace program. The foreign minister of Norway made a forecast for the nearest future—Sweden and Finland would join the EC and later would become members of NATO. Subsequently, this would show the Baltic states the way to integrate in the group of the Scandinavian states and next also in NATO.

The mayor of St. Petersburg Anatoliy Sobchak Spoke against this very sharply and categorically. He described such cooperation as a threat to Russia, which absolutely cannot be permitted. [passage omitted]

Walesa Says Poland, Latvia Natural Allies

LD2402105094 Warsaw Third Program Radio Network in Polish 1000 GMT 24 Feb 94

[Text] A need for cooperation between Latvia and Poland—countries brought together both by their similar past and by common problems they face today—was emphasized by President Lech Walesa speaking in the forum of the Latvian parliament. According to the Polish president both countries are natural allies along the road to European integration.

Walesa emphasized that there were no historical burdens between the two countries. He recalled that the Polish government had never recognized Latvia's annexation by the Soviet Union, thanks to which Polish-Latvian relations could simply be resumed in the autumn of 1991.

The basis for good Polish-Latvian cooperation is the inter-state treaty signed in July 1992, but according to Walesa this needs to be filled with concrete substance. In his view there is need for direct contacts between people. The president stressed that Poles resident in Lithuania were our country's natural ambassador in Latvia. He expressed his satisfaction with the fact that the Latvian authorities have guaranteed the possibility of unrestricted development and preservation of national identity for the Polish minority.

Among others Walesa met were parliamentary chairman Anatolijs Gorbunovs. The schedule of the Polish president's visit to Riga calls for further meetings with the ministers of defense and of foreign affairs, and another meeting with President Guntis Ulmanis.

Gas Deliveries From Russia Canceled

WS2502154694 Riga DIENA in Latvian 12 Feb 94 p 1

[Article by Morris Posse: "Russia Dissolves Gas Delivery Agreement With Latvia"]

[Text] Riga, 11 Feb—The Russian joint stock company "Gazprom," without giving reasons, has dissolved the contract with the state joint stock company "Latvijas gaze" (LG) on natural gas deliveries for the current year, LG Vice President Girts Stelbovics informed journalists at a press conference organized by leading Latvian energy experts. Agreements have been dissolved also with Lithuania and Estonia. For the purpose of signing new agreements, a 14-member Russian delegation is scheduled to arrive in Latvia.

At the same time, the president of the state joint stock company "Latvenergo" Gunars Koemecs stated that the Riga municipal authorities have settled only 54 percent of their accounts for the consumed heat. His enterprise has not received payment for heating of apartments and for hot water amounting to 6 million lats. Due to the cold weather in February, the sum of the debts may increase by one third, Koemecs said.

G. Stelbovics also said that the main reason for the "Gazprom" action is the fact that LG owes 23 million USD to the Russian enterprise. The problem will be resolved during the next few days, because the Latvian Cabinet of Ministers has accepted the payment of this sum to LG, from the credit of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development.

Although the decision of the Cabinet states that the money is slated for necessary gas supplies in the summer, G. Stelbovics has told DIENA that the money will go toward covering the debt. The large debts of LG result from the fact that the debtors do not pay for the consumed gas—the total sum of debts on 1 February amounted to 49 million lats.

At least 80,000 USD will be necessary for purchasing gas in the summer. To receive such a sum, there are talks being conducted by different foreign commercial banks and other financial structures, DIENA was told by G. Stelbovics.

It seems alarming that such a numerous delegation is coming to Latvia, said the state minister of energetics, Andris Kreslins. The reasons might become known after the visit of the representatives of the state gas enterprises

of the three Baltic countries to Moscow in the next few days. It is also not known what the conditions and prices proposed by Russian representatives will be, and what effect they will have on Latvia's economy and people.

Presidential Aides 'Misread' Yeltsin Letter

LD2502180294 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1504 GMT 25 Feb 94

[From the "Diplomatic Panorama" feature]

[Text] The letter Russian President Boris Yeltsin sent to Latvian President Guntis Ulmanis was "misread" by the aides of the Latvian head of state and mass media, Aleksandr Udaltsov, who is in charge of relations with the Baltic countries in the Russian Foreign Ministry, told Interfax.

In his words, the Latvian interpretation of the letter is that the Russian president called on the Latvian leader to meet and iron out differences.

"Nothing can be farther from the truth. The letter is chiefly about the position of the Russian-speaking population in Latvia. It expressed Russia's serious concern over that," the diplomat said.

He explained that only in the beginning of the letter did the Russian president confirm his willingness to have a summit meeting to discuss a broad range of issues and sign agreements on troop withdrawal, social guarantees for Russian military pensioners and the functioning of the Skrunda radar station.

"The ironing out of formulations in international agreements is not the function of presidents. It is apparent from Yeltsin's letter that the summit is impossible unless negotiating teams agree on key provisions of bilateral documents," Udaltsov said.

Three Russian Servicemen Attacked in Riga

LD2502211294 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 2024 GMT 25 Feb 94

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Roman Zadunayskiy]

[Text] Moscow, 25 Feb—Three Russian Army servicemen were attacked in Riga today by unknown assailants and were taken to military hospital in a serious condition. An ITAR-TASS correspondent learned from military sources in the Latvian capital that the three servicemen on leave from the Riga garrison—a sergeant and two privates—were badly beaten up. Two of the servicemen have concussion and the one of the privates was stabbed in the abdomen.

The command of the Russian troops in the Baltics has appealed to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the republic to take measures to investigate the incident. Under Russian legislation, in this case the law-enforcement bodies of Latvia should launch criminal proceedings and carry out an investigation.

Official Supports Ukrainian Disarmament Process

LD2602144094 Riga Radio Riga Network in Latvian 2100 GMT 25 Feb 94

[Text] [Announcer] On Friday, at the Latvian Foreign Ministry, there was a press briefing about Latvia's developing relations with Israel and the Middle East, as well as Latvia's attitude to Ukraine's concepts of foreign policy. On 14 January this year in Moscow, the presidents of Ukraine, the United States, and Russia issued a statement that the problem of nuclear weapons located in Ukraine is for the whole world to solve. But on 3 February, Ukraine's Supreme Council adopted a resolution to accede to the Lisbon Protocol. The press secretary of the Latvian Foreign Ministry, Ivars (?Embrekts), pointed out:

[Begin Embrekts recording] The Foreign Ministry of the Republic of Latvia believes that such action by the president and Supreme Council of Ukraine demonstrates to the world community Ukraine's goodwill and serious intention to promote the disarmament process, and that it is a significant investment in ensuring peace and world security. We hold in high esteem Ukraine's stance in the sphere of nuclear disarmament, and (?in wishing to regard) Ukraine as a (?powerful) and friendly country, Latvia supports the view of the Ukrainian president, that in our modern world a country's security is dependent not only, and not even so much, on its military potential, as on the successful development of its economy. Latvia (?believes in) Ukraine's state consolidation and economic prosperity. The Foreign Ministry has the conviction that the position of the Ukrainian president and Supreme Council on the issue of nuclear disarmament will not only strengthen peace and international security, but will also assist Ukraine to overcome its economic and internal policy difficulties. [end recording]

Lithuania

President on Need for Professional Government, Income Declaration

WS2502145094 Vilnius TIESA in Lithuanian 15 Feb 94 No. 31 pp 1, 3

[Interview with President Algirdas Brazauskas by Aldona Svirbutaviciute in Vilnius on 9 February: "President—Already or Only a Year?..."; first paragraph is TIESA introduction]

[Excerpts] [passage omitted] [Svirbutaviciute] A year after the presidential elections on 9 February, I asked President A. Brazauskas how he would today reply to the question as to what path Lithuania has chosen and what course it will continue to follow.

[Brazauskas] This will be the continuation of the course that Lithuania followed last year. We are conducting reforms and trying to make well-considered moves. One must always see our weaknesses and losses. I pose very many requirements to the executive power, because state management is difficult. These issues are difficult to resolve, although some people used to think differently in the past. It does not matter what people will be in power in the future. The important thing is that the state must be run by professionals. Decisions of the executive power, their quality and rate of adoption—this is what the authorities must care about. Recently, there has been much talk about government officials. I have become strongly convinced that we must not only speak about them but also create a basis for the adoption of government decisions. I am speaking about the activities and the quality of the executive power. I do not maintain, however, that we must replace the latter and elect a new one. I am for the stability of the government and its institutions. If one cannot perform one's duties well today but wants to learn this, he or she must receive support. I see from many facts that we are unable to do many things, but we are willing to learn. My goal is to achieve considerable improvement in this sphere in 1994. I want us to adopt the law on government officials and other indispensable acts, impart responsibility, and define the functions of ministries and departments. [passage omitted]

[Svirbutaviciute] The president, as number-one person in Lithuania, is often observed as if through a magnifying glass. This observation started long before the Seimas and, particularly, the presidential elections. It has continued until now. How have you managed to reconcile this, and how do you assess the reprimands concerning the rejected draft law on the declaration of property and income of government officials and employees?

[Brazauskas] By using the right of legislation, the president's office is currently drafting a new law. We intend to promulgate it. This law must correspond to the spirit of the Lithuanian Constitution. One cannot single out one group of persons, think that they are "swindlers," and prepare the law specially for them. This is not the case in the world. We are drafting it based on the experience of the world where the declaration of property is commonplace. I have always said that I will be the first to declare my property and income. I suppose that the Lithuanian Democratic Labor Party faction in the Seimas [parliament] did not adhere to its principles in voting for this law. Such a law cannot exist. The concept of family is particularly confused there. It follows from this law that both my parents and my children, who have not lived with me for more than 15 years already and who have their own families, are accountable for my property. It is paradoxical that even minor children must declare their assets: The pants that a mother buys for her son will have to be declared. The majority of those who accuse me most blatantly for rejecting this law have never read it. For example, during my visit to Klaipeda I asked the people there whether they had read it, and the reply was negative. So why are they accusing me? All people must declare their property and income. This is not easy and cannot be achieved immediately. Let us adopt this law by stages and steps. The president, the government, and Seimas deputies must declare their income in the first place, and later be followed by others. This law is not an instrument for catching crooks. The target of such laws throughout the world is to collect taxes from citizens which they owe the state. That is why I vetoed this draft law. [passage omitted]

Nuclear Agency Head: No Need To Stop Ignalina Reactor

WS2502210794 Vilnius ELTA in English 1920 GMT 25 Feb 94

[From "News Bulletin" No. 445]

[Text] Vilnius, Feb 25, ELTA—"There is no necessity to stop the second reactor of Ignalina nuclear plant", Povilas Vaisnys, head of Lithuania's State Nuclear Agency Inspectorate VATESI, told ELTA.

"If Lithuania had troubles to get electricity from other sources, the reactor would not be stopped", he said.

A little amount of steam can leak because of bad sealed measurers of flow in the technological channel. It does not hinder safe exploitation of the reactor at all, Vaisnys said.

Anyway, the reactor is to be stopped on Friday, 9.00 p.m. Vaisnys said there was a need to know the reasons even of such a little radioactive leak.

He mentioned one more reason of the stoppage - the first reactor is due to be stopped next month for routine repairs and "we need to be sure the second reactor operates without problems".